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I  Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.1  Video? Video Media? Videography? 
 
“the dominant cultural form of the twentieth century is, and has been, cinema, and 
now video. Only modernist formulations argue that we inhabit a print culture. We 
live instead in a video, cinematic age, where the cinematic apparatus intervenes 
between the material world and everyday, lived experience” (Norman Denzin) 
 
Today, video media has become an ubiquitous part of our lives through 
cinema, TV, documentaries (of various forms) and visual art. Yet, facilitated 
by digitization, the widespread proliferation and accessibility of information 
over the Internet seems to mark the most profound changes in how we 
acquire, view, and experience video media thus expressing and producing 
culture. From the perspective of videography in consumer culture theory 
(CCT – see Arnould and Thompson [2005; 2007] for a comprehensive 
overview) research, it is this relationship I set out to address. Specifically, a 
possibility for an ontology and epistemology for conducting and publishing 
research on video media warrants interest. While such a philosophical 
account of Essence(s) in video work in consumer research calls for 
establishment, there is also a need to further consider issues about the 
production of such work on a workbench level.  
Conducting and representing academic research by utilizing videographic 
methodologies is by no means a novel approach. Various streams have 
explored the medium since the early 20th century, far before digitalization or 
the advent of the video format (e.g. Russell 1999; Ruby 2000; Pink 2001, 
2006). Also, visual expression on film and video has long been debated in the 
domain of visual arts (e.g. Cubitt 1993; Jenkins 2008; Leighton 2008). 
Today, we also have the possibility to consider examples also from the fields 
of usability design (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991; Ylirisku and Buur 2007), 
documentary production (e.g. Bernard 2007; Artis 2008), business-to-
business marketing (Borghini, Carù and Cova 2010) and importantly, 
consumer research (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; 
Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). In 
the realm of consumer research, specifically in the subfield of CCT, the 
videographic method has been recently growing in popularity in a rapid 
fashion (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 2010). 
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In addition to academic journal articles, the most notable evidence of the 
increasing adoption of video in consumer research has been its growing 
presence in the conferences of the Association for Consumer Research (ACR), 
with Russell Belk and Robert Kozinets heralding the annual ‘Film Festivals’ in 
the previous decade at the North American conference (Belk and Kozinets 
2005b). The passing years have witnessed the tradition becoming also 
adopted by the European, South American and Asian conference venues (Belk 
and Kozinets 2010). Furthermore, the journal Consumption, Markets & 
Culture has come out with two special ‘DVD issues’ (see Appendix 2 for a 
table of the publications in the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]), 
dedicated to videographic publications. Yet, even with such early proliferation 
of academic video work, a plethora of questions about ontology, epistemology 
and methodology of videographic research await further consideration. And 
while this growing interest in the videographic method can certainly inspire, 
and in and of its own, provide a mandate for this study, a degree of humility is 
needed when we orientate towards the considerable amount of work that 
waits to be conducted. In this study some early accounts are developed 
further and a few novel ones are provided. 
An initial driving force for this study emerged from a seminar in 2008, 
where I presented some early video work. Surprisingly, the mere notion of 
academic research as videography sparked a wholesale controversy in the 
audience, even as I had barely pushed open the starting gates in the 
discussion. The primary concerns of the audience can be paraphrased as 
follows: 
 
• “Videography can’t be serious academic work, it is in the realm of art 
and entertainment!” 
 
• “You can surely manipulate your audience as much as you want in 
video representation!” 
 
• “There is no way to find rigorous methods for representing academic 
studies on video media!” 
 
In this study, a thorough consideration of these concerns (and many others) 
is pursued. From the outset it is clear that all of them are inherently linked to 
more complex questions about the ontological and epistemological nature of 
the medium (in CCT, for the present purposes), which has, apart from the few 
publications, still received relatively little interest. It seems that the various 
fields of academic videographic research, no matter how long they have been 
experimenting with video, have been more interested in experimentation 
than conceptual work on the nature of the medium. Additionally, this 
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experimentation has been generally contained within the respective fields 
with very little cross-pollination. 
Certainly, the dichotomy of art/science is a pressing one, but as we will soon 
see, contemporary videographers who have come to understand the 
requirements of reflexive research from a postmodern/poststructural 
perspective can offer ways to respond to this concern. Considering the 
question of manipulation naturally refers to the need to understand the 
differences between the ontology and epistemology of video and the 
dominant paradigm of textual academic expression. The final concern is a 
normative one. What kinds of methods would we like to expect in conducting 
good videographic work, without limiting the opportunities for creativity, 
reflexivity and expression? To date, no specific criteria exist. And more 
importantly, should/could such criteria exist?  
This directs the present work toward two avenues of inquiry. First, the 
discussion about possible ontological and epistemological underpinnings of 
the videographic method in CCT is furthered – what is it about doing research 
on video that warrants interest? Second, we need an account of the normative 
side of videographic work – how should it be conducted and to what ends? 
These questions are naturally greatly intertwined. 
To approach these questions, the extant usage of the video media across 
various fields of inquiry is briefly assessed. Subsequently, video media is 
further conceptualized in the field of CCT. These early explorations have led 
this work into considering the philosophical underpinnings of the nature of 
human interaction in spatiotemporal settings and their expression across 
different media. Moreover, both the aesthetic form of audiovisual moving 
image and how it is experienced seemed to require extensive consideration. 
Additionally, the practice of conducting and representing videographic 
research within more established academic discourses, and importantly, its 
pragmatic purpose in academia called for close scrutiny. These 
contemplations are exemplified through three large-scale ethnographic 
videography projects that were conducted by my research fellows and myself 
(Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010; Hietanen and Uotila 2012; Hietanen, 
Rokka and Roman 2012). 
I will make continuous references to these videographies throughout this 
study. A textual synopsis of those videographies is provided in the sections 
4.2, 4.3 and 4.4. The goal is not to seek validation of my epistemological 
positions, but rather to illustrate their possibilities. The videographies can be 
found online as follows: 
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Hietanen, Rokka and Roman (2012), ‘Pushing the Scene’ – Tensions and 
Emergence in an Accelerated Marketplace Culture 
•   http://vimeo.com/32192229 - Hereafter abbreviated ‘PTS’. 
 
Hietanen and Uotila (2012), ‘Post-Materialist Work’ – Dreams as Fetishes 
•   http://vimeo.com/30893212 - Hereafter abbreviated ‘PMW’. 
 
Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck (2009), ‘Brothers in Paint’ – A Practice-
Oriented Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture 
•   http://vimeo.com/36543163 - Hereafter abbreviated ‘BIP’. 
 
The insights from the field, the editing table, video/paper submissions, and 
attending numerous conferences to showcase and discuss videographic 
research act as a pragmatic sounding board against which to construct and 
evaluate the present philosophical reasoning and practical ideas for 
production. 
The goal of this research is to provide perspectives to one over-arching 
research question, what is so special about academic research conducted by 
videographic methodology? Due to the relative novelty of the methodology in 
the CCT tradition, this grand question becomes quickly filtered into a set of 
more specific subquestions. These questions range from the specific character 
of video as a media, its epistemological nature, its role in CCT, the nature of 
the research team and the nature of the audience. These questions will be 
addressed in turn. 
While this study utilizes three published videographies as illustrative 
examples, it is not about them. Instead, I will attempt to construct a possible 
ontology and epistemology of videographic work in CCT – in effect 
conducting an inquiry that is steeped in the philosophical rather than the 
empirical. I began this work by familiarizing myself with CCT publications 
that have to do with videography and the critique(s) of representation. This 
postmodern reading directed me to a Deleuzean philosophy of 
cinematography and furthermore to various scholars utilizing a Deleuzian 
underpinning in their analysis of the embodiment of the moving image and 
the contextual production of representation and emergent relations. In 
addition, in somewhat of a bricoleur ‘quilt-making’ fashion (see e.g. Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005), I have gone over a gamut of works by other scholars that 
make claims about the moving image in line with much contemporary 
continental postmodern/poststructuralist philosophy. This is accompanied 
with a visitation to other academic discourses utilizing the moving image in 
their research activities. Through these readings, an image of the potential of 
the video medium began to coalesce – one that I am sharing with you as we 
go through these lines. This is thus not a typical marketing/consumer 
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research study, it comprises not of ‘rigorous’ research, but rather it is one of 
conceptual investigation. 
In this study, the terms video and video media are used interchangeably. 
They express the medium of the video and refer to its digital nature, and with 
it, its (online) accessibility and simultaneous democratization. Video is not to 
be confused with film, which refers to its predecessor, a projector light shined 
through moving still images creating an illusion of the moving image. 
Videography refers to the entire methodology of the production of an 
expression via moving image, but it also means the finished product of the 
videographic work. This is no mistake. Videography in consumer research is 
to be taken as a holistic concept, as the production, the practice, and the 
dissemination of academic video work, and is, as a hermeneutic endeavor, 
inseparable from the finished product – the show. Likewise, two 
conceptualizations need to be introduced here. In my use of the term ‘moving 
image’ I mean to express the contemporary form of an image set in 
movement accompanied with sound – the ‘audiovisual moving image’. While 
I am well aware of the silent cinema of yore, this research will not make many 
references to this form – when they are made I will attempt to make the 
distinction explicit. Additionally, the reader may note, that unlike several 
works describing the epistemology of text, photography, moving image or 
sound, I will be very hesitant to use concepts like ‘representation’ or 
‘reproduction’ in my subsequent analysis. Instead, following a Deleuzian 
reading by Massumi (2002), I will generally adopt the term ‘expression’ for 
my purposes, where the concept is distinguished from the realist perspective 
of representation, which assumes an external world and possible objective 
descriptions of it. Here expression is not about the world but constitutive of 
it. Thus, expression is always a part of the world’s creation, not a description 
of it as any given static state, or as stated by Massumi (2002): 
 
“The subject does not express the system. It is an expression of the system. The 
system expresses itself in its subjects’ every ‘chosen’ deed and mystified word” (p. 
xvi). “Expression is always on the move, always engrossed in its own course, 
overspilling individual experience, nomadically evading responsibility. It is self-
transporting, serially across experiences” (p. xxi) 
 
I hope the reasons for this will become clear in the course of reading this 
work, but particularly in the sections dealing with the concept 
‘representation’ (see 2.4.4). 
This introductory section to this doctoral study is further structured as 
follows. Next, a brief overview of extant academic streams that have displayed 
interest in the videographic method is presented. This account is necessarily a 
concise one, and attempts to raise very basic but pertinent issues in each of 
the literary streams. Also, I will suggest possible overlappings to draw from 
when the discussion later moves to focus specifically to videographic research 
in the tradition of CCT. Then, an introduction to ontological/epistemological 
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considerations of possible Essence(s) of videographic research is provided. 
Finally, the introductory section of this study will conclude by briefly 
outlining the subsequent chapter on Production (see IV) of conducting 
videographic research in the CCT tradition.  
 
 
1.2  An Introduction to Extant Streams of Videographic Inquiry 
 
In order to approach the goal of providing a philosophical and practical 
account of videographic work in CCT research, an exploration of 
videography-related extant academic discourses must be carried out first to 
establish some initial grounds for interdisciplinary perspectives. Following 
this, I will present a brief background investigation of the diverse CCT 
discourse(s) in consumer research and an overview of the videographic 
research under the CCT rubric. A focus will be put on the annual Association 
for Consumer Research Conference (ACR) ‘Film Festival’ events and the two 
published DVD issues of Consumption, Markets & Culture (see Appendix 2 
for a table of the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]) in order to uncover 
the current state and prevalent methodological approaches of the field. 
Within this context, also the three videographies (Rokka, Hietanen and De 
Valck 2010; Hietanen, Rokka, Roman 2012; Hietanen and Uotila 2012) by the 
author will be introduced. All of these works can be found online as noted 
above, and they can also be accessed via our blog that reports on our 
videographic projects (see http://insidevideography.com). 
Regarding other discourses on visual media, a cornucopia of fields that 
attempt to make sense of film and video from numerous perspectives exists. 
The following albeit necessarily brief exploration is intended to highlight 
these fields 1) basic epistemological and ontological positions, 2) 
development through time, and 3) the nature of ‘good’ videographic practice 
within each stream.  
 
1.2.1  Visual Anthropology 
 
In terms of research utilizing the moving image, the field of visual 
anthropology certainly has the longest lineage. Ever since Robert Flaherty’s 
1922 seminal film Nanook of the North describing the everyday struggle of 
the Inuit, scholars in the field of visual anthropology have concentrated 
filming exotic (and often deteriorating) cultures (Ruby 2000). However, and 
perhaps due to this lengthy heritage in the moving picture, the visual 
anthropologists are still struggling to emerge from persistent past 
assumptions. The fascination of the exotic (the ‘otherness’) has become 
widely criticized by contemporary scholars for being extensively ethnocentric 
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and naively realist in its underpinnings (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; 
Harper 1988; Ruby 2000; Pink 2006). This paradigm was initially questioned 
by Geertz’s (1973) seminal work that embraced a constructivist ontology. 
Thus, through a debate called the “crisis of representation” (Ruby 2000: 30; 
see also Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Van Maanen 
1995; Brown 1998b; Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005) has spurred 
the reconsideration of the realist perspective (understanding the moving 
image as capturing and representing the ‘truth’) and a call for interpretive 
frameworks and reflexivity (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and 
Fischer 1986; see also Ruby 2000; Brownlie 2006; Pink 2006; Santiago-
Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). This highlights an ontological shift from an ethos 
of distant observation to emphasize the relationship “between (ethnographic) 
anthropologist and the subject” (Pink 2006: 67). Even while more recent 
work is quick to note that the controversy is still present, this debate has 
spurred new thoughts about the nature of the phenomenon under inquiry 
warranting new types of epistemic interests for the visual anthropologists 
(Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007). This has been marked by growing 
attention in focusing on meaningful stories, situating research in local 
cultures, and a diminishing interest to observe the exotic ‘other’ (Ruby 2000). 
For the purposes of this study, the contemporary interest in reflexivity and 
local cultural practices are helpful, when the ethnographic procedure of 
videography is scrutinized from the CCT perspective. However, CCT scholars 
do seem to have the advantage due to the absence of some of the realist 
burden, as the philosophical foundation in their field was inherently 
interpretative (although it does have its share of lingering positivistic 
undertones, see 2.3.4). 
 
1.2.2  Art and Visual Culture 
 
Art and the moving image have also had a turbulent relationship, with the 
early art installations using film media adopting, and thereafter following the 
modernist tradition of “bringing with it nothing from life” (Bell 1914, cited in 
Appignasi and Garratt 2007: 25; see also Cubitt 1993). Modernism thus put 
all emphasis on form and the media, generating differences for the sake of the 
form and the media themselves (Cubitt 1993: 28). This dehumanized 
aesthetic focus thus developed as a driver of aesthetic culture, not the pursuit 
of explaining or commenting on it directly. Videographic art, originating with 
the Dadaist ‘Fluxus’ movement in the ‘60’s, began to criticize the elitism and 
formalization of modernist art (Leighton 2008), in order to, as stated in the 
1963 manifesto by Maciunas, to “Promote living art, anti-art, promote NON 
ART REALITY to be fully grasped by all peoples, not only critics, dilettantes 
and professionals”. Thus, through many streams, vidographic art escaped the 
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museums and began to embrace contextual installations and societal critique 
(Cubitt 1993: 38; see also Leighton 2008). 
In terms of this study, the prevailing ethos of reflexive expression of the 
later visual arts tradition can be embraced. However, the modernist 
logocentric preference of ‘finding an originary form’ over cultural pluralism 
may need to be reversed. It seems that for videographic accounts in CCT, 
instead of emphasizing the modernist quest to experiment on the media for 
its own sake, the importance of the medium must be better understood so it 
can be then moved into the background while elevating the rich expression of 
the cultural practices in social contexts. Yet, this ‘backgrounding’ can be 
negotiated only after we can claim to have considerable traction in the 
problematics of knowledge production on video. At present, videography 
practitioners in the CCT field seem to share certain liminality with modernist 
underpinnings by focusing much of the extant debate around the video 
medium itself, even as they assign their interest in marketplaces cultures and 
consumption practices through postmodern frameworks (e.g. Brown 1993; 
Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006). There is merit 
in this, however, as to not experiment is certainly to not discover what can be 
achieved regarding the medium itself. Yet, as we will soon see more 
thoroughly, from an interpretive CCT perspective we cannot settle on an 
originary form or ‘truth’ waiting to be uncovered through research 
approaches and rhetoric efforts. Is it not the voice(s) emanating from the 
social practices and spatiotemporal contexts themselves that are to validate 
video as a medium of inquiry? Certainly we can utilize reflexivity regarding 
both form and expression. 
 
1.2.3  Videography in Managerial and Usability Studies 
 
Video ethnography has also received growing interest recently in industrial 
marketing and product design contexts, with scholars promoting research 
from an interpretive perspective in B2B marketing by utilizing video 
ethnography (Borghini, Carù and Cova 2010). Unlike CCT scholars, however, 
the industry ethnographers tend to underplay the role of holistic 
understanding and the need for empathy in the interpretation process (e.g. 
Ellingson 1998; Richardson 2000; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and 
Cayla 2006; see also Goodall 2000), as they display a preference in the 
descriptive rather than holistic. While an interest in social practices 
surrounding technological phenomena (Greenbaum and Kyng 1991) or the 
need for interpretative work (Ylirisku and Buur 2007) is recognized, the 
approach of ethnographers in industry contexts is thoroughly rooted in 
research designs involving descriptive ‘thin ethnographies’ (Ylirisku and Buur 
2007: 19; see also Sperschneider and Bagger 2003) and brief in situ 
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ethnographic work (Meyer 1982; Rinallo, Borghini, Golfetto 2010; Visconti 
2010). 
It seems from the outset that if videographic research is to follow the recent 
developments in CCT, it needs to be considered ontologically and 
epistemologically to become actualized as something deeper than descriptive 
work only. In addition, particular attention needs to be paid on the 
importance of reflexivity, empathy and rich contextual data in order to create 
convincing representations of cultural practices, as we will soon see. Thus, the 
‘lighter’ approaches of the videographers interested in managerial and 
usability research need to be addressed and reconsidered.  
 
 
1.3  A Preface to ‘An Account of Essence(s)’ 
 
The briefly outlined research streams that have shared various degrees of 
interest in the videographic methodology have yet to formalize video as a 
method. One of the most obvious problems for conducting such work has 
been the relative lack of debate about the philosophical underpinnings of the 
video medium itself as a methodology and a research practice. From an 
interpretivist standpoint, it would seem that the CCT tradition would be well 
suited for these ontological conversations, as this tradition can draw from its 
contemporary reflexive ontological and epistemological underpinnings. 
Fortunately, many contemporary CCT researchers seem to carry less of the 
naïve realist’s baggage, which still seems to riddle many of the visual 
anthropologists’ positions. In addition, the epistemological project for an 
academic account must be different from the (perhaps already passé) 
modernist’s position of videography art, and finally the usability designer’s 
position, where the need to engage into philosophical discussion is less 
obvious, as their epistemological goals appear to be more utilitarian. 
Indeed, CCT scholars seem to be methodologically at a stage that bears 
some resemblance to the modernist endeavor in video art in both conducting 
and expressing videographic studies in CCT research. Here I do not wish to 
imply that a ‘positivist’ claim is present, but rather, that as research on the 
video format is still in its infancy, most discussions have hovered on 
considering what would constitute a good videography technically and 
representationally. It reflects, indeed, anxiety about the underpinning 
possibilities of various epistemologies in videographic research. And indeed, 
the questions themselves may seem taunting: 
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• What does it mean to express research on video? 
 
• What does it mean to experience it? 
 
• Therefore, what types of expressive efforts is it good for (both in and of 
itself and contra the textual paradigm of academic writing)? 
 
As much experimentation can be conducted as felt necessary and interesting, 
but to avoid only conducting implicit ontological and epistemological takes on 
videographic research, there is an opening for further discussion about these 
issues. Therefore, let us move on to shed tentative light on the subject with an 
account of the Essence(s) of the videographic method in CCT. Perhaps a 
subsequent lengthy debate can be sparked, which could inform the CCT video 
researchers about some guidelines (albeit not restricting ones) on how to 
conduct convincing videographic research. At present, only few accounts exist 
on how such work should be methodologically pursued (Belk and Kozinets 
2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006), as most academic writing on videographic 
methodology has been predominantly focused on providing descriptive 
accounts of the field and its promise (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; De Valck, 
Rokka and Hietanen 2009; Belk 2011). Yet, this research has noted that 
attempting to merely convert the orders and style of text-based publications 
risks losing much of the video medium’s potential. To provide some initial 
guidelines, Belk and Kozinets (2006) have presented their criteria for 
evaluating videographic submissions in the ACR ‘Film Festivals’. They are the 
1) topical, 2) theoretical, 3) theatricality and 4) technicality criteria of the 
research work (see 2.3.6). Such criteria, while practical and helpful, say very 
little about what is in this media that allows for certain types of expressions of 
research activities. Thereafter, it follows that we should inquire what is it 
about consumer research phenomena that should be expressed. It is time to 
add to these criteria, as they were, indeed, brought about to constitute a point 
of departure and inspiration (Kozinets and Belk 2006). Thus, there is a need 
for a novel perspective – an exploration of an account of Essence(s). In doing 
so, the following questions need to be addressed: 
 
• What is it about vidoegraphy (as a methodology, form of 
representation, expression etc.) that can be conceptualized to allow for 
something different from text? 
 
• What is it about human interaction that we wish to express on video 
media? 
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To shed light on these questions, to date left open by the mystification of the 
nature of the medium, a philosophical discussion about potential Essence(s) 
of the video media is constructed in the following chapters. In this study, such 
construction work is launched from the domain of the considerably abstract 
and metaphysical. I will adopt many notions from Deleuze’s philosophy of the 
sense (1990/1969) and representation (1994a/1968) as a point of departure 
and a perspective of what it is in human interaction we could attempt to 
express in videographic research. The views of Deleuze are fittingly built upon 
by Thrift’s (2008) theory of non-representation, which gives the 
spatial/material and emergence and predominance (or at least equal agency) 
over the rational(ized). Thrift can further be compared and contrasted to the 
practice theoretical accounts of Schatzki (Schatzki 1996; Schatzki, Knorr-
Cetina and Von Savigny 2001; see also Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005). 
After these philosophical considerations, Deleuze becomes reestablished via 
his philosophical work on cinema (Deleuze 1986/1983, 1989/1985) that 
builds on the established notions of space, embodiment and the potential of 
emancipating the creative mind. 
In conclusion, the challenging nature of expressing videographic studies to 
various audiences is considered. This section will sum up some of the 
implications of our philosophical project. Here one of the initial questions for 
this research is reexamined, as in what does it mean to experience academic 
research on video media, and how is this form of expression fundamentally 
different to the textual form which remains the dominant paradigm for 
representing academic research? What are the politics of the tensions 
between different mediums? While videography is not set up to ‘compete’ 
with or ‘denounce’ textual representation, the very nature of the medium and 
the research practice needs to be considered. As Cubitt notes: “the 
linguistically-inspired semiotic criticism that has proved so productive in the 
last 20 years needs to be curbed in its ambition to see the world well lost in 
favor of textuality without end” (Cubitt 1993: 13). Thus the differences 
between these media must be highlighted. 
Finally, a need to consider wider audiences exists. Videography can be seen 
as a vehicle for popularizing academic research by making it accessible to the 
general audience over the Internet. This argument enables the questioning of 
both the forma of academic research, and the institutions that guard the 
access to it. Through eclectic use of multimedia applications, blogs and 
Internet video, popularization of academic work could also become an 
exercise of tempered ‘anarchy’ against journal institutions, which potentially 
offer decreasing access to information in the age of digital democratization. 
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1.4  A Preface to ‘Production’ 
 
After exploring the possibilities for more philosophically detailed 
underpinnings for videographic research, I will scrutinize the actual practice 
of conducting and expressing videographic research in the CCT tradition. To 
do so, a framework is presented for understanding the various levels of 
expressive approaches and the subjective (and hermeneutically emergent) 
nature of each of these levels. These are the 1) social phenomena under 
inquiry (social practices and spatiotemporal settings), 2) the research group 
and 3) the audience(s) to whom the research is shown. 
In doing interpretive research with ethnographic methods, each threshold 
of expression between these ‘audiences’ accounts for an interpretative liminal 
space. With a holistic approach to ethnography that achieves its reflexive and 
empathic purposes as understood in the contemporary literature (e.g. 
Ellingson 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see 
also Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000; Brownlie 2006) these levels have the 
potential to reduce the realist ‘otherness’ between the audiences – something 
that can hinder the opportunities for empathic understanding. To mitigate 
this threat for audiovisual experiences and expressions of the moving image, 
a novel approach to videographic research team building is proposed to allow 
for pluralistic voices and shared research experiences. This approach will 
further blur the notion of distinctions between the social phenomena 
(emic/etic) under inquiry on one hand and the research group on the other by 
building a foundation for research group heterogeneity. It will also facilitate 
high levels of access into the social phenomenon, a challenge particularly 
relevant for videographers. 
Additional considerations are given about the form of videographic studies 
in consumer research, specifically from a CCT perspective. What should their 
structure be? What is the role of theory? How should practical challenges 
such as the ‘talking head’ and ‘voice-of-god’ expressions be answered? What 
possibilities can viewer interactivity solutions now increasingly offered by 
online video sites give to videographers? 
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II  An Account of Essence(s) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.1  What Could a Medium Like Video be Like? 
 
“[Words] can explain in detail, for example, the living conditions of the 
hummingbird, but actually seeing the hummingbird active, hearing the buzz of its 
wings are experiences and insights that cannot be replicated by words” (Fuat Firat) 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to begin the work of constructing an ontology 
and epistemology of academic videography in consumer research, specifically 
within the discourse of consumer culture theory or CCT for short (Arnould 
and Thompson 2005, 2007). Video as a way of empirical data gathering and 
videography as a form of presenting and expressing academic research have 
been, along with photography (e.g. Peñaloza and Cayla 2006), gaining ground 
during the last two decades in the field of consumer research. This has 
especially been the case within the CCT discourse that emanates from 
constructionist ontologies that have tended to emphasize an interpretivistic 
understanding of culturally embedded consumption phenomena. Video as 
both a form of data gathering and as a presentation has been seen as a 
‘different’ medium (e.g. contra textual presentation) due to its capability, for 
instance, to record the body language, proxemics, kinesics and expressions 
(Belk and Kozinets 2005a), being more emotional and ‘resonant’ and grab 
attention (Sherry and Schouten 2002; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009), 
being in some sense more ‘real’ (Spanjaard and Freeman 2007), being able to 
better record the “bright and noisy” (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335) nature of 
consumption phenomena, to be able to “capture the context-rich 
environment” (Smith, Fischer and Cole 2007: 89), having a “glimmer of the 
gem” (Sunderland 2006: 378) and having “tremendous possibilities to 
enlighten, expose, analyze entertain, stimulate, and critique more effectively 
than other types of conference presentations” (Belk and Kozinets 2004: 6). 
This short list claims something interesting; there must be something very 
special about video! Yet, what all the aforementioned descriptions have not 
systematically uncovered is what this something special really is in a more 
philosophical sense. Currently we have an implicit metaphysical approach to 
video – we know there is something particular and peculiar about it, but, to 
date, we have not seen an in-depth journey to get to the bottom of those 
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matters followed by an effort to construct a potential framework (certainly 
only one of many) of what can lie behind this veil of ambiguity. 
Thus, in a sense, academic work on the video medium in consumer research 
lacks ontology. Certainly, most works accept the general ontological 
constructivist position of CCT, but there is a need to focus specifically on the 
video medium from a philosophical perspective. The goal of this study is to 
tentatively initiate such an endeavor from my perspective. It is my wish that 
this early work will be followed by many more. 
Due to the nascence of the field this is by no means a simple task, as to date 
there is still little to draw on in terms of why and what types of videographic 
inquiry constitute a ‘good’ approach in certain research contexts (and in 
which it would not). Likewise, the criteria for assessing the merit of 
videographic research in CCT remain at a groundwork level, and as we will 
further see, perhaps all for the better. To my knowledge, the only criteria 
available are the 1) topical criterion, the 2) theoretical criterion, the 3) 
theatricality criterion and the 4) technicality criterion (Kozinets and Belk 
2006). While establishing a preliminary normative baseline, these provide 
little assistance in understanding how each specific criterion should be 
interpreted. Thus we need an ontology of the video itself in academic research 
from which such interpretations (certainly a diverse array) could discover 
resources from. Through such efforts, we can then attempt to problematize 
and develop a tentative approach to epistemic pursuits with the video media. 
Yet, this chapter on the Essence(s) of video in CCT is by no means only 
philosophical. During the course of the work on this study I have been closely 
involved with three videography research projects (see 1.1 for an overview and 
the url addresses to these videos on Vimeo). The first videography, Brothers 
in Paint: Practice-Oriented Inquiry into a Tribal Marketplace Culture (BIP) 
was conducted in collaboration with Joonas Rokka (Aalto University, 
Helsinki) and Christine De Valck (HEC, Paris), and constitutes a practice 
theoretical account of the ‘tribal’ consumption culture of tournament 
paintball enthusiasts. BIP won the ‘Juror’s Prize’ in the 2009 Advances for 
Consumer Research conference (ACR) in Pittsburgh. The second 
videography, Pushing the Scene: Tensions and Emergence in an Accelerated 
Marketplace Culture (PTS) was conducted in collaboration with Joonas 
Rokka (now Rouen Business School) and Risto Roman (Helsinki University), 
and also utilized practice theoretical approaches in understanding the 
tensions between commercialization and authenticity from a cultural 
producer’s perspective in the ‘accelerated’ electronic music genre of ‘dubstep’. 
PTS recently won the (curiously renamed) ‘Judge’s Prize’ in the 2011 ACR 
conference in St. Louis. The third videography (also a contender at ACR 
2011), Post-Materialist Work: Dreams as Fetishes (PMW) was conducted in 
collaboration with Hannu Uotila (Aalto University, Helsinki), and provides a 
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critical account of how vocational dreams of freedom and free creative 
expression become an unattainable fetish in the capitalist marketplace 
system. In the course of constructing a philosophical underpinning I will 
utilize my experiences in these productions to strengthen the philosophical 
arguments and to provide a bridge between practical accounts and the more 
abstract positions. 
One more founding question warrants a mention here. When conducting 
videographic inquiry, the first question should always be “Why video?” That 
is, “What does the production and expression of research on the video 
medium add that one would not be able to express similarly via textual (or 
other) methods?” This question should become the “So what?” question often 
presented in conferences to clarify the contributions of presented research. 
 
 
2.2  Levels of Analysis: Video as Method 
 
“But how hard I find it to see what is right in front of my eyes” (Ludwig Wittgenstein) 
 
2.2.1  What Is the Video Media? 
 
In this section it is my aim to move forward in conceptualizing the nature of 
the video medium in CCT. This level of analysis is closely tied with both the 
technical nature of the medium and what it is that it can selectively record 
from a ‘reality’ out there. Thus, what is it that a medium like video can 
express? Further on, I will explore the question of video media specifically as 
it relates to text, or textual expression. 
Here it is of importance to conceptualize some of our most basic terms, 
namely the ones used interchangeably in a variety of my sources. In this 
study, the term video is constructed to mean of the digital video format. 
However, the medium of video media in itself seems notoriously difficult to 
define comprehensively (Cubitt 1993; see also Deleuze 1986/1983). This 
problematic can be broken down into several subquestions regarding the 
medium itself. The first issue resides at a technical level. Video media cannot 
be conceptualized as a ‘thing’ in a static state, but in a continuous 
transformation with respect to technical development that both manifests 
and drives it, or being “Embedded in interactive multimedia, as it 
increasingly is, video becomes an even more active medium” (Lemke 2007: 
40). 
Video can thus be any electronically recorded and mediated clip that has the 
potential to express visual and audible presentations. These presentations, 
however, have a great deal to do with the particular medium used to express 
them (TV, computer, portable devices etc.) and the medium where they are 
stored (DVDs, flash drives, solid state drives and ‘cloud’ storage). Thus, the 
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concept of video is often used to denote any piece of video footage irrespective 
the nature of its potential viewing or storage. Therefore, video, in term of 
academic research, is commonly used to signify raw and unedited (and too 
often ephemeral) empirical data. Film is profoundly distinct medium as 
compared to video, even if often seen in the literature as interchangeable 
concepts. Film is an analog and physical medium – reels of separate static 
images that, when put into movement at a specified speed, create the illusion 
of movement. But as Cubitt (1993) states, “the film strip has always actually 
been where the work of marking/exposing it took place; there has been some 
physical contact between it and some kind of outside reality (the light through 
the lens, the hands of the artisan). Video isn’t like that” (p. xi-xii). This is not 
to say light is not used in the process, but what becomes recorded through the 
process of digitalization can be argued to be technically as much abstracted 
from (any type of) reality as a visually represented image of an atom – the 
process of abstraction of ‘reality’ into binary ones and zeros which can be 
recorded as such onto magnetic storage devices, and later reincarnated with 
electronic impulses to reproduce an illusion of what was recorded – an 
illusion we as humans can perceive to simulate what was seen through the 
lens at the time of recording. The video medium has technically nothing in 
common with a ‘reality’ – other than its software mediated illusionary power 
of communication (see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 
2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This realization seems to have 
worried many scholars invested in maintaining a special verisimilitude with 
the medium and the recordings it expresses, for many have become “worried 
about the gradual erosion of our belief in the indexical link between film (and 
by extension video) and reality” (MacDougall 2001: 21).  
This sort of longing for some unproblematic ‘naturality’ of the moving 
image seems to have linkages to several realist traditions of visual media, 
most notably photography (e.g. Barthes 1981/1980; see also Bolter and 
Grusin 2000; Leighton 2008) and visual ethnography (e.g. Russell 1999; 
Ruby 2000; Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). Barthes (1981), 
in his seminal work on photography, goes as far as to construct the ontology 
of photography around its veracity itself, when he states: 
 
“The photograph [unlike painting] is literally an emanation of the referent. From the 
real body, which was there […] What matters to me is not the photograph’s ‘life’ (a 
purely ideological notion) but the certainty that the photographed body touches me 
with its own rays and not with a superadded light” (p. 80-81) 
 
Yet, video as an electronic medium lives an ephemeral life abstracted from 
physical reality, whereas film was physically present at the place of recording, 
and the images transferred to it are of the same physical light (Cubitt 1993). 
Video is not physical. Thus, this study on videography will follow this more 
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postmodern avenue in terms of the experiential potential of videographic 
research. As Russell (1999) argues: 
 
“as the image is no longer linked ontologically or indexically to something ‘out there’ 
in the real world. Unlike the cinematic image, preserved on celluloid, the video image 
is made anew at every transmission; and digital image processing has opened up the 
possibility of infinite manipulation. In the light of the TV monitor, the cinema is 
reinvented as a site of disappearance, loss, and memory” (p. 7) 
 
Equally, and unlike Barthes’s (1981) notions on photography, my work here 
will attempt to maintain the impossibility of representing any semblance of a 
past ‘reality’, thus taking an interest in exactly the opposite. If the veracity of 
the medium cannot be maintained in representation, the relationality of 
video medium becomes of importance in the thoroughly digitalized world of 
the Internet mediated communications. Likewise, we need to further consider 
what kind of an epistemological quandary this presents us, and what does the 
idea that “much video work is simply uninterested in representing the world 
as it is or might be” (Cubitt 1993: xvii) suggest to us. Thus, cinematographic 
work on film becomes a similar act of subjective storytelling as videographic 
work, but video is even more profoundly abstracted from ‘any-place-
anywhere’ due to its sheer technological makeup. The medium’s relations to 
any origins are of pure illusion with its endless potential of discontinuing 
timeshifts (Cubitt 1991), replication and simulation (Cubitt 1991, 2001) and 
as Bolter and Grusin (2000) note, its “immediacy” (p. 30; see also Belk 1998) 
that grasps the viewer and makes for an experience of embodiment, a 
convincing illusion of reality, making the audience marvel “at the discrepancy 
between what they knew and what their eyes told them” (p. 31). These, 
initially innocent definitions, come to constitute of further resources for a 
profoundly nonrealist ontology of videography, as we will soon see. 
To do videography, in this study, as an operative concept, is the production 
of academically oriented video research – from the empirical fieldwork via 
the editing table to the distribution of the completed research through a 
variety of digital media. A videography conceptualizes a complete and 
finalized unit of video production, the complete montage – the ‘whole show’ 
to be expressed to and experienced by audiences. This use of the term is 
somewhat similar to many documentarists’ take on it. As a concept used 
commonly by authors on documentary, one often sees ‘video’ to mean the 
pieces of film footage, while a work of ‘videography’ would express a whole 
argument – footage organized in such a manner as to present a perspective 
through its expression of the world (e.g. Nichols 1991). However, the 
similarity is in terms of practical composition alone, for the video 
documentarists generally do not make assertions about the nature of reality, 
commonly assuming better representation of the world out there as 
amounting to better representation of ‘real’ states (e.g. Nichols 1991; Bernard 
2007; Artis 2008). As one may have already surmised from my writing up to 
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this point, our journey will traverse into far different ontological and 
epistemological territories. 
Likewise, video medium is no one ‘thing’ or element, as technological 
developments perpetually push the video medium into differing formats 
allowing for differing practices of viewing and experiencing – the “VHS, S-
VHS, VHS-C, V 2000, Betamax, U-matic, Hi-band, Beta SP, Video-8, Hi-8, 
MII, MAC and D-MAC and so on” (Cubitt 1993: xii). In addition, the recent 
integration of video into our personal computers has revolutionized the 
places and occasions of viewing. Such formats of distribution have included 
the CD-R(W), DVD-R(W), and also completely nonphysically mediated 
services, such as Torrent downloading, YouTube and Vimeo, just to name a 
few. The most recent developments have included sharply declining costs for 
HD (high definition) recording for amateur video makers, especially with the 
introduction of video shooting capabilities to HDSLR photo cameras and the 
potential to record video in 3D.  
 
 
 
Videography note (1): 
 
Our first videographic project, BIP was recorded in standard definition (SD), while 
both PTS and PMW were recorded in high definition, dramatically increasing the 
requirements in equipment, digital storage space and processing power. While the 
demands both in terms of equipment and the expertise in their usage have dramatically 
increased, the viewer may note an equally dramatic difference in terms of quality 
between e.g. the BIP and the PTS project – not unlike any other expressive media, the 
quality must appeal to the respective audience to enhance its potential convincingness. 
 
 
 
Plummeting costs of both equipment and broadband connections have 
turned virtually every citizen of a developed country into a potential 
videographer (Cubitt 1993), and the same can be said for academicians alike 
(MacDougall 2001; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De 
Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Also, the availability of editing software 
that is now often offered pre-bundled into most operating systems and the 
computing power readily available to run them has placed a mobile video 
studio in the hands of every single laptop owner. One could speculate that 
many scholars criticizing video and seeking to maintain the orthodoxy of text 
have seemed less keen to consider: “So, do you think video will go away any 
time soon?” 
To move on from a more technologically oriented perspective, let us briefly 
consider (at this introductory level) what the utterly abstracted nature of the 
video medium would mean for our epistemic possibilities. As I will adopt and 
further a CCT approach to videography, I will argue that in my account of an 
ontology of videography we need to jettison all lingering illusions of the 
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‘truth’ or ‘external reality’ that allows itself to be represented. As we have 
already briefly explored, many epistemic endeavors outside the field of CCT 
seem to lack a profound discussion about the ontology of videographic 
expression, thus often implicitly accepting something like a perspective of 
(naïve) realism – the video (or any visual account, film or photography alike) 
as a ‘verisimilitude-machine’, a recorder of objective reality. Such has been 
especially the case in the history of visual anthropology (see 1.2.1), as it still 
seems to struggle to free itself from its realist tradition (e.g. Ruby 2000; Pink 
2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b). The antithesis for such an 
ontology can, as we have seen, be found in the domain of visual arts, that 
seems to have often been interested in the processes of jettisoning all reality 
in terms of the form of its expressions (Cubitt 1993; Appignanesi and Garratt 
2007). Similarly, it has been argued that, “Video disassembles the ontological 
pretence of the image (its pretence at presence) by creating a porous and 
extensible time out of what otherwise is constructed as the irrefragable 
instant of sight” (Cubitt 1993: 202). For now, it will suffice to note that I am 
personally inclined to take the route of the latter (while at times facing strong 
criticism for it), but nevertheless maintaining that through video we can 
potentially invoke efficacious relations by reproducing convincing illusions of 
social reality, or as Derry et al. (2010) suggest, “These themes arise as 
productive tensions that help encourage new and continuing members of our 
video research community toward a broad middle channel that avoids the 
Scylla of strict and formal empiricism on the one side and the postmodern 
Charybdis of ‘anything goes’ on the other” (p. 41). And again, while my 
approaches may align more consistently with the latter, a sociohistorical 
research tradition remains and needs to be taken into consideration. Thus, 
while this study will primarily follow poststructural pathways, there is a need 
to establish some notions of what evocative and efficacious videographic 
research in the CCT may entail from the perspective of pragmatic legitimacy 
in academia (in its differences to textual expression) – at least in its current 
state. 
We will revisit these challenges in a continuous fashion as we proceed, but 
for some initial traction, let us make matters somewhat more problematic at 
this point. What is to researched and expressed via videography so as to take 
full advantage of the medium is problematic in its own right, but additionally, 
in terms of expressing any sense of ‘reality’ in videographic productions, there 
remains the question of the part of the viewer(s). Video may possibly allow 
for a wide range of experiences. Yet, aren’t these experiences considerably 
related to the time and place of the viewing of videographic work? What if the 
same videography is viewed again (and again)? Is it same or different? And 
what about, not only the shifts of time regarding the viewing and the actual 
event, but also the effects of sequential shifts of time within the videographic 
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montage (the order of shots in a sequence)? Also, we must note the 
superficially trivial matters such as the intellectual/professional inclination of 
the particular audience (ACR Film Festival/videography shown on a 
broadcasting network to the ‘masses’), the time of day, and the proximity and 
interestedness of the audience(s) next to the viewer. Now that videos are 
increasingly circulated online, taken apart and endlessly remashed and 
remixed, further empirical work is also needed about the evolving social 
practices of video footage viewing as it increasingly moves from stationary 
devices into mobile appliances and interactive platforms (see also Kozinets 
and Belk 2006; Sunderland 2006). This work, while beyond the scope of this 
study, could provide CCT videographers ideas for approaches in both 
legitimizing and popularizing their work simultaneously. While we will 
consider the ontology of experiencing video and the idea of popularizing 
academic expression of research activities in due course, the culturally 
changing nature of the social impact of video needs to be also pursued in 
future work. Indeed, as further conceptualized as a profound encounter, 
perceiving video media is not a passive undertaking. But what is the nature of 
this encounter, how do such experiences come about? 
While taking due note of the substantial technical and practical differences 
between various media, say film and video, we can explore the many links 
tying them together – most importantly the relationship between the 
viewer(s) and an image that is by its very nature of movement itself (Deleuze 
1986/1983). Embarking on this exploration, we will move on to consider a 
Deleuzian ontology and epistemology for the cinematographic moving image, 
for: “With the definitions given, both video and film experience share 
substantially the same audio-visual semiotic; the same interpretative 
conventions for their salient sensory features” (Lemke 2007: 41) – the 
(potentially convincing) experience of a moving medium. 
In addition, Cubitt (1993) urges us to consider the special qualities of video 
by the use of a wedding video as an example, which is a “product of supreme 
invisibility and supreme formalism […] every tape must appear fresh and 
personal as if it addressed this event and no other, never to betray the 
suspected secret: that it is the same as every other wedding video” (p. 4; see 
also Bolter and Grusin 2000). Thus the recognition of the uniqueness and 
indexical function of the event becomes specific to the viewing situation, 
“promising presence while presenting absence” (Cubitt 1993: 5). But when 
one views a wedding video in which one recognizes no one, the relation is 
overturned, or “The sense comes over you of looking in on something rather 
private, something to which you are uninvited, that excludes you” (p. 5). 
There is an uncomfortable ‘in-your-faceness’ about the medium – something 
if not absent then at least of more distance in textual expression, sanitized 
with the comfortability of interpretive symbolic abstraction. Thus, the video 
  21 
can maintain the orders of the world by promising continuity in our social 
rituals, making it “only surprising that we greet an image of ourselves 
participating in the wedding not with pleasurable recognition, but with shock 
and embarrassment” (p. 7). These exemplary recognitions of the particular 
qualities of the video medium can act as initial clues for us here. There is 
something interesting going on between the moving image and its viewer(s), 
something that becomes embodied by the audience in the machinic 
expression the moving image forces upon us. These matters call for further 
investigation and will be considered throughout this study. 
Video media and videographic expression are complex and perpetually 
changing and invite us into an emergent relationship. Yet, here we will 
conclude our introductory ‘sneak peek’ of what will constitute the following 
pages. As presented, it suffices to acknowledge how the video media does not 
lend itself to simple definition. This has tremendous implications to the 
construction of an ontology of videography in CCT. In doing so, it is not my 
purpose here to construct a profound history of the moving image – such 
references abound. Additionally, technical considerations will be only 
minimally addressed, but a brief exploration of technical matters will be 
provided in the chapter on Production (see IV). There the focus is not in so 
much in the technical perspective per se, but rather in an effort to construct a 
set of notes that flow from our own experiences in the field. Naturally, a 
purely technological account would become quickly outdated. But now, let us 
turn to a brief historical elaboration of the CCT approach in the broader 
gamut of consumer research. 
 
 
2.3  Consumer Research: Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) 
 
“The 20th Century was not kind to 18th Century notions of what truth and beauty 
mean […] The terms need to be re-examined from a local, quotidian vantage point, 
with concepts such as ‘aesthetic judgment’ located within a community” (Kip Jones) 
 
In the following section I will briefly introduce the academic discourse of 
Consumer Culture Theory (CCT – see Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007) 
within the more general paradigm of marketing and consumer research. The 
field of consumer research can be seen as a nexus of highly divergent 
discourses in terms of ontological and epistemological underpinnings that 
can generally be grouped as the more ‘positivistically’ (quantitative 
orientation, more on these distinctions in 2.3.3) oriented Behavioral Decision 
Theory (BDT), Judgement and Decision Making (JDM) and the more 
postmodern CCT (Belk 2009). These research streams emanate from 
microeconomic theory, cognitive psychology, experimental design, 
quantitative analytical methods, and more recently anthropological research 
from constructivist/interpretivist perspectives (Arnould and Thompson 
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2005, 2007). CCT, from its divergent ontological underpinnings emerged to 
provide something of a challenge to the other extant paradigms in consumer 
research – here’s a brief overview how. 
 
2.3.1  Background in Alternative Ways of Seeking Knowledge 
 
From the early 1980’s, what came to be known as CCT (later noted to be 
perhaps better described as ‘Consumer Culture Theoretics’ [Arnould and 
Thompson 2007]) research has emerged to constitute a broad ontological and 
epistemological approach; not a unified movement or discourse or even a 
conclusive set of theories or methodologies (Arnould and Thompson 2005). 
And while some have put this diversity forth as a critique, CCT could not have 
come about in any other nature. The reasons for this are multiform and resist 
a straightforward description. In the following, I will attempt to provide an 
overview of the developments in this diverse field and continue to how 
videography as both a method of data collection and a way of expressing 
research findings may fit in CCT and constitute an outcome of the historical 
legacy of the field. 
While the strands of historical developments that have led up to the 
contemporary state of the field are diverse, the underpinnings of CCT seem to 
stem in many ways from the large-scale ontological and epistemological 
fragmentation in academic research, often attributed to a breakdown of the 
modernist ideal and a subsequent emergence of a postmodern ethos (e.g. 
Arnould and Thompson 2005; see also Spencer 2001; Firat and Dholakia 
2006). Generally, what has been described as the modernist worldview has 
since become colloquially known as ‘positivism’ (e.g. Anderson 1986; Hudson 
and Ozanne 1988; Hunt 1990, 1991; Denzin 2001a; see also Critchley 2001). 
The central tenet of ‘positivism’ is that the nature of reality exists outside of 
the minds of humans and that it can become known in a truthful way through 
our tools of representation (e.g. language). Thus a single truth (also known as 
logocentrism) is at least possible and can be represented objectively (also 
known as the Cartesian dualism of the separation of mind/thought and 
body/material reality). The term ‘positivism’ originates from the scientific 
movement of the Vienna Circle whose members became known as the logical 
positivists, who, in a nutshell, proclaimed that through sense experience and 
the use of a “rational reconstruction of scientific knowledge by means of 
semantic and syntactic analysis” (Schwandt 2000: 304) would produce truth 
claims, conclusive and incontrovertible truths that could thus be uncovered 
and represented (e.g. Schwandt 2000; see also Hunt 1991). What seems often 
forgotten today is that the logical positivists were the radicals of their day (see 
also Tadajewski 2010), new idealists of logic revolting against German 
idealism of the great philosophers Hume and Kant (among others). Also, it is 
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important to note, that the belief in neutral objectivity and unlimited and 
ultimate access to the natural world via suitable methodologies for both 
conducting research (objectively) and representing it emerged considerably 
later (Tadajewski 2010). 
As Hunt (1991; see also Levin 1991; Heath 1992) rightly posits, the 
contemporary vernacular of ‘positivism’ (hence the scare quotes) does not 
have much bearing on the rational reconstruction of theories typical of the 
Vienna Circle. Rather, it remains as a term of high usage as an umbrella 
concept to imply a naïve belief in certainty to be achievable by the human 
instrument or communicable certainty through a language that accurately (or 
increasingly approximately) refers and corresponds to external states (e.g. 
Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Shankar and Patterson 2001; Tadajewski 2010). 
Personally, I would prefer “naïve realism” (Denzin 2001a: 325; see also Hunt 
1991; Schwandt 2000), “scientism” (Bhaskar 2008/1975; Critchley 2001), 
“[naïve] objectivism” (e.g. Hunt 1993: 86), “naïve scientism” (Brownlie 2006: 
505) or “trivial realism” (Belk 1998). However, I will, for better or worse, 
continue using the concept in this study, as it has become so thoroughly 
established in the contemporary academic vernacular. 
The logical positivist program ran into trouble soon as some of its 
fundamental principles were questioned initially by philosophers such as 
Thomas Kuhn, who’s immensely influential work, The Structure of Scientific 
Revolutions (Kuhn 1996/1962; see also Anderson 1983; Grant 2001) argued 
that science was a sociohistorical endeavor (not objective) where some 
worldviews were of so divergent natures that they could not be unified 
through reconstructing them in logical language (inconsumerability). 
Another powerful voice of criticism came from Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose 
early philosophical work, Tractatus (originally published in 1922), seemingly 
sided with the logical positivists, when, in fact, he claimed that through logic 
one could never objectify, for example, religion, aesthetics or ethics (Johnson 
2001; Heaton and Groves 2005). In his later work, Philosophical 
Investigations (Wittgenstein 2009/1953) he went further to claim that all 
what can be uttered through language is always contextual and irrevocably 
intertwined with the embodied context (thus providing one foundational 
perspective to practice theory, see 2.9.1). Other influential voices included the 
newlyfound interest in Nietzsche, who profoundly questioned our capability 
to access any ‘reality’ (Deleuze 1989; Critchley 2001; Roberts 2001; Hughes 
2009), Quine, who questioned the feasibility of the positivist’s analytic-
synthetic dichotomy (Critchley 2001); Laudan, who argued that the limit of 
scientific thought was pragmatic problem-solving (see Anderson 1983); 
Feyerabend (1999), who took the impossibility of the line of demarcation to 
its logical conclusion – epistemological anarchy (‘anything goes’); Gadamer 
(2004/1976; see also Arnold and Fischer 1994), who argued against the 
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possibility of objective knowledge in human understanding, and Rorty 
(2009/1979; see also Spencer 2001), who developed pragmatism as the 
sociohistorically contingent limit of philosophical activity, to name just a few. 
One cannot either forget the originally Marxian Frankfurt School of critical 
and nonpositivst philosophy heralded primarily by Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Habermas, that emphasized criticism against the empiricist worldview and 
propounded interest in the sociohistoric analysis of cultural phenomena by 
emphasizing dialectical analysis (e.g. Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, 
Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; see also Hammond 2001; Horkheimer and Adorno 
2002/1987). 
As can be seen, at a philosophical level, important topics that the positivists 
could not reconcile have to do with the problem of the objective nature of a 
human as a researcher, the problem of language as a conveyer of objective 
truths and the problem of the historically changing nature of knowledge. 
Altogether, these constitute a profound problematic for science as a field 
when attempting to defend it for its special epistemic purpose and as a stable 
demarcation contra to other expressive activities, such as art or fiction – this 
certainly in a philosophical, not pragmatic sense, as we will soon see.   
Yet, arguably one of the most notable critical voices came from continental 
philosophers, in particular French thinkers Jacques Derrida (see Stern 1996a; 
Bristor and Fischer 1993; Collins and Mayblin 2005), Michel Foucault (see 
Canning 2001; Heaton and Groves 2005) and Gilles Deleuze (see Bogue 
2003; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009), whose work is commonly described 
under the ‘poststructuralist’ rubric. These approaches resist logocentric 
notions of representation, language and objectivity – which would indeed call 
for resisting such labeling as well. In this study, it is my attempt to construct 
an (not the) ontology and an epistemology for videography in CCT that is 
underpinned in Deleuzean thought, and thus Deleuze will be more 
extensively (yet by no means comprehensively) introduced later. 
All these (and other) developments went on to influence a moment of 
extreme confusion in various fields of academia. Categorized under several 
diverse rubrics, the tumultuous relations between realist science and 
postmodernist worldviews (e.g. Firat and Dholakia 1995; Firat, Dholakia and 
Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006) have been described as a period of 
“science wars” (e.g. Franklin 1995: 164), “paradigm battles” (e.g. Arnould and 
Thompson 2005: 869) and “critique of authenticity” (Russell 1999: xii). In 
any case, realist and objectivist calls of modernism seem to have been 
substantially disassembled – even if much of the backdrop from the 
‘positivist’ worldviews is predominant in the mainstream of consumer 
research and is still lingering and resonating in CCT research (e.g. Holt 1991; 
Shankar and Patterson 2001). 
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2.3.2  The Hunt Versus Anderson Debate 
 
“Truth may well seem to be “a more modest being from which no disorder and 
nothing extraordinary is to be feared: a self-contented and happy creature which is 
continually assuring all the powers that be no one needs to be the least concerned on 
its account; for it is, after all, only ‘pure knowledge’” (Gilles Deleuze, quoting 
Frederick Nietzsche) 
 
The field of marketing and consumer research went through its own academic 
battles as well, predominantly the now colloquially toted ‘Hunt versus 
Anderson debate’ (e.g. Kavanagh 1994). Even though the debate about the 
scientific nature of marketing had been raging for decades alongside the 
aforementioned philosophical debates and changes in society such as the 
‘consumer revolution’, increasing civil rights, and feministic movements 
(Levy 2006; see also Anderson 1983), I will enter the historical stream of 
ideas in consumer research in this study where Anderson and Hunt began 
theirs. Anderson (1983), a self-proclaimed relativist, later critical relativist 
(Anderson 1986), follows the dismantling of the logocentric truth claims and 
objectivity of the logical positivists to argue for relativistic takes in 
sociological paradigms such as marketing. For him, the philosophical 
movements summarized above show how all knowledge claims are always 
theory-laden (non-objective) social constructions that are always paradigm-
dependent and change over time, for: 
 
“Within a program, knowledge is sanctioned largely by consensus […] Thus, research 
areas will tend to evolve as changes take place in methods, concepts, values, beliefs, 
and theories. Whether such changes can be viewed as progressive in any sense, will 
be judged differently by different research programs” (Anderson 1983: 25-26) 
 
To Anderson (1983), conducting marketing research with the positivist 
trappings fails to understand the historical nature of any truth claim, and 
quoting Tucker’s famous wording, makes researchers study the consumer “in 
the ways that fishermen study fish rather than as marine biologists study 
them” (Tucker 1974: 31, quoted in Anderson [1983: 27]). Thus, for Anderson, 
the search for a ‘truth’ becomes a misguided pursuit, as there can never be 
any truth that is not relative to its political, historical or paradigmatic context 
– and even if there were, there would be no way to recognize it (notions of 
truth are thus relative language games). As knowledge becomes diachronic 
(historically changing) and the lack of our objective access to reality is 
accepted, there is no longer a single knowable truth about a reality out there 
to be discovered by the (always evolving) scientific method, and therefore: 
  
“Perhaps the most significant breakthrough in the field of science studies in this 
century is the recognition that the crucial unit of analysis is not at the level of the 
proposition, hypothesis, or theory, but at the level of the macrostructures in which 
these concepts are embedded” (Anderson 1986: 159) 
 
There seems to be a strong implicit pragmatist underpinning in Anderson’s 
relativism, however, as he sides with the Laudanian thought of judging 
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research by its problem-solving ability. Additionally, there is thus a clear link 
to the necessary political aim of every research pursuit, and therefore a 
critical relativist would demand: 
 
“to know a program’s methodological, ontological, metaphysical, and axiological 
commitments before he or she is willing to grant epistemic authority to its knowledge 
products. More importantly, critical relativists want to know a program’s realizable 
cognitive (and social) aims before they are willing to give it serious consideration” 
(Anderson 1986: 167-168) 
 
It should be remembered, that ‘positivism’ has also been known as the 
‘received view’ (Anderson 1983; Holbrook and O’Shaughnessy 1988; Hudson 
and Ozanne 1988; Hunt 1993). Thus, Anderson’s relativism aims for virtually 
the opposite, as it seems no one view will be taken for granted or on faith 
alone. 
Anderson (1986) also attacks Hunt’s ‘positivistically’ inclined logical 
empiricism more directly by pointing out that Hunt seems to be afraid of 
acknowledging the destabilization of a secure logos, and it seems that this 
insecurity is what lets the rhetoric of truth incessantly chug along. He notes 
that Hunt seems not to understand the stakes and therefore can only attack 
‘straw men’, such as when Hunt claims that accepting alternative ontologies 
would be like equating medical science and palmistry (Anderson 1986: 156). 
Anderson’s (1986) pragmatism intensifies with his critical relativism, when 
he notes that pluralistic methods and epistemologies could only aid the 
”pragmatic aims of a theory” (p. 156), due to a headstrong commitment to one 
approach alone can only produce what he called “knowledge for its own sake” 
(Anderson 1983: 27), noted also by Levy (2006), or as Arndt (1985) puts it: 
 
“By limiting itself to the empiricist orientation and logical empiricist paradigms such 
as instrumental man, marketing has remained essentially a one-dimensional science 
concerned with technology and problem solving. The subjective world and liberating 
paradigms challenge the assumptions of empiricism by generating metaphors 
resulting in the asking of quite different research questions” (Arndt 1985: 21) 
 
The outcome of Anderson’s relativism is that science can be nothing else than 
what “society bestows a high epistemological status […] because it values its 
knowledge products” (Anderson 1983: 26). Anderson (1983) believes that 
marketing departments had been mired by what was later formulated as 
‘physics envy’ (Tapp 2007; see also Arndt 1985) or having been “anxious to 
cloak themselves in the mantle of science” (Belk 2009: 36). This was a kind of 
headstrong ethos to pursue research in line with the natural scientists to gain 
some of the trappings of a “bona fide scientific area” (Anderson 1986: 169). 
For Anderson (1983), the ultimate irony is that by doing so, most of 
(pragmatic) relevance is lost – critical relativist approaches could make for 
better contextual and socially significant problem-solving knowledge, 
whatever their politics may be. He wants to go beyond the idea of pursuing 
single unchangeable ‘truths’ and the falsification and confirmation of 
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hypotheses through tests that pose as the correct method for logical 
empiricists, as such design does not offer empirical usability in many avenues 
of social science. For Anderson (1983, 1986), a relativist approach would 
allow different paradigms to freely negotiate the most usable methods and 
theoretical underpinnings to produce best problem-solving capability. 
In his numerous writings at the time, Hunt (e.g. 1990, 1991, 1993), a self-
proclaimed logical empiricist (later, scientific realist, see Hunt [2004]) takes 
great exception to approaches not committed to the ‘truth’ in marketing 
science. While he does make occasional distinctions where different 
relativist/constructivist/interpretivist approaches differ, they seem to all 
remain antithetical to his foundational position of science’s objectivity, truth 
and single reality that waits ever-progressing uncovering. He maintains that 
inquiry without a pursuit of truth is necessarily nihilistic, incoherent and/or 
irrelevant (Hunt 1990). In terms of logicality, Hunt may have some solid 
ground to stand on, for as others have noted, to be critical is to assume 
knowledge of how to make judgments on knowledge claims – thus ‘critical 
relativism’ is inconsistent as a form of ‘traditional’ relativism (Siegel 1988). 
Yet, it must be noted, that Anderson and Hunt seem to also profoundly 
disagree on the notion of relevance, even as both appear to employ a very 
pragmatist notion of problem-solving. It seems that the debacle is not about 
problem-solving as such, but, rather, about what type of knowledge has the 
‘right’ to be a problem-solver. In Anderson’s relativism, a plurality of 
approaches is accepted, each answering to its own paradigmatic goals while 
critically and reflexively assessing the nature of its place in society. For Hunt, 
problem-solving knowledge must be ‘truthful’, meaning it must correspond 
(in empirical testing and thus verification) to a ‘reality out there’, which 
through scientific progress or success (e.g. Hunt 1990: 2, 9, 10, 13), can be 
increasingly mastered.  
For Hunt (1990) (and for realists in general), something like a real world 
‘out there’ in a stable sense exists (hence the possibility of synchronic and 
sufficiently corresponding knowledge of the external reality), and knowledge 
about this reality is ultimately of the single right type, even if never perfect 
with certainty. His realism entails the 1) approximate truth of mature 
scientific theories (those that have withstood tests), that the 2) concepts of 
these theories genuinely refer to real things in the world, that 3) successive 
theories retain the ontology of their predecessors, that 4) success entails truly 
referential characteristics and 5) will go on to genuinely refer. Hunt notes that 
relativists have found several historical examples to show how 4) and 5) have 
not consistently withstood the test of time. Yet, he seems to feel completely 
comfortable in moving towards a scientific realism (which often feels naïve 
indeed [cf. Hunt 1990: 9]), where the notions of ‘approximate truth’ of the 
‘genuine referring’ of words to ‘things out there’ is relatively unproblematic – 
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even as he has no problem criticizing the use of “loose metaphors” (Hunt 
1990: 3) by others. Scientific progress is the measure of things – yet, as we 
will see, we do not have a measure for it unless we can assume and maintain a 
stable logos – again one that is always political, but this is not a focal matter 
for Hunt, perhaps due to his propounding of the ideal of objectivity or 
neutrality of scientific inquiry. Moreover, this realist criteria seems quite 
limiting to say the least, as it would seem to extensively exclude much 
academic inquiry – say historical research about one-time events and all 
inquiry understood as interpretive altogether (as it is not in the domain of 
hypothesis testing – unless great leaps of reification are undertaken, which 
Hunt often seems to pursue himself when, for example, elaborating on ideals 
of science, such as trust or justice). 
Hunt (1990) maintains that without a ‘truth’ to aspire to, a scientific 
endeavor can only become nihilist if it wishes to stay coherent (Hunt 1990), 
and indeed, without a stable logocentric structure, an absolute to aspire to, 
how could one defend against such a notion? It would seem that nihilism is 
unavoidable (e.g. Feyerabend 1999) unless one can adopt a pragmatist and 
thus politically oriented considerations of knowledge products – which 
Anderson’s critical relativism accepts – critically (Anderson 1983, 1986; cf. 
Siegel 1988). While being wildly inconsistent himself (eschewing religion as a 
truthful claim), Hunt accepts one for science: “One might ask: Why could 
science not choose to pursue a ‘utopian’ goal” (Hunt 1990: 7), thus arguing 
that such a goal is perfectly in line with constructs like justice in the legal 
system. Similarly, this allows Hunt (1990) to feel secure in his suspicion of 
moral relativism. He has a logos: “Importantly, scientific realism helps us 
understand the actual workings of modern science without mocking it” (Hunt 
1990: 10).  
In addition, Hunt (2004) seems to use the argument from popularity 
regularly. He states that no matter which paradigm, researchers “implicitly 
advocate a form of scientific realism” (p. 5). A similar argument was also put 
forth by Heath (1992), who applauded the reporting style of some of the first 
CCT scholars who infused their work with characteristics of lingering realism 
(criteria for triangulation, member checks, peer audits and the like). 
Interestingly, he calls this whitewashing of ontological rigor “liberatory 
humanism” – for him seemingly thus liberated from nihilism. Indeed, while 
Heath (1992) calls for the building of bridges between paradigms, it would 
appear that he accepts only those that bring the interpretive research closer to 
a ‘positivist’ ideal. While I have not been particular about ‘hiding my cards’ in 
this assessment, we must indeed ask, how much implicit realism can be found 
in our CCT-oriented thinking and reporting? 
If we, adopting contemporary interpretivist epistemologies, do implicit 
realism, it must indeed be a very odd one. It seems for Hunt that the 
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constructivist notion of multiple realities renders any argument incapable to 
say anything about anything. And I do agree: to take what has been called 
“hardheaded relativism” (Anderson 1986: 167; see also Siegel 1988) to its 
logical conclusion would arrive at Feyerabendian irrationalism. But can some 
of this philosophy be relaxed without becoming self-refuting? Is it truly 
impossible to say, while taking the basic tenets of constructivism (if we can 
move away from the tradition of ‘relativism’ to consider the debate from a 
contemporary perspective) seriously, that the notion of constructed worlds 
takes them out of any type of intelligible conversation? I would argue that the 
very reason we write convincing stories (Holt 1991) that address multiple 
realities is very much pragmatic – addressing realities without being realist in 
a Huntean sense. In line with Shankar and Patterson (2001), “writing is 
simply means to staging truth effects” (p. 492) that become reflexively 
negotiated between our scientific and personal selves. Our ‘realism’ is thus of 
a reflexive kind, for our ‘access’ to anything is interpretative, made and 
postulated rather as a rhetorical device (e.g. Holt 1991; Belk and Kozinets 
2005a). The way I see it, we do not go after the inner workings of elusive 
systems (reified models and theories) as “objects of wonder” (Shankar and 
Patterson 2001: 494), but rather interpret and present in prose, on a 
humanistic level how social beings make sense of their realities. To read CCT 
research, even as sometimes written in terms that can be appropriated to 
serve various perspectives, as a vault of stable facts is to miss the point 
altogether; yet they, as knowledge products often do, become to assume 
factual characteristics when they influence new ideas and thinking. It is 
necessarily not what is exactly said about these realities (and how could Hunt 
not agree if approximation is enough, especially in line with all historical 
disruptions of realist thought), but how such utterances go on to 
hermeneutically influence new thinking and spatiotemporal outcomes. This 
thinking will be further developed in my positing of a relational epistemology 
for videography in CCT (see 3.3) and by addressing some of the limitations of 
constructivism by adopting notions of material emergence from non-
representational theory (see 2.9.2). 
As Hunt does not accept the philosophical implications of language as a 
fundamentally unstable and imprecise expressive game and implicitly does 
the work of reification in the sense of positing ideas expressed in language as 
things (which goes for the idea of logic in itself – ‘through logic to greater 
truth’), it seems he is confident in arguing the problem away. His tactics, 
criticized by many in no uncertain terms (e.g. Brown 1998b, 2005; Monieson 
1989), include a flux of non sequitur inconsistencies, arguments from 
popularity (see e.g. Hunt 2004) and ‘moving of goalposts’ (see e.g. Hunt 
1991). What makes his style interesting is that the same argumentation he 
uses to support his claims he also uses to refute others (even on subsequent 
 30 
pages, see Hunt [1990: 6-7], on the distinction between ‘creation-science’ and 
ideals of ‘true’ science). The logicality and flow of arguments between 
Anderson and Hunt alone could be a source for several interesting studies. 
But regarding this study, by assuming many of the poststructuralist 
perspectives, I will not construct another logos around the logic of words (in 
the sense that by following it we can reach something ‘real’ – get to a truthful 
account of issues under debate or a truthful representation of research), while 
simultaneously not eschewing it completely. 
Making arguments along Huntean lines, Heath (1992) seems to also miss 
the point entirely by brushing off the problematic nature of language. He 
assumes that (what he terms) naturalists simply use different labels to 
describe the same things (astonishingly establishing a parallel: 
interpretation=causal explanation). What these more ‘positivistically’ inclined 
scholars appear not to be able to entertain is that an interpretive researcher 
does not take language for granted – “staging truth effects” (Shankar and 
Patterson 2001: 492) does not express the reification of true states but the 
production of evocative stories. Heath (1992) treats causation as an equally 
straightforward concept, thus making an implicit argument that ‘of course’ 
there is causation, but interpretive researchers only dance around it 
semantically (cf. Heath 1992). And was this not what Anderson was pointing 
towards, after all, by advocating that to do ‘nonpositivistic’ inquiry does not 
mean one cannot say anything; it means language is a layer of illusion, with a 
conceptual 'life of its own' (see also Deleuze 1994b; Denzin 2001a) and must 
therefore be treated with criticality and wariness of its political 
underpinnings – not to establish true states in a true world. To use ‘causation’ 
as an explanation is to argue for something quite absolute – to reflexively 
speak of possible influences is not (yet to my knowledge no CCT scholar has 
purported that due to the problematic nature of causation we could not 
discuss about any conceivable influences of any kind). As causation and 
objectivity take precedence for both Hunt and Heath, interpretivism is merely 
seen to whitewash it, or as Heath (1992) puts it, “A cause (influence) by any 
other name is still a cause (influence)" (p. 111). Thus it is of no surprise that 
'positivist' and interpretive researchers often find it difficult to argue with 
each other. Due to the recognized illusionary nature of text, someone utilizing 
interpretative frameworks must be very interested in its nuances. For a 
'positivist' researcher such ‘mockery of science’ can be dismissed, as text is 
seen as a stable and relatively unproblematic structure. Finally, Heath’s 
(1992), the argument falls down already at the offset, as he seems to implicitly 
presume the goal of an interpretive researcher to be a similar 'progress to a 
truth' that befalls the 'positivist' inquiry and representation. 
One could go on to further assess the Hunt vs. Anderson debate (including 
other scholars who have made their voices heard in this assessment), but it 
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would not be very useful for my purposes. For me, it is not a question who is 
‘right’, or if such a debate can (through language and logical argumentation 
itself, i.e. who grants the truth status of logic itself?) produce ‘rightness’ of 
any kind. In addition, Siegel (1998) made a poignant early note: “empirical 
testability alone is too weak to constitute the sole criterion of scientific 
adequacy” (p. 132). In this study we will also question other too often taken 
for granted assumptions (e.g. language, logic and representation). But at this 
point, for my purposes, it seems noteworthy to consider what these and other 
voices at the time have contributed to the CCT field. Interestingly, many 
questions Anderson and Hunt rose up appear to still have much bearing on 
the reasonably pluralist contemporary state of the CCT field. And far from the 
proverbial dust settling, a tension remains between the ‘positivist’ 
mainstream in consumer research and the ‘postmodern’ minority of 
interpretive researchers in the CCT field. Let us very briefly go through some 
of the points arisen between Hunt and Anderson that seem to resonate 
powerfully to this day. 
First of all, both Hunt and Anderson seem to argue for pragmatism – albeit 
from different perspectives. The difference is how we recognize the limits of 
our ability to shape the world (language and deed alike) and 
anthropomorphize it through humans as thinkers. In a contemporary sense, 
it would seem fair to argue that everything is, in a sense, pragmatism. The 
‘truth’ (or good academic work) is what we define it to be in our 
sociohistorical context. Our language (not to mention our senses) as a system 
of abstracted symbols forces upon us an irrevocable limitation to an 
unproblematic access to the world (what would a ‘pure access’ be like – the 
very problem of philosophy itself). In addition, our contextually emerging 
imagination tells us to investigate ‘easily closable partial systems’ to satisfy 
our pragmatic inspirations (see 2.4.2). The overarching problem is a 
difference in worldviews – can things (even ideas in the reifications of Hunt) 
be reduced, and can scientific problems be approached synchronically – can a 
wholeness of a ‘closed’ system be assessed in a ‘snapshot’ fashion (from the 
outside)? For Hunt it would seem that such systems we can close (can this 
satellite stay in orbit; medication lengthens human lives), are things in the 
world to be theorized, hypothesized, objectified and then tested, and that 
system becomes increasingly an approximate truth. Hunt, as his realism 
suggests, seems to commonly address the world as this synchronic structure. 
Indeed, for him, criticizing this notion seems to constitute the ‘mocking of 
science’ and ‘making science a miracle’ (Hunt 1990). Put simply, science for 
him cannot go beyond these systems that seem to be closable. Anderson, 
along with many other postmodernist thinkers, seems to see such easily 
closable systems as intertwined with the contextual and sociohistoric limits of 
our imagination and language systems. Thus, whatever the collectively 
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negotiated methodologies may be, we could attain situational knowledge if 
that knowledge turns out to be pragmatically effective. Yet, such efficacy must 
always be reflexively seen as a constituent of its sociohistorical context, as 
everything scientists undertake has a political underpinning. Anderson, as his 
relativism would suggest, sees the world diachronically as a flux of emergent 
ideas and undertakings. Anderson and Hunt thus seem to argue between 
different sets of poles, from inconsumerable positions in a Kuhnian sense. 
Furthermore, Hunt commonly uses truth and objectivity as working terms, 
moralistic ideals that are to be pursued, not necessarily affirmed – later even: 
“truth as not an entity, but an attribute. It is an attribute of beliefs and 
linguistic expressions” (Hunt 2004: 7) “let alone an immutable entity” (ibid.: 
8). Anderson takes a more philosophically precise stance, which for Hunt 
constitutes something like the never-ending sophism of the “philosopher’s 
fallacy” (Hunt 1990: 6) or “vulgar absolutism” (Hunt 1993: 87), and thus 
leaves it at that. In his work, the notion of trust as a moral guideline among 
scientists suffices (Hunt 1990, 2004). It could be argued that Anderson’s 
shortcoming in this debate is his specificity, for Hunt it has to be vagueness – 
a kind of ‘don’t you get it’. Yet, both seem, to use a Kuhnian metaphor, seem 
to aim for pragmatist approaches of relevance, albeit in very different worlds. 
Anderson’s relevance is one of a reflexive inclination to the meaning-makings 
of agents in the world, Hunt’s is one of utilitarian and pragmatist problem-
solving for progress – yet thus the (political) nature of progress is left out of 
science’s magisterium. 
For Hunt, the reification of ideas seems to pose no problem, even as he 
seems to recognize it when it does not seem to threaten his arguments (Hunt 
2004: 8), and at other times, “theories and people are, to say the least, 
‘tangible’” (Hunt 1990: 11) and “In sociology, if a proposition such as ‘racist 
beliefs in a society generally result in the unfair treatment of a racial group’ is 
successful, then we have reason to believe that something like ‘racist beliefs’ 
exists” (ibid.: 11). One could argue that for him social science implicitly seems 
to progress by reification – how else could one empirically test (in order to 
verify) intangible notions such as ‘emotion’, ‘brand preference’, or some such. 
Scientific ‘progress’ (or success of science) is also central to his arguments, 
and this seems to be where a Huntean logical empiricist/scientific realist 
position is most problematic – in its reification and logocentrification of 
Western culture as the ‘true’ perspective to judge human ‘progress’ from. This 
logocentric perspective has become widely contested by many scholars, for 
example by cultural studies (Sardar and Van Loon 2004) and feminist 
researchers (e.g. Bristor and Fischer 1993; Stern 1993). What Anderson is 
implying is for, in effect, context-sensitive and reflexive storytelling in the 
form of pragmatic and convincing academic fictions. What Hunt seems to 
crave for is what I would call something like ‘teddy-bear pragmatism’ – a firm 
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(assuring) belief in the synchronic truth of any closable and testable system 
with reasonably unproblematic access to it through tools of representation. 
Hunt criticizes Laudan for providing “not a single example of an acceptable 
goal for science” (Hunt 1990: 7), because for him one seems truly necessary, 
as one can be seen in his statement: “researchers can find comfort in the fact 
that there exist philosophies of science – such as scientific realism – that at 
the minimum, are not antithetical to truth and its surrogate, trustworthy 
knowledge” (Hunt 2004: 11, emphasis added). This ‘teddy-bear’ thus never 
really becomes questioned. 
Still the notion “Unfortunately, however, debates in this area are often 
carried on at such an abstract level that, once the dust settles, research in the 
natural and social sciences generally goes on much the way it did before” 
(Anderson 1986: 158) can, in retrospect, have merit here. Yet, it was these 
types of exchanges that have truly opened up the field of 
marketing/consumer research to begin going beyond the notion of stable 
‘right’ and ‘rigorous’ methods so as to embrace different approaches, and later 
different forms of expression as well – even as such pluralistic widening of 
the scope of research has been a long time coming (e.g. Denzin 2001a; 
Shankar and Patterson 2001; see also Van Maanen 1995; Richardson 2000). 
This debate, among other numerous philosophical movements, has 
emergently provided one of the foundations for many divergent approaches 
in CCT, including naturalistic approaches, critical research, and criticisms of 
representation (see also Kavanagh 1994). In doing so, even if this particular 
debate has stagnated (Kavanagh 1994), it would seem important not to 
underestimate its foundational influence in terms of the subsequent 
developments in the field. 
 
2.3.3  Constructivist Ontology, Interpretive Epistemology, 
Emerging Criteria as well as Early and Lingering Realism 
 
Parallel to the Hunt vs. Anderson exchange, what later became the CCT field 
gradually emerged. What was it exactly what the interpretive paradigm had to 
offer, and with what criteria was it to become considered a respected field? 
While seminal early approaches included the production contextual 
knowledge on consumer meanings (e.g. Levy 1981), there was one event of 
‘going natural’ par excellence – the Consumer Behavior Odyssey (e.g. Belk 
1987; Holbrook 1987; Sherry 1987; Belk, Sherry and Wallendorf 1988; Belk, 
Wallendorf and Sherry 1989) during the summer of 1986, in the course of 
which a group of now firmly established CCT researchers spent their summer 
off-period by travelling across America in ascetic conditions to seek novel 
means for contextual knowledge that would radically differ from ‘positivist’ 
(Sherry 1987), while enthusiastically confronting the potential of being 
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accused of scientific heresy (Belk 1987). In many ways it is to them we owe 
that a field such as CCT is taken seriously in marketing/consumer research 
today – even if such a project of establishment is of seemingly interminable 
nature. 
Liminally to the beaten trails of the Consumer Behavior Odyssey, some 
opening salvos in the marketing/consumer research literature for new 
epistemological perspectives were being fired back and forth. They consisted 
of attempts to build criteria for evaluating this new (in marketing/consumer 
research) type of research that was not done in a laboratory or relied on the 
hypothetico-inductive research design of the more ‘positivistically’ oriented 
mainstream (e.g. Lincoln and Guba 1985; Hirschman 1986; Hudson and 
Ozanne 1988). Initially, the approach was somewhat reconciliatory, with the 
early writers adapting the criteria of ‘positivist’ researchers so as to make 
them conform to qualitatively-oriented ethnographic approaches. The 
classical, and now much criticized (see e.g. Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Holt 
1991; Spiggle 1994; Shankar and Patterson 2001) approach for evaluating 
ethnographic-style consumer research was put forth by Lincoln and Guba 
(1985), who called for interpretivist research that would be evaluated based 
on its 1) credibility, 2) dependability, 3) transferability and 4) confirmability, 
which would be achieved by use of rigorous techniques, such as audits 
(independent research data-to-results assessments), peer debriefings (cross 
checking interpretations among the research team), member checks (cross-
checking interpretations with participants) and triangulation (making 
interpretations across data sources and methods). Similar notions also made 
their way into marketing/consumer research journals (e.g. Hirschman 1986; 
Wallendorf and Belk 1989). 
While Hunt (1991; see also Heath 1992) praised the formulation of such 
criteria, criticism was soon to amass. It was noted that Lincoln and Guba had 
effectively reconstructed the ‘positivist’ criteria (Holt 1991; Spiggle 1994; 
Shankar and Patterson 2001; see also Hudson and Ozanne 1988) of internal 
validity, external validity, reliability and confirmability to constitute 
credibility, dependability, transferability and confirmability (e.g. Hirschman 
1986). This was seen as a loosening some of the ‘positivist’ undertone, yet 
keeping the logos intact: ‘more logic = better, more evidence = better; more 
consistency = better’. Certainly, on a Huntean level of a implicitly pragmatist 
adherence to a form of ‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’, these are all in line with his 
‘utopian’ ideals – but from a more strictly philosophical position (what Hunt 
would perhaps call the ‘philosopher’s fallacy’), such erudition cannot be 
defended. Thus it is the case for this study as well, as it is much inspired, 
among others, by Holt (1991) and Thompson (1990), who launched a strong 
attack against this apologetic form of ‘naturalistic inquiry’ from the 
perspective of interpretive anthropology.  
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Holt’s (1991) and Thompson’s (1990; see also Thompson 1997) basic 
argument is that as a hermeneutical being, no research conducted (and 
thereafter assessed) by human researchers can move towards stable centers 
of any such claims – ‘trust’, ‘credibility’ etc. can only be matters of agreement 
in the aforementioned sociohistorical context – nothing more! No amount of 
tools to enhance the criteria, be they prolonged engagement (in the field site), 
persistent observation, regular on-site team interaction, negative case 
analysis or debriefing by peers can ever (on a epistemological basis) assure us 
of any movement to a more stable ‘truth’ account. While it may be the case 
that such techniques can make the research more convincing in the eyes of 
the researchers in a paradigm (not to mention external stakeholders), that 
again would constitute another pragmatic question, no more. Thompson 
(1990), drawing from Gestalt psychology, takes an epistemologically similar 
perspective – for him, the criteria for good interpretive research is the 
readers’ experience of a sudden insight, a sudden altercation of the 
experiential horizon – in effect the liberation of thought (Eureka!). 
However, one must bear in mind that Holt (1991) is quite clear in his 
remarks about understanding that the ethos in Journal of Consumer 
Research at the time would not have accepted these more radical approaches 
to epistemology. He also notes that the adaptations from the ‘positivist’ 
toolkit to constitute “a valuable storehouse of naturalistic research 
techniques” (ibid.: 61). Yet, the very event of these diverging voices becoming 
heard, in both their philosophical (‘utopian’) and pragmatic (politics of 
paradigms) sense alike contributed to the very pluralistic notion of CCT as a 
field where ‘received views’ are to be perpetually resisted. And indeed, much 
time has passed and ink has been spilled since these notions were printed. 
In addition, in the field of consumer research, Holt (1991) and Thompson 
(1990) were probably among the first to take a position on the problematics 
of representational media, as “A word cannot be apprehended directly; it is 
always inferred on the bases of its parts, and the parts must be conceptually 
and perceptually cut out of the flux of experience” (Clifford 1988: 38, quoted 
by Holt 1991: 57) and to bring interpretive approaches to their logical 
conclusion (one so much unappreciated by Hunt). Thus, there is no 
philosophical basis for defending any other criteria than its insight-inducing 
efficacy and the ability to convince a reader (Thompson 1990; Holt 1991). 
Indeed, how could there ever be a possibility for such stability (or a Huntean 
‘utopian goal’), if the notion of language as a representational medium and 
the hermeneutical cycling between the ever emergent researcher(s) and 
participant(s) is taken seriously on philosophical level? As Holt (1991) notes, 
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“The subjective, contextual nature of the researcher's interpretive task can be no 
different from that of the subject. A ‘correct’ interpretation of meaning is forever 
elusive because an infinite number of interpretations, based on differing 
‘contextual assortments,’ are possible. When meaning is construed as a dialectic 
process between the object and its interpreter, rather than an immanent attribute, 
evaluation of the accuracy of an interpretation, based purely on the methods used, 
becomes impossible” (p. 58) 
 
The logical conclusion articulated by Holt (1991) has also much to do with the 
very ‘anti-positivistic’ notions of the need to have and express researcher 
reflexivity in conducting and reporting research (e.g. Anderson 1986; Clifford 
and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; see also Van Maanen 1995; Ruby 
2000; Brownlie 2006 Pink 2006; Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 2007b), 
which means a constant effort by the researcher to question his/her 
assumptions and the foregrounding of the personal voice of the researcher in 
the written scholarly work. Again, this is not generally intended to produce 
any type of enhanced veracity, verisimilitude or correspondence, but to allow 
for more diverse viewpoints, and thus to craft a more convincing story. Even 
more interestingly, researcher empathy (e.g. Sherry and Schouten 2002; 
Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000) has been 
called for, so that the researcher, in order to produce convincing ethnographic 
work, should be involved in the consumption phenomena in such immersive 
ways that s/he would feel an empathic connection to the context and the 
participants. Obviously, such calls for new approaches that span the whole 
duration of each research project and beyond, slam headfirst into what 
remains of the supposed objectivity of the naïve realist backdrop. Yet, could 
any other approach, even if forever intersubjectively emergent, be more 
convincing for researchers who contemporarily see their work primarily as 
rhetorical devices (e.g. Denzin 2001a; Shankar and Patterson 2001; Kozinets 
and Belk 2006)? 
 
2.3.4  Various Epistemological and Methodological Approaches for 
Different Takes on Knowledge 
 
“If social exchanges are the same as Art, how can we portray them?” (Kip Jones) 
 
CCT is such a vast field of methodological approaches, epistemic pursuits and 
even diverging ontologies (e.g. the recent introduction of Practice Theory into 
CCT, see 2.9 for an overview) that it resists categorization, and indeed, from 
its inception, such a resistance follows consistently from its pluralistic 
underpinnings. Many potential approaches for knowledge production based 
on these foundations have since been offered, not as competitors for a new 
hegemony, but as diverse approaches for different kinds of knowledge 
products and relations. Primarily focusing on various shades of qualitative 
inquiry (e.g. Schwandt 2000; Goulding 2005) these, often liminal approaches 
fuse various epistemological and methodological stances – epistemologies 
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include various ways of ‘locating’ knowledge and thus producing it through 
diverse methodological workbench approaches. 
 
Examples include: 
• Postmodernism (Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; Firat and 
Venkatesh 1995; Firat and Dholakia 2006) 
 
• Ethnography (Celsi, Rose and Leigh 1993; Arnould and Wallendorf 
1994; Peñaloza 1994; Schouten and McAlexander 1995; Kozinets 
2001; Arnould and Price 2006; Üstüner and Holt 2007; Goulding et 
al. 2009) 
 
• Existential-phenomenology (Thompson, Locander and Pollio 1989; 
Thompson and Haytko 1997; Goulding 2005) 
 
• Hermeneutics (Arnold and Fischer 1994; Thompson 1997) 
 
• Semiotics (Holbrook and Grayson 1986; Mick 1986; Sherry and 
Camargo 1987; Arnold, Kozinets and Handelman 2001; Goulding 
2005) 
 
• Introspection (Gould 1991, 1995; Wallendorf and Brucks 1993; Brown 
1998a; Holbrook 2005) 
 
• Critical Theory (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Bristor and Fischer 1993; 
Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 2001a) 
 
• Deconstruction (Stern 1996a, 1996b, 1998) 
 
• Practice Theory (Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Shove and Pantzar 
2005; Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009; Halkier and Jensen 2011; 
Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011) 
 
• Netnography (Kozinets 2002a, 2009) 
 
• Critique of representation (Smithee 1997 [you may or may not know 
the man behind the name]; Brown 1998b; Schouten 1998; Sherry and 
Schouten 2002; Bochner and Ellis 2003; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; 
Kozinets and Belk 2006) 
  
At first glance it would seem that these pluralistic research endeavors fulfill 
Anderson’s wishes in their eclecticism and criticality. Yet, such a diverse field 
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made it difficult for researchers in the interpretative minority stream(s) to 
assume a research identity – a critical shortcoming in academia from a 
pragmatic perspective. Thus, Arnould and Thompson (2005) coined the label 
Consumer Culture Theory (CCT) to conceptually organize the work conducted 
during the previous two decades. 
 
As noted by Arnould and Thompson (2005): 
 
“Consumer culture theory is fulfilling the recurrent calls of consumer research’s 
thought leaders for a distinctive body of theoretical knowledge about consumption 
and marketplace behaviors. It strives to systematically link individual level (or 
idiographic) meanings to different levels of cultural processes and structure and then 
to situate these relationships within historical and marketplace contexts. It presents a 
continual reminder that consumption is a historically shaped mode of sociocultural 
practice that emerges within the structures and ideological imperatives of dynamic 
marketplaces” (p. 875) 
 
Likewise: 
 
“Interpretive methods are capable of uncovering paradoxes in thoughts and 
behaviour, and revealing the nature and structure of consumer rationales and 
justifications, making them especially appropriate for examining this situation 
wherein people’s stated attitudes and behaviours differ. Moreover, this approach 
allows us to examine the holistic influence of culture, rather than utilizing particular 
reductionistic dimensions of culture” (Belk, Devinney and Eckhardt 2005: 279-280) 
 
A contrarian view to epistemology: 
 
“The time for obfuscation and obscurantism masquerading as profundity is past; the 
time for reasoned rethinking is just beginning” (Hunt 1994: 24) 
 
While on the ‘other side’, in no loose terms: 
 
“In social sciences today there is no longer a God’s eye view that guarantees absolute 
methodological certainty. All inquiry reflects the standpoint of the inquirer. All 
observation is theory-laden. There is no possibility of theory- or value-free 
knowledge. The days of naive realism and naive positivism are over” (Denzin 2001a: 
325) 
 
While rumors of such demise may be greatly exaggerated, CCT has indeed 
become established as a field of interpretive inquiry into the nature of 
knowledge uncovered via holistic field site experiences; certainly not in the 
laboratory. As Belk (1998) states, “As qualitative researchers we are the 
explorers who leave our desks and go out and observe and talk to consumers 
in their natural environments. And it is up to us to preserve and present some 
of the richness and humanity of the consumers we encounter and their 
worlds, despite the grown-ups […] who would reduce this complexity to 
numbers” (p. 309-310). Additionally, CCT is loosely unified through its links 
to an ontology of constructivism and epistemological interpretivism (of which 
the former is now somewhat questioned by the recent introduction of Practice 
Theory) and its interest in understanding profound, rich and culturally 
complex and overlapping phenomena. This inquiry has consistently defied 
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‘progression’, ‘truth’ or ‘reductionism’ of the more ‘positivistically’ orientated 
discourses, as “Owning to its internal, fragmented complexity, consumer 
culture does not determine action as a causal force” (Arnould and Thompson 
2005: 869). 
Earlier attempts to establish a ‘field’ for interpretive research have been 
made as well. Hudson and Ozanne (1988) contrasted the interpretive against 
the ‘positivist’ and Shankar and Patterson (2001) constructed the ‘ICR’ 
(Interpretive Consumer Research) concept in their review of interpretive 
epistemologies in consumer research. They projected a very poststructuralist 
future with lessening influence of the ‘positivist’ backdrop, increasing 
influence of reflexivity and even artistic approaches (Shankar and Patterson 
2001). 
More recently, CCT scholars have been characterized as contextually 
investigating the “sociocultural processes and structures related to 1) 
consumer identity projects, 2) marketplace cultures, 3) the sociohistoric 
patterning of consumption, and 4) mass-mediated marketplace ideologies 
and consumers’ interpretive strategies” (Arnould and Thompson 2005: 871), 
and to situate these ideas of marketplace phenomena into historical 
marketplace contexts. While both the concept ‘CCT’ and the fourfold 
categorization of the research approaches have been criticized for being a 
totalizing closed system and as trying to establish a new logocentric ‘theory’ 
towards which to progress, Arnould and Thompson (2007) clarify their 
position by insisting that the CCT label was set up mostly to pragmatically 
improve the academic careers of interpretive researchers by giving them a 
vernacular rallying point, and that “Our framework for mapping this diversity 
into four clusters of theoretical interest should be used as an orienting device 
and nothing more” (Arnould and Thompson 2007: 6). Indeed, the framework 
is expanding as we speak. A recent Facebook update by Eric Arnould noted: 
"Most importantly it made me think that the work that Craig Thompson, 
Zeynep Arsel, Gokcen Coskuner-Balli, Aric Rinfleisch, Markus Giesler, Ashley 
Humphries, Melea Press and others have been doing, some of Rob Kozinets 
and colleagues work for instance, about market creation, formation, and 
reformulation is really an important direction for CCT not captured in the 
fourfold theoretics Craig and I wrote about almost 7 years ago”. It seems that, 
criticism notwithstanding, the CCT framework is working satisfactorily in 
providing nonlimiting systematization that is open for extensions – exactly 
what Arnould and Thompson called for (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 
2007). 
Arnould and Thompson (2005, 2007) also provide a practical account of the 
shortcomings of CCT researchers in their jargon and in their ability to 
construct linkages to other academic discourses in promoting their cause – 
seemingly persistent challenges, as I was most recently involved in such a 
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debate at the CCT5 and the ACR 2011 conferences. The current problems of a 
minority field notwithstanding, there is also a flipside that I feel has 
constituted much of the driving force behind CCT. Not taking any 
epistemology for granted and the lack of a single theoretical and 
methodological focus can (and does) translate into a greater degree of 
freedom to pursue a diversity of research interests. This position, combined 
with a brazen approach to take philosophical questions seriously, can allow 
the CCT field to further evolve rather than to stagnate. Yet, as noted by 
Arnould and Thompson (2005, 2007), there is a more pragmatic game of 
institutional politics that needs to be played, as CCT researchers still 
constitute a small minority in the academic hallways of top-tier university 
departments.  
One movement that has been seen as somewhat problematic by many, has 
consisted of the ‘flirtations’ some CCT researchers have been making with 
other areas of inquiry, for example by incorporating more artistic approaches 
into the ongoing academic discourse. Such endeavors should not be 
surprising, as artistic modes of expression, such as poetry, visual 
representations and ethnographic fictions have certainly made recent inroads 
into other academic disciplines, such as anthropology and sociology, and, 
more close to home, into the discourse of organization theory (e.g. Goodall 
2000; Denzin 2001a; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Bochner and Ellis 2003). 
But how can such an intermingling of epistemic pursuits be maintained, after 
all, is artistic expression not wrapped around a completely different pole from 
‘science’ if seen as: 
 
“The creation of art is a ritually potent sphere often connected in human history to 
gift giving, mysticism, animism, irrationalism, countercultural movements, and 
authenticity” (Kozinets 2002b: 30) 
 
“Producing interesting theoretical perspectives is, I think, a matter of rejecting the 
premises of science and embracing those of art […] That is, in our data collection and 
representation we should eschew the cold precision and hollow mechanical language 
of science in order to become both literary and visual artists in crafting compelling 
documents for today’s visual world” (Belk 1998: 331) 
 
And indeed, while some see these movements as posing a risk for CCT in its 
striving to become further established under academic auspices (Arnould and 
Thompson 2005), such thinking is well in line with the 
postmodern/poststructuralist movements. This fear is certainly relevant from 
a pragmatic perspective, if it is believed that such liberty in academic 
expression will automatically mean decreased relevance in the political game 
of academic prowess. Yet, if we continue to move further from the arcane 
notion of truths-for-certain, or the progression towards a single truth, would 
it not be curious if different expressive approaches would not be accepted as 
well, or as Kavanagh (1994) states, “if marketing is to provide new insights 
[…] it should broaden its attendant philosophical discussion from the 
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philosophy of science to aesthetics, metaphysics, technology and theology” (p. 
36; see also Belk 1986). Bold claims indeed, and perhaps some of the ongoing 
tensions reflect the insecurities of some researchers in the CCT community, 
who feel (and rightly so) that they have battled so long for more qualitatively-
oriented approaches against ‘the numbers as truth’ approach that they feel 
these new types of expressions will jeopardize the ongoing political game, or 
as Kozinets and Belk (2006) put it in terms of videographic work: “Somehow, 
the association with art deprivileges and delegitimizes videography, making it 
seem more entertainment than knowledge” (p. 343). As will be discussed 
further in this study, there is indeed a pressing need to take the epistemic 
implications of such ‘entertainment’ very seriously (see also Martin, Schouten 
and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006). 
A balance between expressive strategies and epistemological approaches 
will hopefully emerge in such ways that CCT research will not forevermore 
continue to be touted as consisting of ‘entertaining esoterica’, something 
unscientific and without relevance (Arnould and Thompson 2005, 2007; see 
also Belk 2009). Yet, it seems that CCT researchers often appear to feel that 
they are the producers of relevance in consumer research if anyone is, a 
notion that we can hear echoing since as early as the 30’s, when the first 
frustrations with the inapplicability of research solely utilizing quantitative 
methods emerged (Levy 2006; see also Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 
2006; Sunderland 2006 for a contemporary perspective). Indeed, it does 
seem that while it is admitted that there were some shortcomings in the 
project to market the CCT field (Arnould and Thompson 2007), the relevance 
question has not received sufficient interest. But what would be ‘relevance’ for 
CCT? And how could such relevance be marketed amidst the 
intercolumniations of prestigious academic hallways? At least in Europe, it 
seems that ethnographic approaches are swiftly making their way into 
managers’ decision-makings regarding corporate research activities and 
projects, not to compete, but to coexist with conventional quantitative 
approaches. Concurrently, numerous market research organizations offering 
‘ethnographic only’ research are beginning to mushroom around us. Indeed, 
there are many examples where managers seem to have surpassed the 
creativity of expression which we now pursue in academia e.g. in terms of 
utilizing ethnographic storytelling and videography (Belk and Kozinets 
2005a; Martin, Schouten and McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006). Is this 
a promise for future relevance? And yet, is it not the promise of CCT to go 
much further? Indeed, why do we always seem to be axiomatically indebted 
to the managers in their respective organizations (see also Holbrook 1985; 
Sherry 2008)? Should it not be, as stated already long ago by Arndt (1976) 
that: “The ‘self-evident’ orientation toward marketing practitioners as the key 
reference group could well be replaced by an endorsement of a true consumer 
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frame of reference” (p. 218). It would seem, that one task of CCT could be to 
continue to go beyond such given positions and to tap into the society around 
us from the perspective of the consumers and their well-being (Murray and 
Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 2001a). Could such, 
still somewhat nascent, approaches open doors for completely new 
bedfellows, such as non-profit organizations and government interest 
groups? Would that be a new source of relevance? Time will tell. 
 
2.3.5  Early Proliferations of CCT’s Interpretive Epistemologies 
 
While CCT, from its inception some three decades ago, has been on the 
forefront of interpretive inquiry in marketing/consumer research, we can 
today see its nascent proliferation to other fields of marketing. These links 
and growing interests to add more plurality into research approaches are 
most easily spotted in the often closely related field of retailing (e.g. Arnold, 
Kozinets and Handelman 2001; Kozinets et al. 2002; Borghini et al. 2009) by 
bringing in immersive ethnographic approaches and semiotic analysis, in the 
fields of relationship marketing (e.g. Gummesson 2000, 2003, 2005) and 
business-to-business marketing (e.g. Cova and Salle 2008; Borghini, Carù 
and Cova 2010) so as to generally advocate for the recognition of 
interpretivism and its openness to various methodological approaches as 
epistemologically relevant for the production different types of knowledge. 
In addition, CCT has become to incorporate some perspectives from other 
fields of marketing, notably from the field of relationship marketing with the 
advent of ‘Service-Dominant Logic’ (e.g. Vargo and Lusch 2004, 2006). This 
work has been initiated by Peñaloza and Venkatesh (2006), who, in line with 
the basic tenets of S-D Logic, stress the value of market offerings in use, to 
further the notion of markets as historically contextual social constructions, 
where the producer/consumer dichotomy is becoming increasingly 
problematic as consumers become seen as social collectives that are active 
producers, not only ‘receivers’ of value (see also Cova and Dalli 2009). 
Similarly, Arnould (2006) explored the concept of the consumer in 
accordance with S-D Logic and found linkages between value creation in 
active experiencing and consuming for the construction of more 
managerially-oriented possibilities into the CCT toolkit. 
I wish to end this admittedly brief overview of CCT research with some very 
recent echoes from the field. By attending both the CCT5 conference in 
Evanston and the ACR2011 in St. Louis, I have come to sense some recent 
developments that are bubbling under the surface, perhaps to emerge in the 
near future.  
Growing interest seems to be amassing around inquiry into the material 
spaces and temporality, that would allow for some reconsideration of the 
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established epistemological approaches anchored in symbolism and 
retrospective meaning-makings. These approaches move the unit of analysis 
from meaning-makings into the spatiotemporal emergence and evolution of 
consumption without forgetting the agency of the material (nonhuman) 
realm. Additionally, interest in consumer well-being and ‘transformative 
consumer research’ (TCR) seem to be gaining considerable ground as well. 
These shifts are accompanied with further interest in the critique and 
experimentation with various types of representational approaches. It seems 
to me that critical research, videography and even neoromantic approaches, 
such as poetry and more mystical aspects of consumption, may continue to be 
growing hot topics. Recently, the proverbial grapevine has been buzzing with 
talk about reigniting the more philosophically oriented debate in the Journal 
of Consumer Research.  
Additionally, evolutionary aspects of marketplaces and consumption are 
seemingly emerging as a new locus of interest. There is a noticeable 
movement from synchronic 'snapshot' research approaches and 
representations to longitudinal assessments of marketplace dynamics of 
consumption and consumer communities (e.g. Giesler 2008). This would 
appear to relate to the aforementioned Facebook quote by Eric Arnould (see 
2.3.4). 
And while there has been considerable debate about which academic 
discourses could team up with CCT approaches, it would seem that nothing 
very impactful and lasting has so far come about. From my perspective, what 
would seem to be most promising at this point would be the increasing 
adoption and cross-pollination of practice theory (e.g. Schau, Muñiz and 
Arnould 2009; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011), organization theory 
(first suggested by Deshpande and Webster 1989), consumer well-being from 
critical theory perspectives (first suggested by Murray and Ozanne 1991; see 
also Denzin 2001a), and even post-materialism (e.g. McLarney and Chung 
1999). Certainly, these are my own fleeting ruminations, but at the very least 
it would seem that CCT is filling its promise of continuing to be a divergent 
and evolving field. 
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2.3.6  Videography in CCT 
 
“Someone needs to do for film what William Ivins did for prints (1953) and Estelle 
Jussim did for photography (1983) – that is, explore the transformative potential of 
film on the human self-image. Now that human beings can see themselves in a way 
not possible with the unaided eye, what do they see and what are the consequences? 
[…] I know of no scholarly literature dealing with the uses of image technology that 
does not suffer from a naïve belief in the objective quality of photographed data or 
concentrate on the technical […] For ethnographic film to succeed, audiences must 
understand that they are looking at an introspection – a thick description – by an 
ethnographer based on his or her experiences in trying to understand the social 
reality of those portrayed and not a ‘copy of nature’” (Jay Ruby) 
 
“Reworking memory and tradition as fantastic forms of cultural desire – rather than 
sites of authenticity – ontologies of loss can become allegories of desire” (Catherine 
Russell) 
 
“We believe that this issue [first CMC DVD special issue 2005] will break several 
bounadaries toward a better future of scholarship. It is a first of its kind but will not 
be the last” (Fuat Firat) 
 
With the initiation of a videographic session at ACR in 2000, consumer 
research utilizing the audiovisual moving image has now traversed a journey 
over a decade long (Belk and Kozinets 2010). However, utilizing video as a 
way to produce ethnographic data in consumer research goes much further, 
in fact, to the very beginnings of CCT-oriented research approaches, as video 
cameras were present in the ‘consumer research odyssey’ (e.g. Belk 1987; 
Sherry 1987; see also 2.3.3). In addition, the field of documentary-type 
videographic work has already spanned a period of close to a century, from 
when the anthropologist Robert Flaherty conducted his seminal film study 
Nanook of the North about the Inuit life near Hudson’s Bay (Belk and 
Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 
2009; Belk 2011). More recently, with the proliferation of affordable 
technologies and an emergence of a more video-oriented culture (Belk 2001; 
Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006), the submissions to the 
ACR ‘Film Festival’ have become increasingly internationally diverse and 
technically proficient (Belk and Kozinets 2010). Yet, to date, one is at a loss to 
find more than a handful of publications considering the methodological 
issues of this medium and its expression at academic venues (see Belk and 
Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 
2009; Belk 2011, for notable exceptions). Moreover, while these extant 
articles have been informative and useful, time still seems to await for a more 
thorough and systematic consideration about the medium’s possible 
ontological and epistemological potential as well as practical workbench 
approaches. This state of being became the driving force behind this work. 
As we have seen, CCT embraces inquiry with diverse epistemologies and 
pluralistic methods and has already made inroads into potential alternative 
modes of expressing research than the proverbial ‘academic technical style of 
prose’. To go further, the fact that most research in the field has been 
  45 
represented in a textual format alone is beginning to seem regrettable (De 
Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009), and moreover, “even with fewer 
exceptions it has been silent” (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335). It is certainly 
striking how little normative (not in the ‘there is one right form’ sense) work 
has been published on the workbench level of making of ethnographic 
research on video medium (Russell 1999; see also Marcoux and Legoux 2005 
for a notable exception), probably a symptom (and perhaps a great 
opportunity) of the field’s continuing nascence and the difficulty of defining 
it. 
In fact, accounting for the history of the videographic method in consumer 
research is a surprisingly irritating task, if one in looking to find any 
videographies dating before the first Consumption, Markets & Culture special 
issue in 2005 (see Appendix 2 for a table of the two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; 
Vol. 10]). What seems that we are left with are some miscellaneous ACR 
addresses and personal conversations with the pioneers to go by (as I 
attended my first film festival as late as in 2008), together with the abstracts 
of the ACR and CMC special issue video submissions that often have very 
little to do with the making of the video itself (rather resembling ‘mini-
articles’). Initial concerns, somewhat typical while indeed very pressing, 
concerned the possibility of peer reviewing videographic research and the 
ability of tenure track boards to evaluate them, but they also recognized the 
potential for video media to reach wider audiences, as compared to written 
research papers in academic journals (Belk 2001). Throughout the 
subsequent years, the international submissions were quick to outnumber the 
American-based, and a multitude of expressive approaches and increasing 
technical skills have emerged (Belk and Kozinets 2011). 
While few in number, the publications in the field have outlined an easily 
approachable foundation to build on. The most pressing question is certainly 
why to engage in this type of methodology at all – what is that is different 
about video that warrants its utilization? 
In extant work on videography, CCT scholars have attempted to establish an 
initial foundation regarding a general need for video as a medium via which 
to express research. Kozinets and Belk (2006) noted the life of consumers to 
be distinguished “not merely by thoughts, attitudes and concepts, but by the 
colors, shapes, noises, motions and sounds of people and things in constant 
interaction […] consumer culture is bright and noisy” (p. 335) and video “can 
be resonant, emotional, vibrant and humanizing [providing audiences a] 
vicarious sense of experience that deepens understanding and fosters 
empathy” (p. 340). Likewise, it has been noted that while ethnographic data 
production makes wide use of visual aids and contextual settings, researchers 
have commonly only included such images in the appendixes of published 
textual work, almost as an afterthought (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009; 
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see e.g. Peñaloza 1998 for a notable exception). Some have made inroads into 
other videographic approaches as well, utilizing multi-methods for the 
consideration of more metrics-oriented research on how to better produce 
‘accurate’ representations (Spanjaard and Freeman 2007), and while not 
exactly in line with the CCT underpinnings of this study, illustrate the 
multiple ways of how video could be utilized in research stemming from 
diverse ontological and epistemological underpinnings. 
The problematic epistemic nature of the video medium has also become 
widely recognized. Kozinets and Belk (2006) raise this issue by 
acknowledging an inherent dualism regarding the medium: “As a grounded 
reality, videography could be thought to be much more like the real world […] 
these arguments tend to mistake videographic simulation for reality […] 
videographies are narratives just as surely as are written texts” (p. 339). Thus 
for them, the comparison of video work with the realm of art rather than of 
science does not constitute much of a menace; in fact “seeing research as 
equal parts art and science can be extremely liberating” (p. 343). Then again, 
along with some ‘positivist’ notions of CCT as “entertaining esoterica” 
(Arnould and Thompson 2005: 870; see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a), or as 
the ‘appetizer’ (Belk 2009; see also Sunderland 2006) for ‘real’ science, this is 
hardly a surprise. Legitimization may have to be arrived on by internally 
expanding the field together with the ever-intensifying proliferation of video 
technologies, as we seem to have firmly come past the adoption-of-positivist-
trappings by now. Where might this acceptance of artistic pluralism take us? 
Is there any rescue from our academic practice becoming art? Should there 
be? Many contemporary scholars have begun to reject this ‘danger’ and are 
starting to embrace it (e.g. Belk 1998; Denzin 2001b; Sherry and Schouten 
2002; Ellis and Bochner 2003; Kozinets and Belk 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 
2006; see also Van Maanen 1995; Russell 1999). We have seen from the 
modernistic and realist inclination of some visual anthropologists, that a 
historical commitment to objectivity renders the moving image too easily into 
the realm of ‘empirical evidence’ alone (e.g. Russell 1999). The same would 
seemingly be the case regarding some of the lingering realism in CCT and the 
ideas to ‘better capture the reality’ in terms of videographic work. Certainly, 
there will be no conclusive pragmatic solution to these issues here – rather, 
how can we maintain our philosophically intricate positions in the future, 
while remaining relevant in a world (still) seemingly too hesitant to accept 
them. What seems to be sometimes insufficiently discussed is that such a 
movement for gaining political ground for relevance is perhaps not one of 
argumentation or articulation, but of carving our own established positions in 
academic auspices. Let us be reflexive when undertaking such uninvitingly 
hegemonic pursuits. 
  47 
As we have seen, at a workbench level, Kozinets and Belk (2006) crafted 
four criteria as a stating point for discussions to assist CCT videographers in 
their work – the 1) topical criterion the 2) theoreticality criterion, the 3) 
theatreticality criterion and the 4) technicalty criterion. Their concerns were 
that videographies in CCT need to focus on consumption phenomena (while 
the field is certainly broad), that the finished works should go beyond mere 
descriptions and also incorporate theory-building, that videos need to take 
advantage of the medium by telling convincing and evocative stories, and that 
the technical expertise needs to be sufficient so as to not undermine the 
potential insightfulness of the work (as is surely the case with textual 
expression as well). They go on to recognize that such criteria are intended as 
liberating rather than restricting – something of guidance and on which to 
build – as we will later attempt (see 3.3.1). 
In the literature, one also finds a more pragmatic backdrop. It is not only 
that video opens new avenues for producing, analyzing and expressing 
research, but it also seems that many companies have increasingly become 
interested in using it both for internal communications and for learning about 
the contexts of consumers’ consumption practices, not to mention that video 
has become virtually expected as a teaching aid in classrooms (e.g. Belk and 
Kozinets 2005a; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Yet, there is still no 
firmly established, respected and citable repository (or ‘journal’) of quality 
videographic work in consumer research, and the field is still in its early 
stages in terms of making its voice heard and in building its influence from 
within (Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This 
renders extant work to offer very little academic traction – and even a 
persisting ephemerality (Belk 2011). But while printed work may have more 
physical gravitas, we may remind ourselves of Cubitt’s (1991) arguments and 
reconsider the nature of the medium, so that it does not compete with text in 
a futile attempt to mimic, for example, journal publication structures, but 
rather, to embrace the potential differences and put them to full use.  
Contemporary videography, by its very digital nature, is not confined onto 
pages or within incumbent journal institutions – it is free to express and 
popularize academic research through the Internet. Video is not text, it is not 
a faithful image of reality, and it will most certainly resist a lockdown by the 
modern gatekeepers of academic knowledge production. It is of pure illusion, 
but has the potential to be very convincing due to its inherent experiential, 
resonant and vibrant nature. Video is not a ‘representation’ or ‘reproduction’, 
it is an expressive ‘encounter’ (see also Deleuze 1994a). The question is how 
we can understand what this encounter is like (the ‘bright and noisy’ the 
‘more real’ etc.) and how this nature can be put to use for it to be convincing 
in whatever pragmatic sense we are striving for. 
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Let us conclude this section by briefly considering the two special DVD 
issues of Consumption, Markets & Culture (see Appendix 2 for a table of the 
two CMC DVD issues [Vol. 8; Vol. 10]). These constitute some of the first 
examples of videographic work in consumer research that have been 
published in a refereed academic journal. The form (from what I hear due to 
publication reasons) was the following: the authors were instructed to 
produce brief ‘printable’ textual accounts of their videographies that were 
published in the issues alongside a DVD disc. However, perhaps due to the 
nascence of this form of publication, a distinct separation between the textual 
accounts and the videographic works seems to have emerged. The brief 
textual accounts seem to resemble ‘mini-articles’, where the role of the video 
is not brought to the forefront. There seems to be a considerable emphasis on 
presenting the video only as a part of the research, or seeing the videography 
as a supplement to the textual account (again as something of an 
‘afterthought’). In fact, in many of these studies, ‘videography’ is not included 
in the keywords at all. Only a few studies reversed this practice and gave 
predominance to the videography by giving the text a more explanatory role – 
usually for establishing descriptions of background information (Henry and 
Caldwell 2007; Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007). Some went even further to 
problematize the nature of videography itself in the textual account (Marcoux 
and Legoux 2005; Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007).  
In fact, only Marcoux and Legoux (2005) make their concerns explicit 
regarding the reasons for conducting videographic research in academia. 
Instead of a companion or an account of theoretical or conceptual 
background information, their text provides an interestingly detailed 
description of their practices of videography production, from the in situ 
empirical work to their decisions on the editing table. In their descriptions of 
video practice, the emergent and iterative (even haphazard) nature of video 
work takes precedence, as their original visit to the site was not initially 
intended to become the videographic production under review, the idea for 
which emerged from only three minutes of data through sudden realization 
facilitated by the “show up effect” (Marcoux and Legoux 2005: 243) of video 
material (see also Hastrup 1992). As video expresses contextual relations it 
goes beyond the reflections in fieldnotes, thus making for the possibility to 
foreground unconsidered contextual relationships post facto. MacDougall 
(2001) sees similar advantages to video contra costly and cumbersome film 
production, as “This kind of unexpected by-product – the possibility of going 
off tangent – is, I think, one of the further benefits of the turn to video” (p. 
20). This difference in the medium contra other expressive forms will be 
further developed as we proceed, and concluded in chapter III. Practical 
considerations regarding utilizing the special properties of the medium will 
be further considered in the Production chapter (see IV). 
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To move on to consider how producing and viewing videography can 
provide convincing illusions and experiences, let us finish this chapter with 
two quotes from Deleuze, whose work on ontology, epistemology and 
cinematographic film we will turn to next, in order to further our perspectives 
on what aesthetics videographic researchers in CCT could employ to make 
video in consumer research an ever more convincing medium. 
 
“What the artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is not to be achieved, formed or 
reproduced; it has to be created” and “Like the cathedral, its only quality is to have 
been made by men. Thus it is not hidden by appearances; it is, on the contrary, which 
hides appearances and provides them with an alibi” (Deleuze 1989: 146) 
 
“Something in the world forces us to think. This something is an object not of 
recognition but a fundamental encounter” (Deleuze 1994a: 139) 
 
 
2.4  Videography in CCT, a Deleuzian Perspective 
 
“The image itself is a the system of relationships between its elements, that is, a set of 
relationships of time from which the variable present only flows” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
In the previous sections, we have briefly explored the nature of the video 
medium as a ‘thing’ in and of itself, as well as some preliminary approaches to 
videographic research (as a work of interpretive production and as an 
academic expression of research). I intended for these considerations to work 
as ‘awareness raisers’, initial considerations as we continue towards 
considering video as an aesthetic, reciprocal and experiential medium that is 
potentially very different from the experiences of textual accounts of inquiry. 
However, in constructing an ontology and epistemology for videography in 
consumer research, specifically in CCT, we first need to mine for some more 
resources from possible philosophical underpinnings. To do so, I will adopt 
something of a Deleuzian ontology for understanding the experiencing of 
video and ‘being’ in general. Gilles Deleuze, one of the prominent French 
philosophical thinkers of the contemporary era, has written extensively on the 
ontology of being from the perspective of ‘sense’ (Deleuze 1990/1969), 
representation (Deleuze 1994a/1968), philosophy (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994b/1991) and, fittingly, cinema (Deleuze 1986/1983, 1989/1985). One 
disclaimer begs to be mentioned here: this study concentrates specifically on 
videographic research, and is therefore by no means an attempt to do any 
justice to the voluminous writings of Deleuze. Rather, as I will later suggest, I 
merely wish to appreciate some perspectives of the Deleuzian approach(es) 
that I can adapt and incorporate to my exploration of videographic research. 
As a thinker, Deleuze is notoriously inaccessible and complicated, even 
frustrating (Bogue 2003; Colebrook 2006; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009), 
and it is suggested that his texts are not meant to be read and deciphered, but 
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rather read “along with Deleuze” (Bogue 2003: 2). Or as Conley (1993) 
exquisitely puts it: 
 
“The sentences do not reflect a law, but vary on their implicit form. They are 
declarative; often composed of two or three independent clauses connected by a 
colon or conjunctions; unlike a classical concept, they do not seek to recall the origin 
of a signatory stamp. Attention is shunted away from their composition to the logical 
process that makes their linkage appear as an unfolding of ideas and shapes […] The 
chapters can be read in any order; their conclusions are enveloped everywhere in the 
‘machinic’ manner of the text” (p. xix) 
 
There is a very distinct reason, however, for Deleuze’s elliptic and indirect 
style of writing, a form that often embraces the incomprehensible. While 
Deleuze might resist this classification, due to an aversion to being 
compartmentalized into any overarching ‘ism’ or structure, his ontology often 
seems thoroughly postmodern or poststructuralist, many a time seemingly 
borderlining the profoundly nihilistic, while simultaneously retaining some 
forms of vitalism and emancipatory possibilities that extend to mysticism 
(e.g. Colebrook 2006; Williams 2008; Hughes 2009). Yet, there are several 
structures Deleuze utilizes in his complex analysis. In fact, the whole universe 
is a structure in which relational ‘molecular becoming’ emergently undergoes. 
This materialism becomes elevated in the creative thought of humans, where 
creativity itself transcends the system, but an inherent part of it goes on to 
resonate with it further. Thus, he does not deny a structural underpinning (or 
the usefulness of structural thinking), but rather focuses on the 
transcendental nature of our access to them (through language), and that our 
knowledge of them is forever uncertain (and never beyond the system but 
constitutive in and of it – why I use the concept ‘expression’, see 1.1). Yet, he 
is certainly “not anti-science, but opposed to an often concealed philosophical 
restriction of thought under the banner of a defense of fact-based science” 
(Williams 2008: 32). Indeed, while most philosophical accounts have to do 
with knowing the world and the justifications for that knowledge (facts), the 
notion of subjectivity or the meanings or intentions, Deleuze’s primary 
interest is in something more fundamental that underlies these structures. 
Facts, while important, are merely ephemeral ideas/concepts, and in inquiry, 
mask more profound inner states on the lower levels of consciousness. It is 
for these reasons that Deleuze is opposed to any stability in concepts, such as 
‘meaning’, ‘truth’ or ‘being’ in itself. Rather than ‘cognition’, ‘understanding’, 
‘knowledge’ or ‘truth’, Deleuze’s ontology is substantially more fundamental – 
an indefinite becoming of relational events.  
In his account of being, Deleuze (1990) initially operates on a level beyond 
consciousness or cognition – to him, all experience is an emergent becoming 
of senses in a constant interplay of increasing and decreasing intensities on 
the lowest levels of consciousness or in the realm of the precognitive (Deleuze 
1990; Hughes 2009). To exemplify this complexity, he gives an example from 
Alice in Wonderland, where, in a particular scene, Alice increases in size as 
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compared to what she previously was, but as Deleuze notes, she 
simultaneously decreases in her sense of her smaller Alice (Williamson 2008: 
28). Through this notion, we can immediately see the nonlinearity of the 
Deleuzean perspective – all sense shifts in intensity simultaneously between 
two poles. A similar relation is present in the simultaneous fear and joy when 
we open an old photograph album, as we fear to see how distant we have 
become with respect to our childhood, all the while we are content with 
becoming closer to our fond memories (Williams 2008: 29). Such shifts in 
experiential intensities go on to pose a fundamental problem that is central to 
Deleuze. Our language fails in describing them. As Hughes (2009) states, “We 
then realize it is impossible to speak of intensity and precisely because “we 
have no language to express what is in becoming’” (p. 20). Thus, we see that 
language in itself poses a problem for Deleuze, as well as the notion of 
constant ephemerality of the shifting experience – a shift that is unutterable 
and always occurs in between two poles, moving away from something while 
approaching something else. As Williamson states: 
 
“Supposing that we do not – and cannot – say what we mean (the full sense we 
generate as a presupposition), the regression is then that each time we attempt to 
capture our presupposed sense we generate another one, to infinity […] ‘We always 
have more sense than we think’ [or can ever express in language]” (Williamson 2008: 
54) 
 
This is becoming and emergence for Deleuze, an unsettling qualitative 
shifting between intensities of the past and the future, making our present an 
emergent flux on the move. 
While some hastily label Deleuze’s work as utterly unbecoming sophism, for 
the more contemplative it should now come as no surprise why he was 
compelled to write in such a fashion. He is constantly testing the limits of 
language, for: 
 
“We write only at the frontiers of our knowledge, at the border which separates our 
knowledge from our ignorance and transforms the one into the other. Only in this 
manner are we resolved to write. To satisfy ignorance is to put off writing until 
tomorrow – or rather, to make it impossible” (Deleuze 1994: xxi) 
 
Thus, his wordplays, sentences, and chapters that begin out of nowhere and 
seem to end similarly, are seemingly his way of proving the point. As he 
analyzes the unutterable and this ephemeral and eternally elusive experience 
that is constantly on the move (no stable structure to utilize or return to), he 
brings it forth in text that is composed of indirect discourse (Hughes 2009). 
As there is no center, logos, or structure to represent, he goes on to show this 
by only attempting to seed new becomings and new relations, within his text, 
between the text and the reader and between the reader and the world. The 
text thus aspires not to situate itself or the reader, but to bring about new 
experiences by moving the reader from his/her comfort zone. This comes 
about in indirect, elliptic and circular writing, by contradicting himself and by 
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extensive use of paradoxes (like the Alice example) and humor. The text 
strives to make the reader puzzled and uncertain in order to invoke new 
experiences of becoming that stretch infinitely to new relations beyond the 
reader. 
 
2.4.1  Sense, Event, Series, Singularity 
 
Central to Deleuzean philosophy are the concepts of sense, series and the 
event. Put simply (if this only were possible), the sense is a change in 
intensity in the lower levels of consciousness. Within the changes of intensity 
in these shifting senses, our being and action becomes lunged forward in 
social and cultural settings and in all forms of life. The sense always stretches 
into two directions, toward an increasing intensity and away from another. It 
is never cognition that speaks, because there is always sense before it 
(Williams 2008: 91). Indeed, cognition expects a ‘completed’ and static state 
whereas sense is prior (i.e. the emerging sensation) in becoming. 
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Videography note (2): 
 
 
Emerging intensities of senses and their expression can be interpreted in BIP as the 
second author (the autoethnographic researcher) explains defeat while being close to 
tears. In this scene he moves toward a realization of defeat but equally constructs 
possibilities that may lie in the future. 
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Additionally, in the course of the both the PTS and the PMW projects, the 
autoethnographic member expressed multiple feelings of distancing, while becoming 
more analytically aware of the social practices he used to enthusiastically engage in his 
community, he simultaneously notes a melancholy sense of disenchantment. While 
moving toward understanding, intensities seem to carry with them a simultaneous 
emergent distanciation, even melancholy, banality. 
 
 
 
For Deleuze, senses become constituted into events, and the event is 
something that lunges the subconscious to experience new intensities, a 
“novel selection in ongoing and continually altering series” (Williams 2008: 
2). All of experience, the collective being of all things thus becomes a 
resonating and indefinite rhizomatic mesh of senses and events that connect 
and interconnect into an infinite series where one event changes one sense 
and its becoming in the series (say, action in a social setting), which causes 
events in other series (how the sense of other beings [human and nonhuman] 
in the setting is altered), resonating and creating new senses in relations 
without end. There is a sort of structural-poststructural distinction about 
sense and its intensities here, as we see (somewhat paradoxically) how 
Deleuze breaks out of the stability of cognitivism to connect it with the 
structures of material (and bodily) emergence. Rational pursuits are thus 
deemphasized, as there is more in how both the subconscious (through 
shifting intensities of sense and subsequent affects) and the conscious 
(interpretation and the subsequent qualitative distinctions) intertwine. There 
is more than rational understanding, and this understanding is a material and 
bodily one, allowing us to “associate this material inscription with an 
emotional one; to generate affirmative change that runs through each 
replaying of the initial event” (Williams 2008: 18). This seems to point out 
that changes in material emergence (and in our embodiment) evoke shifting 
senses to which we then assign affective qualities (was a change e.g. 
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‘good’/’bad’). Sense in itself, in its indefinite unfolding, is always neutral, the 
qualities we assign to them determine how (always socioculturally shifting) 
they influence new relations “reverberating forward and back in time” 
(ibid.: 4, emphasis in the original), or: 
 
“Like the cathedral, its only quality is to have been made by men. Thus it is not 
hidden by appearances; it is it, on the contrary, which hides appearances and 
provides them with an alibi […] What the artist is, is creator of truth, because truth is 
not to be achieved, formed or reproduced; it has to be created” (Deleuze 1989: 146) 
 
For further consideration, we need to add the concept of the singularities, 
which “are a matter for the surface, that is the surface between the depth of 
bodies [in a very literal and physical sense] and the height of ideas, where 
‘between’ means operating in both” (ibid.: 107). Singularity could be seen as 
the physical indication of an event that connects embodiment to changing 
shifts of senses and thus changes ideas (e.g. the first gray hair or “It was the 
morning when my father stared back from the mirror” [ibid.: 93]). One must 
not confuse the singularity as a mere physical attribute, however, as “The 
singularities aren’t the actual knots and bends in the stick [the physical 
attributes of a piece of wood that determine its potential for usage], but the 
relation between these and the ideas surrounding them” (ibid.: 110). Thus, 
senses change in intensities in resonating series as events change their 
reverberating relations. These events have a physical ‘surface’ that attaches 
the continuum of emerging embodiment to the other end of the pole and of 
ideas to the other. The surface is the condition for open renewal of the 
relations between the two poles (ibid.). Such abstract notions find more 
grounding, as we go on to consider the potential of material agency in non-
representational theory (see 2.9.2). 
Events and singularities reverberate with the intensities along the series, yet 
are simultaneously transformed by the series themselves causing new senses 
of individuation. Series should not be confused with sequences as there is no 
prior ordering (Williams 2008), and neither can an experience emerge from 
emptiness, for there are no novel starts (something loosely comparable to a 
hermeneutical notion). There is thus no center and no linearity in any series 
or the subsequent agency arising from it. Neither does this notion imply 
reductive possibilities in any way – the changes of the intensities of sense and 
subsequent human agency have nothing to do with choices or free will, only 
the outcomes of resonating intensities of experience. There are two poles in 
the manifestation of the shifting senses, there is always both depth and 
surface – deep emotional states, and how these states go on to constitute 
relations with the embodiment of the spatiotemporal and material 
arrangements. Thus: 
 
 56 
“Relation is not the property of objects, it is always external to its terms. It is also 
inseparable from the open [all material and experiential emergence], and displays a 
spiritual or mental existence. Relations do not belong to the objects, but to the whole, 
on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of objects [e.g. an experiment 
design]. By movement in space, the objects of a set change their respective positions. 
But, through relations, the whole is transformed or changes qualitatively. We can say 
of duration itself or of time that it is the whole of relations” (Deleuze 1986: 10) 
 
This we can also see from the aforementioned Alice in Wonderland example 
(Williamson 2008: 27). The actual event is thus a spatiotemporally 
manifesting material occurrence (e.g. spilling of coffee in an increasing state 
of aggravation [ibid.]), and that event is also of depth as in its changing of the 
spiller’s sense of aggravation extending to his past of the reasons for his easily 
aggravatable nature and to the future of how this aggravation brings about 
new senses with relation to this past. Through videography, we can 
potentially produce spatiotemporal illusions of emerging relations at both the 
deep and surface levels by utilizing certain forms of visuals, considered 
further [see 2.5]). Furthermore, for Deleuze, an individual is not a distinct 
entity, but rather a process of individuation, as novel events bring about new 
intensities of sense that instill action (Williams 2008: 89). There is no stable 
or static state of being, only constant becoming. This is true of videography as 
well, as we will later discuss. Social settings in spatiotemporally embodied 
surroundings offer glimpses of this becoming, this shifting of intensities that 
resonate across all individuating series. One must note that textual accounts 
cannot express the resonant emergence in similar ways, as they rather 
describe one particular perspective into phenomena (see also 3.2). Text is the 
emergence of a perspective put forth via a certain textual structure, whereas 
video is an expression of multiple ones, each with emerging spatiotemporal 
agency (including the perspective, but reaching beyond, as we will soon see). 
 
 
 
Videography note (3): 
 
Thus, when we film social settings, what we see are the altercations in intensities in 
indefinite resonating series that go on to constitute new relations both within and 
beyond the setting that our video illusionarily expresses. 
 
In PTS, we do not see tensions contained in the social settings – we see a glimpse of the 
global resonance of intertwined series where shifting senses constitute resonating 
series that emerge in a complex and emerging negotiation of cultural meanings. We 
attempted such illusions by not constructing and expressing interviews (or 
‘interrogations’) of ‘talking heads’, but rather we produce perspectives into 
conversations within meaningful spatiotemporal contexts – this might potentially 
create more convincing illusions of the emergence of both intensities and meaning-
makings (see IV). 
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Additionally, via videography, we can see glimpses of both the depth and 
surface in the emergence of shifting senses. The depth is one of changes in 
intensity that are the altercations in affect (the expression of emotional states, 
see also 2.6.2) and the surface the relations of these changing senses with the 
spatiotemporal and material arrangements that both constitute and restrict 
the social settings. 
If we draw parallels to the CCT discourse, we can see how these infinitely 
resonating series of senses (albeit precognitive) can be recognized in 
hermeneutical frameworks (e.g. Thompson 1997; Gadamer 2004/1976) that 
note on the becoming of subjects through their interaction, the ‘fusion of 
horizons’, and call for the need for reflexivity and empathy in ethnographic 
research (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; see also 
Van Maanen 1995; Ruby 2000; Brownlie 2006 Pink 2006; Sherry and 
Schouten 2002; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; Goodall 2000; Richardson 2000). 
But these notions are fixed in the cognitive constructions of realities, and, 
with the conceptual tools of Deleuze, we can add ideas of experiential 
subconscious becoming and material agency. Indeed, when the researcher 
enters into and learns about the social context and relations s/he is changed, 
but likewise, so are both those under study and the very constituent material 
context itself (through action or relations that will bring about future action). 
In both, these events cause shifting senses and altercations in their series that 
go on to call for reflexive consideration in research and empathy in the act of 
interpretation. And, as it should be clear, these processes never reach a 
consummation, but rather manifest in a moment where the work of 
interpretative perspective is reported as a work of research – for us, at best, a 
narrative of convincing academic fiction. See 3.1 on how videographic 
research in consumer culture theory is conceptualized as an emergent 
becoming of relations simultaneously within and beyond the research 
settings. 
 
2.4.2  Deleuze on Empirical Inquiry and Research 
 
Due to his work of constant decentering, emergence and shifting intensities 
that draw from a chaotic multitude of series and stretch until infinity (not to 
mention his moral holism, as there is no structure to draw a moral reference 
from [Williams 2008: 11]), it is easy to erroneously see Deleuze as someone 
whose philosophy is overwhelmingly steeped into nihilism. While such a 
reading may hold for a scientific realist with the inclination to construct 
science as a process toward some specifiable goal or ‘progress’ (e.g. Hunt 
1991), this would be too hasty a judgment. While it seems certain that Deleuze 
is on many fronts incompatible with hypothesis testing, falsification or 
statistical validation, he is certainly not opposed to empirical pursuits – only 
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his seem to veer into an offbeat nature (Williams 2008: 49). Rather, he 
focuses on more fundamental questions of ontology, as “It could never be 
enough to give an empirical or naturalistic account of these processes as 
different practical extensions, since this could not account for the 
metaphysical basis for the multiplicity, for its relation to the unconscious, to 
language and sense” (Williams 2008: 194). 
Contemporary ‘positivism’, or naïve realism, as a pursuit of reductive 
knowledge products can certainly work in a pragmatist sense, but as we have 
seen, only in ‘easily closable systems’ that our epistemic imagination 
sociohistorically allows for – while often disregarding the political 
underpinnings of any such research endeavor. Thus, in line with his notions 
of liberating creative thought, Deleuze’s empirical work would not try to 
affirm a result, but rather his ‘higher empiricism’ (or ‘superior empiricism’, 
an example of Deleuzean playfulness in wording [Williams 2008: 103, 106]) 
would be one of uncovering multiple and divergent perspectives into 
phenomena (ibid.). Deleuze is not an advocator of ‘knowledge’ as his 
philosophy eschews such logocentric cores, rather one could see him as a 
proponent of the eternal extension of the human mind – stretching the 
imagination to its broadest limits, because: 
 
“’Mankind always sets itself only such tasks it can solve’ – not because practical or 
speculative problems are only the shadow of pre-existing solutions but, on the 
contrary, because the solution necessarily follows from the complete conditions 
under which the problem is determined as a problem, from the means and the terms 
which are employed in order to pose it” (Deleuze 1994a: 159) 
 
Similarly to Deleuze’s notion of not directly opposing traditional science, his 
thought on empiricism is rather intended to expand and offer novel 
perspectives so as to add to the existing ones and “to interact with them 
critically and constructively” (Williams 2008: 49) and to experiment with 
language while conducting research. In a sense, there is no denial of the 
pragmatic value of empirical science here either, rather a shift in the level of 
ontological and epistemological approach. What thus becomes interesting is 
not any measurement or its accuracy, but their relation to sense (how 
scientific experiments resonate in the series of relations between actors 
through singularities and events). This is their effect on our world as a whole 
(and beyond). 
As a further notion on empirical work, for Deleuze, one important question 
is what it is that can be quantified. Due to his interest in the subconscious 
(intensities of sense) emergence of individualized relations that have efficacy 
ad infinitum through their reverberations, it is not surprising that anything as 
unstable as language cannot be of value unless the spurious ‘realness’ of 
imagined closed systems is taken axiologically. As stated, we can certainly do 
so, and in many fields pragmatic outcomes can be surely derived from such 
work as there is, albeit only provisional and commonsensical, tendency for 
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matter to form isolatable systems (Bogue 2003: 24). However, for Deleuze, 
intensities cannot be quantified, as in his philosophical system based on 
emergence, the comparison of, for example, psychological events as static and 
complete objects autonomously and simultaneously present in a fixed system 
makes little sense. It is exactly the changing (the different and intertwined) 
relations of these states what would interest Deleuze. It also follows, that we 
would forever lack any plausible access to such entities both cognitively and 
through the impossibility of language to describe their shifting emergence. 
Similarly, these shifts individualize in affects and then into qualitatively 
distinguished emotions. The changes in the intensities of sense that bring 
about the actualization of the shift of one affect into another cannot be 
quantified, as they are not changes of one quantitative state (such as more 
loneliness) but of qualitative (linguistic) difference (‘small amounts of 
estrangement’ to ‘wrenching and hopeless solitude’). As interpreted by Bogue 
(2003), “To quantify psychological states is to change a sequence of 
heterogeneous complexes unfolding in time into homogeneous units in 
timeless space […] by comparing psychological events to one another as static 
and completed objects simultaneously present in a fixed space” (p. 13). And 
as we have seen, these states are not in the same continuum but extend 
towards different pasts and different futures. 
For his nonlinear and nonreductionist positions, Deleuze seems to have 
been considerably influenced by the mystical metaphysics of the French 
philosopher Henri Bergson. From Durant’s (1961) lively account, we can infer 
that Bergson forcefully rebelled against a ‘positivist’ ontology and a 
reductionist epistemology. In his metaphysic, he reversed the binary of life as 
a deterministic and reductionistic machine process originating from an 
ancient cloud of particles (he saw this as the greatest incredulity, rather than 
as any form of defendable ‘rationalism’) by foregrounding not the matter but 
a cumulative temporal flow (durée) instead. Life, especially in reflexive 
thought that emerges from instinct alone, is thus not reductionistic, as, 
through creativity and multiple layerings of both intuitive and reflexive 
faculties, it becomes a compounding flux of ever proliferating states, which 
are not synchronic but ever emergent, as ideas are mere points selected by the 
memory in the eternal flow of experience. For him, language is the expression 
of understanding (rational), and while it can be granted that it has its 
uncontestable place in such a realm, it does not extend to exemplify intuition 
and life in its vividness – and often (regarding realist science) makes the 
study of ‘life’ that what a scientist says when experimenting on a frog’s 
carcass. Or as Deleuze quotes him, “Modern science must be pre-eminently 
characterized by its aspiration to make time an independent variable” 
(Deleuze 1986: 4). 
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Thus, to maintain a metaphysic of an irreducible ‘Open Whole’ (all material 
and experiential being, the infinitude of relations in the universe), Deleuze, 
drawing from the Bergsonian durée, constructs how temporal durations are 
not fixed, even if we often tend to think about time as a homogenous fixed 
flow (past-present-future) (Deleuze 1989). Yet, Deleuze argues that our 
psychological experience cannot be reduced in such a fashion, as (borrowing 
Pierce’s firstness-secondness-thirdness) “the three kinds of images are not 
simply ordinal – first, second, third – but cardinal: there are two in the 
second, to the point where there is firstness in the secondness, and there are 
three in the third” (Deleuze 1989: 30). Thus, virtual resonances of past events 
compose the ‘present’ states, which actualize potential futures present both 
now and in the past. Firstness refers to itself only as a pure possibility (or, as 
we have seen, an intensity), secondness refers to itself through something else 
(for example a linguistic binary – interpretation), and thirdness refers to a 
comparison in a relational sense (combinations of resonances, rhizomatic 
series), or: 
 
“The present and former presents are not, therefore, like two successive instants on 
the line of time; rather, the present one necessarily contains an extra dimension in 
which it represents the former and also represents itself […] The passive synthesis of 
habit constituted time as a contraction of instants with respect to a present, but the 
active synthesis of memory constitutes it as the embedding of presents themselves. 
The whole problem is: with respect to what? It is with respect to the pure element of 
the past, understood as the past in general, as an a priori past, that a given former 
present is reproducible and the present present is able to reflect itself” (Deleuze 1994: 
80-81) 
 
In Deleuze’s metaphysics, time is of sense and experience itself (not an 
external objective entity), and is thus not reducible to parts, as all history and 
future (in relation to sense) occupy every fleeting moment emerging into the 
next one. In my reading of these notions, we can uncover something that is 
structural-poststructural simultaneously (as this is at times difficult to 
distinguish in Deleuze). For while there is a temporal flow in the surface 
(material) event (such as spilling water on a burning house), this event only 
reverberates in series through intensities that transcend into the depth of 
affects (become interpreted [e.g. ‘good’/’bad’ event]) – where sense is always 
nonlinear and rhizomatic, always between two poles of intensities in past and 
future (sorrow for the devastated childhood home – hope for the future 
edifice that will be the home for so many new senses and events). So in a way 
there is temporality, but it does not suffice, as it is of surface only, not in the 
entirety of emergent becoming. This is another case of Deleuzian resistance to 
the possibility of reductionist epistemology. One could also read similar 
potential in videography in CCT, as such work draws simultaneously from the 
senses of the past and future if we construct relational moving images where 
the participants negotiate the sociocultural setting (both the researchers and 
the participants), its further actualization as interpretation and videographic 
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expression (both at the video editing [researchers] stage) and its viewing in 
various contexts through various technologies (audiences and their relations 
to other audiences beyond the immediate viewing contexts). 
Furthermore, my notion of videographic research does not entail the 
eschewing of any existing forms of expressing academic research (indeed, 
data in video format can be utilized as a basis for text-based reporting of 
research findings in potentially convincing and diverse ways), but rather offer 
new insights capable of producing broad new resonances within itself and 
beyond in the academic community (see 3.4). Research by CCT scholars, as 
an interpretative discourse relying on postmodern frameworks goes on to 
provide further parallels. As we have seen (see 2.3.4), many such research 
approaches can be seen to intersect Deleuzean thought, as the emphasis is 
focused on elaborate contextual interpretations that have the potential to 
bring about new ways of thinking about consumption phenomena. 
Additionally, the criticism of representation in the form of both videographic 
(the ACR conference ‘Film Festival’) and poetic (the CCT conference ‘Poetry 
Session’) research approaches illustrate different ways of bringing about new 
experiences that go beyond notions of academic text as a sanitizer and 
compartmentalizer of thought. 
 
2.4.3  How Deleuze Brings about New Relations through Humor, 
Paradox and Free Indirect Discourse 
 
As we have seen, Deleuze utilizes language in writing so as to not approach 
any form of a stable understanding. For him, all language is inadequate and 
unstable and thus is but a means to inspire creative outcomes that bring 
about new relations of experience. This is poststructural Deleuze par 
excellence, or as Williams (2008) puts it “nonsense is not the absence of 
sense but rather a presence of an important kind of sense that can only 
operate through nonsense […] breaking with the demands of denotation, 
manifestation and signification, and opening an additional realm of sense” (p. 
68). For Deleuze, breaking with the logic of signification and the accurate 
(‘correct’) representation and understanding of an expression thus liberates 
experience and thought into new creative possibilities. 
Similarly, Deleuze, in an artistic fashion, attempts to affirm his 
philosophical position also in the form of his writing, which is constructed in 
the form of illusory free indirect discourse (Hughes 2009: 15) – writing as an 
aesthetic tool in and of itself. In addition, Williams (2008) notes that humor 
was not a mere desirable intricacy for Deleuze, but rather “a central aspect of 
philosophical teaching and learning” (p. 17). This is very fitting for Deleuzean 
philosophy, as he is primarily interested in the emergence of new relations in 
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such ways that do not approach any center, a structure of logos of truth or 
‘right opinion’. For him: 
 
“The truthful man in the end wants nothing other than to judge life he holds up a 
superior value, the good, in the name of which he will be able to judge, he is craving 
to judge, he sees life an evil; a fault which has to be atoned for: the moral origin of the 
notion of truth” (Deleuze 1989: 137) 
 
For Deleuze, humor and paradox are suitable vehicles for this, as they do not 
assume a position of superior knowledge, but rather inspire surprise and new 
thought in a destabilized way, liberation through initial discomfort and 
puzzlement (see also Thompson 1990). “Humor selects the eternal side of the 
event” (Williams 2008: 152), or, “For if irony is the co-extensiveness of being 
with the individual, or of the I with representation, humor is the co-
extensiveness of sense with nonsense. Humor is the art of surfaces and of the 
doubles, of nomad singularities and of the always displaced aleatory point” 
(Deleuze 1990: 141). As we will see, this is contrasted by his view on irony, 
which he sees as a destructive force for similar reasons, as to be ironic 
presupposes a superior position in relation to something else – it subjugates 
becoming rather than liberates it. In addition, there is also a physical element 
in humor that our reactions in its presence bring about. When we react, we 
affirm that there is more to sensing humor than mere intellectual tasks and 
rationalization (Hughes 2008: 18). 
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Videography note (4): 
 
 
We utilize humor in both BIP and PTS to raise the consciousness of the viewer into the 
artificial and constructed nature of the videographic illusion we express. In BIP, the 
closing scene is of the autoethnographer stepping on the paintball field in France. He 
asks the first author: “Are you in an ethnographic state of mind?” With this utterance, 
the idea of representing any form of reality is eschewed. Also, it highlights how the 
autoethnographer is becoming distanced from his former state as the immersed 
practitioner toward an interpretive researcher. 
 
 
In PTS, in the interview with a New York based DJ/promoter, his final statement of 
quitting and mailing his most valued records to Finland is left in the videography to 
show the hermeneutic and emerging relation between the researchers and the 
participant. Thus the researcher has become relationally recognized and been ‘put on 
the map’ of these powerful cultural agents manifesting in such colorful utterances. 
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In terms of the moving image, Deleuze (1986) sees the cinematographic 
expression of clichés as contributing to something similarly negative, as a 
subtraction of the creative potential of creative use of the moving image. “But 
how can the cinema attack the dark organization of clichés, when it 
participates in their fabrication and propagation, as much as magazines and 
television?” (ibid.: 210). For Deleuze, much of such creative opposition has 
become overwhelmed by the marginalization of experimental cinema under 
the realist cinema (comprising mostly of commonsensical expressions of 
causal relations in unsurprisingly framed spatiotemporal settings) of 
mainstream Hollywood – such that would, like the great classics, challenge 
the audience to think beyond the audiovisual ‘representation’. And in line 
with Cubitt’s (1991) criticism of the never-ending banality of contemporary 
television, neither can a work of irony overcome this uncomplicated form of 
cinema, for “the rage against clichés does not lead to much if it is content only 
to parody them; maltreated, mutilated, destroyed, a cliché is not slow to be 
reborn from its ashes” (Deleuze 1986: 211) – where the parody itself becomes 
sanctioned as another expression of cliché itself. 
In addition to the examples from our projects, even when not directly 
attempting to express humorous relations, we can draw more other types of 
inferences to videography in CCT. As stated in 2.2.1, video has a peculiar 
relationship with surprise and intimacy that can potentially account for very 
different intensities and experiences of embodiment as compared to other 
types of media (e.g. text and photography, see 2.8). Due to the convincing 
agency of the moving image, it allows (or forcefully imposes) videographic 
illusions of ‘reality’ – even if the moving image is clearly a fiction (e.g. a 
horror movie). Reading about ‘tensions in a community of consumption’ is 
more detached and more tempered by interpretation and textual aesthetics 
than seeing it ‘in-your-face’, simultaneously before and within the viewers’ 
embodied experience. For example, “when we squirm and twist in 
embarrassment and amusement at Allen’s predicaments (a character in 
Woody Allen’s Annie Hall), it is not because they are fixed, but on the 
contrary, because they are open” (Williams 2008: 63). These possibilities for 
discomfort, similar to Deleuze’s notion of humor, open doors for the 
intensification of new senses through novel events and can thus have the 
potential to be very evocative, moving and impactful. Thus, consistent with a 
Deleuzean view, it is this very potential for discomfort that needs to be taken 
very seriously, possibly even cherished, and video indeed holds this promise. 
These ideas will be further developed later in the sections problematizing the 
embodiment of video experience (see 2.8) and further accounting for the 
ontological and epistemological differences in experiencing the audiovisual 
moving image contra text (see 2.8 and 3.2).  
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We have also seen similar approaches in CCT with the aforementioned 
works on representation (e.g. Thompson 1990; Holt 1991) on poetry (e.g. 
Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002) and on art (e.g. Belk 1986, 1998; 
Ellis and Bochner 2003). For example, the work on poetry, as it “releases 
sense by breaking the bond to syntax” (Williams 2008: 69), foregrounds a 
relational possibility for my further work of constructing one possible 
epistemology for videography – which is due to its less textual nature (even 
though there can be narration and text objects onscreen) a different kind of 
experience with much potential for the aforementioned ‘eternal’, rather than 
the ‘sanitized and contained’ side of experience. We will turn to this in due 
course (see 2.7), but now let us continue ‘reading alongside Deleuze’. 
 
2.4.4  Deleuze on Representation 
 
“After all, the output of most marketing research exercises still comprises a 
representation (verbal delivery) of a representation (academic paper) of a 
representation (data analysis) of a representation (survey instrument) of a 
representation (sample) of a representation (respondents’ response) of a 
representation (respondents’ mental schemata) of a representation (the researcher’s 
assumption that the topic is worth researching) of a representation (the context – 
published papers, established theoretical frameworks, etc. – from whence the 
assumption derives)” (Stephen Brown) 
 
“In the era of imagology, there is no sovereign ‘real’ against which to measure the 
model, or the copy, the fake, the representation” (Douglas Brownlie) 
 
“The goal is evocation rather than representation” (John Sherry and John Schouten) 
 
One central consideration, when applying Deleuze to a possible ontology of 
videography in CCT research, is to explore his approaches regarding the 
concept ‘representation’. Up until this point I have been very hesitant to use 
this concept and have instead utilized the concept ‘expression’. Let us now 
consider the nature of representation further, as both a concept and as an 
epistemological proposition. What could it mean to represent something? 
What could we represent in a meaningful way? What meaningful work could 
this concept do for us? How would we go about it? 
As we have already seen, the given position of textual accounts as 
‘containers’ of stable meaning has already been widely questioned by CCT 
scholars. Such work has included the ACR conference ‘Film Festivals’, the 
CCT conference ‘Poetry Session’ and articles exploring the nature of these 
types of media and articulations (e.g. Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 
2002; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; De Valck, Rokka 
and Hietanen 2009). These movements emerged from the 
postmodern/linguistic turn that swept through a broad range of academic 
disciplines in the late 20th century. This turn emphasized the unstable nature 
of meaning and texts as well as a similar destabilization of notions such as 
‘truth’ and ‘objectivity’. Notions of the possibility for unchanging truthful 
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knowledge or the possibility for ‘true’ representation (objective replication of 
the ‘Same’) had fallen into crisis (e.g. Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and 
Fischer 1986; Van Maanen 1995; Belk 1998; Brown 1998b; Ruby 2000; 
Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005). 
But what is the problem in terms of academic video or text? Couldn’t we 
simply take them as some stable accounts of a reality out there? Why hasn’t 
such a definition sufficed? Representation, at a quick glance, seems to us a 
completely mundane and acceptable concept in academic research. Naturally 
we represent our research findings according to some criteria of scientific 
rigor in order to uncover and disseminate academically relevant knowledge of 
the world! And certainly we do so in accordance with the rules of the most 
respectable academic outlets of knowledge – journals and conferences! But 
what does this notion, this concept of representation, render opaque? What 
does its banal simplicity envelop? 
Through our admittedly hasty pass through a Deleuzean ontology and 
epistemology we have already constructed ideas for constant and diachronic 
displacement and destabilization of any center, be it knowledge, (the) self or 
being in general. If this is taken seriously, it raises substantial difficulties for 
the concept of representation as a conveyer of stable meaning. Wouldn’t 
representation necessarily entail a signification of something stable, a ‘right’ 
or ‘ultimate’ meaning – a truth to be understood by its ‘correct’ reading (or 
viewing in terms of video media)? As Deleuze notes: 
 
“In short, representation may well become infinite; it nevertheless does not acquire 
the power to affirm either divergence or decentering. It requires a convergent and 
monocentric world: a world in which one is only apparently intoxicated, in which 
reason acts the drunkard and sings a Dionysian tune while none the less remaining 
‘pure’ reason. […] The damage is done not only by the requirement of finite 
representation, which consists of fixing a propitious moment of difference, neither 
too large or too small, requirement of infinite representation, which purports to 
integrate the infinitely large and infinitely small of difference, excess and default 
themselves” (Deleuze 1994a: 265) 
 
Thus, a meaningful representation assumes a ‘knowable’ and communicable 
center, something to evaluate as its objectification. This is systematically at 
odds with a Deleuzean ontology (see also Coleman 2011). But neither is this to 
say that we do not constantly attempt to represent in a pragmatic sense – and 
similarly that we could thus not say nothing. The realm of inquiry is rather on 
a philosophical plane here. However, ‘representation’ as a desirable goal (e.g. 
in academia) is static, a synchronic illusion in the emergent becoming of the 
shifting intensities of sense and relation. Thus, “where only difference returns 
eternally while the same never returns” (Williams 2008: 114). It becomes a 
logocentric concept, as the same can never occur in the becoming and 
resonation of sense in Deleuzean series – every event makes up for new 
becomings in both matter and thought, and every attempt of representation 
must entail an attempt of both replication and its own notion of doing the 
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representing (of some past or future event). The same applies to academic 
production of knowledge as well. In a very foundational Kuhnian sense, 
science is the production of a consensus of meaning (Kuhn 1962). In this play 
of meaning an academic concept of knowledge often assumes a realist ‘truth’, 
but as we have seen, any such truth is an expression of an unstable language 
game, and language can never describe what is, or how senses resonate and 
become emergently embodied. Indeed, “there is no doubt that we have the 
means to distinguish between repetition [the reoccurrence of absolute 
sameness], since things are said to repeat when they differ even though their 
concept is absolutely the same. […] It (language) repeats because it (the 
words) is not real, because there is no definition other than nominal” 
(Deleuze 1994a: 270-271). Thus, in a Deleuzean philosophical sense, all we 
are left with is the embodiment of the resonations of relational emergence – 
the relations between people, ideas, and the material arrangements 
constituting them in constant flux. And as we have seen, this framework 
constructs the individual not as a stable being but rather “a temporary and 
illusory entity drawing together much wider processes” (Williams 2008: 163) 
in the process of constant individuation. 
One must note that Deleuze does not argue against the attempts to 
‘represent’ something, or indeed argue that ‘representation’ does not happen 
when we express language (or video, for that matter). Rather, as we have 
seen, his position on empirical science, he does not deny its pragmatic value 
or outcomes. Here again we see Deleuze being instead interested in more 
fundamental questions of knowledge – what does it mean philosophically to 
represent? Indeed, a necessity of a pursuit of representation in our pragmatic 
practices (as people, as academics) remains, as that is what we aspire to. 
However, in line with Deleuzean thought, the logocentric value of this work is 
destabilized as not a particularly interesting level of analysis (as we can never 
describe the sense through which representation emerges as relation). Yet, 
representation must be understood as inclined to the French sense of the 
concept ‘performance’, a dramatic theatre (Williams 2008: 149). Thus, when 
considering the meaningfulness of representation, we succumb to illusions of 
stable meaning, primarily as we cannot distinguish the concept from the 
subjective abyss of the thinker, the emergence of representation in 
spatiotemporally bound (and liberated) space, so as to never be grounded in 
the identity of indeterminate concepts (Deleuze 1994a), or: 
 
“A representation designates an object or an event and associates it with signification 
or meaning, for example when we describe a situation in response to the question 
‘Tell me what happened?’ But, for Deleuze, this representation is necessary lacking, 
with respect to an event, without an expression of its significance – not what it is, or 
what it means, but how it changes values or infinitives, that is how it alters relations 
of intense investment (for example, when we try to dramatize the effect of a meeting 
rather than describe who we met and what was said, and then everything changed…)” 
(Williams 2008: 143) 
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Any solution (a stable answer, a truth) is a problem, as “They entice us into a 
comfortable world of concrete fictions and resolutions imposed upon a reality 
of perpetually shifting relations” (Williams 2008: 205). Thus, in line with 
postmodern frameworks commonly adopted in CCT, my account of academic 
work on video media and its expression as videographies has to reflect on why 
we attempt to ‘represent’ as we do. There is a need to consider the end of 
stable signification – one that could persist in the tremors of emergent events 
and singularities as they extend from yore to the future in the unfolding chaos 
of the present (see also Denzin 1995). But, having said that, where do we go 
from here? 
What of it then, of such a ‘ruin of representation’ from an ontological 
perspective? For my purposes, it raises a new perspective for seeing the role 
of video in CCT research. By understanding how the concept of 
representation is used in its original language – more like ‘performance’ 
(Williams 2008), and in line with Belk and Kozinets (2005a), Sherry and 
Schouten (2002) as well as Ellis and Bochner (2003), we need not be afraid of 
the conceptual linking of videographic work with art. This can open potential 
for videographic research as: 
 
“Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all repetitions, by virtue 
of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses copies 
into simulacra). Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most habitual and the 
most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always displaced in 
relation to other repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a difference may be 
extracted from it for these other repetitions. […] Art thereby connects the tableau of 
cruelty with that of stupidity, and discovers underneath consumption a clattering of 
the jaws, and underneath the most ignoble destructions of war, still more processes 
of consumption” (Deleuze 1994a: 293) 
 
If we need to cast doubt on the knowledge value of representation (and 
indeed the question of the sheer possibility of its rigorous evaluation), we 
need to reconsider our relations with the concepts we utilize when speaking 
about the value of videography in CCT research. As Cubitt (1991) notes, 
“Video work is about difference, about dialogue, about place and about time” 
(p. 175). Indeed, “representation is never enough, since real movement in the 
present involves changes in values, or more precisely in the intensities of 
values” (Williams 2008: 143). Here we see what CCT scholars, such as 
Thompson (1990), Holt (1991), Sherry and Schouten (2002) Schouten (1998) 
and Belk (1998), are approaching, but should we not be even more interested 
in what our efforts at inquiry influence the reader/viewer to become (in terms 
of both thought and action alike) (see also Denzin 2001a). If we can produce 
convincing experiences that, through shifting intensities, first grasp the 
viewer in embodiment, and then allow for thought to enter new series and 
becomings, we have produced potential for new resonating relations. To 
express research on video thus becomes focused not on description and 
representing a world out there, but on a possibility of convincing and moving 
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fictions – necessitating the researcher to reflect on the reasons (every 
expression [every ‘utterance’] is an exercise in power [political]) such 
production is founded on. And there were indeed noted ‘false’ starts in visual 
anthropology (notions of capturing the ‘real’) and even in CCT (applying 
‘positivist’ criteria to interpretive research). CCT videography may just be a 
novel enough of a research approach to sidestep these modernist landmines. 
Especially, now that we can help ourselves to plentiful accounts on the 
problematics of representing ‘real’ phenomena through expressions of the 
audiovisual moving image, or: 
 
“the camera/film-maker also had his identity, as ethnologist or reporter. It was very 
important to challenge the established fictions in favour of a reality that cinema could 
capture or discover. But fiction was being abandoned in favour of the real, whist 
retaining a model of truth which presupposed fiction and was a consequence of it. 
What Nietzsche had shown, that the ideal of the true was the most profound fiction” 
(Deleuze 1989: 149) 
 
It now seems hardly surprising why, for Deleuze, it came to be cinema that 
constituted such an important topic of contemplation and writing. The 
moving image itself, in its incessant emergence of the fiction that, when 
understood as relational becoming through the intensities of sense and thus 
in imagination and thought, maintains the most ‘truthful’ relation – not to 
represent reality, but all thought, for the moving image: 
 
“expresses a whole which changes, and becomes established between objects: this is a 
process of differentiation. The movement-image (the shot) thus has two sides, 
depending on the whole that it expresses and the objects between it passes […] from 
the dual point of view of specification and differentiation, constitute a signaletic 
material which includes all kinds of modulation features, sensory (visual and sound), 
kinetic, intensive, affective, rhythmic, tonal and even verbal (oral and written)” 
(Deleuze 1989: 29) 
 
Representation thus has become subsumed by differentiation, and 
differentiation thus becomes movement, when it becomes expressed via the 
audiovisual moving image. We must now further strive to uncover where such 
distinction may lead us in terms of this mysterious medium. Thus, through 
out brief visitation into some of Deleuze’s writings, we have arrived at some 
juncture of a Deleuzean ontology that I will further adapt to videography. As 
we have seen and as many a reader may have noted, Deleuze, even at a 
glance, can seem either ‘terribly complex’ or ‘wonderfully abstract’. But our 
task is one of considering video, so let us proceed to topics more closely 
related to the audiovisual moving image, or: 
 
“As language is pursued into tail-chasing rhetoric, video, [in this now emerging 
ontology] freed from the representational burden, becomes philosophical. And 
indeed, it now need no longer limit its themes to the relation to reality – the 
epistemological – but can entertain other issues” (Cubitt 1993: 205) 
 
Deleuze also offers us conceptual tools for continuing on this journey, for we 
can next follow through by adapting selected parts of Deleuze’s philosophy of 
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cinema. Thereafter, reflection on cinema can move us toward more difficult, 
yet simultaneously potentially pragmatic notions on videography making in 
CCT. Let us thus turn to Deleuze on cinema. 
 
 
2.5  Deleuze on Cinema Applied to Video 
 
“A theory of cinema is not ‘about’ cinema, but about the concepts that cinema gives 
rise to and which are themselves related to other concepts corresponding to other 
practices, the practice of concepts in general having no privilege over others, any 
more than one object has over others […] So that there is always a time, midday-
midnight, when we must no longer ask ourselves, ‘What is cinema?’ but ‘What is 
philosophy?’” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
In addition to his other philosophical considerations, Deleuze wrote 
plentifully on cinematography, Cinema 1: The Movement-Image (1986/1983) 
and Cinema 2: The Time-Image (1989/1985) constructing an entire 
philosophy of cinema. This project, as an intellectual exploration, was 
seemingly of great importance to him, as “The great directors of cinema may 
be compared, in our view, not merely with painters, architects and musicians, 
but also with thinkers. They think with movement-images and time-images 
instead of concepts” (Deleuze 1986: ix). 
Much of Deleuze’s deliberation on cinema emerges closely paralleled with 
his earlier philosophical endeavors described above, as several concepts 
overlap and apply. Deleuze’s starting point is a modification of semiology (the 
theory of signs) founded by C.S. Pierce, and whereas a Saussererian linguistic 
structuralism has its basis in the linguistic opposition of the signifier and the 
signified, Pierce’s semiotics is based on the non-lingual system of the 
“representamen-object-interpretant” (Bogue 2003: 66), where the signs 
themselves are autonomous, not subjected to an external representational 
language, for example a narrative (ibid.). A sign can only point to another 
sign, ad infinitum. What Deleuze is attempting, is to go with the latter, to let 
images stand on their own as autonomous and distinct of their linguistic 
counterparts (ibid.). Thus, and as we have earlier touched upon (see 2.4.4), 
Deleuze’s philosophy of the cinema must be understood as being beyond how 
the moving image represents something (the logocentric position), and rather 
about how it, in and of its own, has the potential to eventify experiences and 
relations, as an autonomous whole, which constantly spills beyond itself 
through intensities that emerge into relations. Thus, the audiovisual moving 
image has a propensity to surge beyond itself, and in such a capacity “can 
create new movements and new times that break with our expectations in 
terms of ‘ordinary’ space and time; in turn these are accompanied by new 
thoughts and ways of thinking” (Williams 2008: 30). The notion of time (and 
its creative ‘production’ via montage or “montage-cut” [Deleuze 1989: 13]) 
will be of special interest here, as Deleuze distinguishes the moving image 
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from other expressive media by making the ontology of moving image the 
movement itself, as the unity of the moving image is not constituted by the 
frames that can be ‘freezed’ from it, but rather the relation between “near and 
distant parts produces the unity” (Deleuze 1986: 26), especially in the creative 
ordering and reordering of time in expression and interpretation, or: 
 
“Montage […] precedes the filming, in choice of material, that is, portions of matter 
which are to enter into interaction, sometimes very distant or far apart (life as it is). It 
enters into the filming, in the intervals occupied by the camera-eye (the cameraman 
who follows, runs, enters, exists: in short, life in the film). It comes after the filming, 
in the editing room, where material and filming are evaluated against one another 
(the life of the film), and in the audience, who compare life in the film and life as it is” 
(Deleuze 1986: 40) 
 
We can see this in his treatment of photographic media, which (though 
certainly relational as well) “is a kind of ‘moulding’: the mould organizes the 
internal forces of the thing in such a way that they reach an equilibrium at a 
certain instant (immobile section)” (Deleuze 1986: 24). This seems to be one 
of the important distinctions between a stationary and a moving image – a 
photograph is already shot – forcefully separated in immobility from its 
spatiotemporal emergence, whereas the moving image retains its agency vis-
à-vis the audience in its mechanical becoming. 
Though not linguistic per se, the instability of language can be seen as a 
metaphor for the moving image as equally destabilized and ephemerally 
subjective. Similarly to Deleuze’s discontinuous and creative use of language 
in his texts (see 2.4.3), he sees cinema as consisting of a vast potential of such 
liberating (in)consistency through montage of filmic scenes that, through 
cuts, become nonlinear (creatively constituting relations of past, present and 
future) to demand and inspire novel thought (Williams 2008: 30). This use of 
textual form seems to be connected with the aforementioned relationship 
between the moving image and photography, as Deleuze (1989) notes: 
 
“But at the very point that the [moving] image is replaced by an utterance, the image 
is given a false appearance, and its most authentically visible characteristic, 
movement, is taken away from it […] The movement-image is the object; the thing 
itself caught in movement as the continuous function. The movement-image is the 
modulation of the object itself” (p. 27) 
 
Although most of Deleuze’s work on the moving image is from the perspective 
of cinema, several of his concepts can also be applied to videography. 
Additionally, he does draw occasional parallels to visual anthropology. 
Deleuze’s project on cinema can be seen as consisting of three approaches. 
First, in line with his subsequent work on the nature of philosophy as 
consisting of the construction of concepts (Deleuze 1994b), he wants to 
produce concepts, a philosophical language, that relates only to cinema as an 
originary and autonomous foundation (Bogue 2003). As we have seen, for 
him, language and concepts are an ever-mobile means and ends themselves 
(Deleuze 1994b), as in a poststructuralist fashion they cannot signify any 
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higher ideal thing (logos), and this pursuit is depicted in his two volumes on 
cinema. In his first work (Deleuze 1986), he constructs an ontology of the 
‘movement-image’ and a taxonomy of the various types of movement-images 
– i.e. how different types of cinematographic expressions connect the thought 
of the director to the experience of the viewer and what types of potential 
intensities certain camera views (shots) express. In the second volume 
Deleuze (1989) discusses the nature of the expression of time with ‘time-
images’ – i.e. how the illusions of (different types of) time are constructed 
through the combinations of various ‘time-images’ that break down the 
traditional spatioteporally oriented ‘realist’ images into deterritorialized 
dreams that can only cause relations outside of themselves as they do not 
express clear-cut visual fields for description and orientation. In the following 
I will attempt to summarize some of his insights and provide approaches for 
adapting his thinking to videography in CCT. 
 
2.5.1  What is Cinema when Seen as the Movement-Image? 
 
In line with his undergirding ontology, Deleuze sees film as a collection of 
separated durations, where each shot is a “slice or chunk carved out of the 
matter-movement of the open whole” (Bogue 2003: 3). The shot in itself is a 
spatiotemporally limited duration of the ‘Open Whole’, but is always 
intertwined with it, as it retains its meaning through the resonances with all 
its externality (new relations through the production of intensities of sense) 
ad infinitum. Thus, through frames (spatiotemporally constructed sections), 
shots (the movement and agency of these sections) and montages (sections or 
clips in temporal relations) the Open Whole and its ongoing duration 
“unfolds itself in movement-images” (Bogue 2003: 4). The movement-image 
denotes the unfolding of spatiotemporal settings where movement takes 
precedence. Thus, unlike photography, there is no single instance or 
equilibrium (a possibility of a synchronic moment of meaning), but, rather, 
the ever-changing movement of events can itself be seen as the most 
important nature of cinema. 
Before Deleuze can construct a system of concepts to describe the types of 
cinematographic expressions of illusion, he must first construct an account of 
what the images, when set in movement, become to constitute. He starts his 
argument with a critique of Bergson, who, even as he sees no ‘things’ in the 
universe, but rather emergent vibrations in the Open Whole in constant 
transformation and emergence into some other ephemeral state (Bogue 
2003: 24), still goes on to describe the cinematographic experience as a series 
of snapshots (Deleuze 1986), where the ‘ideal’ image (the single frame) takes 
precedence. Not surprisingly, as being for Deleuze is constant emergence, he 
reverses the level of analysis from ‘images added with the component of 
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movement’ to ‘movement where any particular image is arbitrary’ (similarly 
to his approach to concepts). Thus, it is the relations between the images in 
movement which are experienced, not any particular frozen frame as all 
frames become ‘any-instants-whatever’, where movement itself (not a 
designated context) takes precedence (Deleuze 1986; Bogue 2003). And if all 
singular poses are interchangeable, it must be the movement through its 
relations that has the potential to bring about novel outcomes. Thus:  
 
“The movement of the tortoise must be taken as and indivisible, qualitatively 
changing whole, and the same is true of the movement of the hare. Equally 
important, however, is that through this shift in positions a qualitative change 
takes place that affects the tortoise, the hare, and the space they have traveled – a 
change in the whole” (Bogue 2003: 24) 
 
This is another example of Deleuzean non-reductionism, what can be linked 
to hermeneutic emergence of human agency and how it always unfolds in 
spatiotemporally relational performances (see 2.9.2). This applies to all 
storytelling, even if many past streams of moving image works have 
mistakenly attempted to ‘capture’ reality by having become dazzled by the 
illusion of spatiotemporal ‘representation’. Rather, it would now apply that 
every social practice, including the act of filmmaking, is a spatiotemporal 
performance in and of itself (see also 2.4.4 and 2.9.2): 
 
“we notice in the first place that the character has ceased to be real or fictional, in 
so far as he has ceased to be seen objectively or to see subjectively: it is a character 
who goes over crossings and frontiers because he invents as a real character, and 
becomes all the more real because he has been better at inventing […] But what we 
are saying about the character is also valid in the second place, and in particular, 
for the film-maker himself. He too becomes another, in so far as he takes real 
characters as intercessors and replaces his fictions by their own story-telling, but, 
conversely gives those story-tellers the shape of legends, carrying out their ‘making 
into legend’” (Deleuze 1989: 151-152) 
 
In line with Deleuzean perspectives to open and closed systems, through 
notions of considerable Bergsonian influence (see 2.4.2), and relations that 
reverberate beyond these conceptual systems, the cinematographic moving 
image has a relation to the Open Whole (first through those involved in the 
production and then through audiences) and also to the other shots of the 
moving image (through the medium and the composition of the montage). As 
Bogue (2003) notes, the shot is the “provisional and commonsensical” (p. 27), 
an isolation in the whole durée of qualitative change – which indeed then, 
through creative recombination of times and places, goes on to ‘change 
everything’. It can be seen here how far Deleuzian thought has taken us from 
anything resembling the Cartesian dualism of a defendable dichotomy of 
body (matter) and mind (thought). Similarly, perception is never an 
isolatable act, even in its sensory-motor (commonsense causality in definable 
contexts, see 2.6.3 and 2.7.1) interpretation of possibilities for future action, 
as it does not see in any completeness what surrounds us, but, in fact, 
subtracts to constitute the objects of interest – intertwining the limits of our 
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biology and past experience (Bogue 2003: 30; see also Raichle 2010). It 
always extends to the durée, to the Open Whole, which is always the 
emergent intertwining of meaning, sense and spatiotemporal relations (see 
also 2.9.2). And as we have seen, this change is of non-linguistic character, or: 
 
“The first is to distinguish them from things conceived as bodies. Indeed, our 
perception and our language distinguishes bodies (nouns), qualities (adjectives) and 
actions (verbs). But actions, in precisely this sense, have already replaced movement 
with the idea of a provisional place towards which it is directed or that of a result it 
secures. Quality has replaced movement with the idea of a state which persists whilst 
waiting for another to replace it. Body has replaced movement with the idea of a 
subject which would carry it out or of an object which would submit to it, of a vehicle 
which would carry it” (Deleuze 1986: 59-60) 
 
Thus, we arrive at three fundamental conceptualizations of the closed and 
open systems in cinematography, the 1) frame or immobile cut (a sequence of 
still frames denoting spatial coordinates between things), the 2) shot or 
mobile cut (the transfer of relations between the things with relation to the 
durée), and the 3) montage or the assemblage of the various types of 
movement-images (the durée itself which encompasses all the resonant 
relations) (Deleuze 1986). 
The frame abstracts an instant cutout of its spatial coordinates of the world, 
thus making it a site of “deterritorialization of the image” (Deleuze 1986: 15; 
see also Pisters 2003). This deterritorialization can be simply geometrical 
(separating it from the out-of-the-frame) or dynamic (when the frame 
changes in shape, e.g. when resembling a first-person view from a blinking 
eye), and always implies an angle of framing – the implicit point-of-view of 
the camera lens (Bogue 2003: 43). This viewpoint, the perspective of the 
camera lens, can potentially even act as an active onlooker or a fetishizing 
voyerist, yielding considerable powers of agency to such potential points-of-
view (see also Denzin 1995). In these ways, the frame both includes (the 
closed set) and excludes (the out-of-field). The shot brings the frames into 
motion, and has two potential frames of reference or movement. First being 
the bodies themselves in altering spatial coordinates in relation to one 
another, and the other being the perspective of the camera lens. Whereas the 
single frame, not unlike photography, is a fixed mould of the world, the shot 
is a ceaselessly varying one, where cinematic consciousness is not the 
spectator, but the always autonomous camera perspective, be it of human 
form (first person view), inhuman (e.g. a descriptive shot from outside) or 
superhuman (e.g. camera perspective flying over or climbing walls of 
skyscrapers) (Bogue 2003: 47). Finally, the montage is the determination of 
the whole durée, as it combines cuts with one another in relation (spanning 
inward to the film) and to the audience and beyond (spanning outward from 
the film). There is, however, a perpetual mystery about this – how do distinct 
shots become combined through simulations of time? We will return to this 
question in our consideration of the time-image (see 2.7). 
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Thus, through its relations, the moving image becomes ontologically more 
than what a realist might call capturing reality through ‘representation’ (it 
stretches beyond), or a thing of completion of isolated contours (as it is never 
complete in and of itself). Things around us are constituted via their sense-
inducing arrays of light (from which perceptions are subtracted from), and 
thus “what we call visual images, whether directly perceptual or cinematic, 
are made of the same ‘matter’” (Bogue 2003: 34). For Deleuze (1986), their 
becoming in movement, the arbitrary cuts of the montage, and their relations 
to each other and their relations beyond the immediate audience becomes a 
metaphor, “the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema” (p. 59). Through 
this detour, we can thus now return to our primary task – the possibilities 
and limits of meaning and relation in the movement-image. We must note, 
that Deleuze enters a very profound (even at times quite bewildering) work of 
proposing a conceptual taxonomy of the types of movement-images and all 
their expressive ‘signs’, the specialized images that compose the higher order 
of the movement-images. For our purposes, we cannot do justice to his 
complex system here, and, in fact, most of Deleuze’s cinematographic ideas, 
let alone his categorization of signs, would be very difficult to apply to 
discussions and publications on CCT videography. Thus, while I will attempt 
to consider most of his concepts to bring about novel ideas for future 
videographic research, it may suffice to concentrate on the more applicable 
ones in more detail. 
 
 
2.6.  Types of Movement-Image 
 
“The movement-image is the object; the thing itself caught in movement as 
continuous function. The movement-image is the modulation of the object itself” 
(Gilles Deleuze) 
 
One of the central tasks for Deleuze is to construct a taxonomy of 
cinematographic concepts of the movement-image. He starts by postulating 
that all the types of movement-image are composed according to the ‘sensory-
motor schema’ (or the sensory-motor situation) (Deleuze 1986; see also 
Deleuze 1989; Bogue 2003) – the relation any particular movement-image 
has with spatial coordinates within the frames and shots. Thus, the sensory-
motor schema denotes spatiotemporally organized and chronologically 
understandable movement that “coordinates the perceptions, feelings and 
actions of each living image” (Bogue 2003: 4). These are organized as 1) 
perception-images, 2) affection-images, and 3) action-images (Deleuze 1986, 
1989). Each movement-image denotes specific types of aesthetics that 
compose their potential sense and experiential characteristics. While 
cinematographic work differs in various ways from more ethnographic 
pursuits (predetermined scripts, predetermined scene elements), an 
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exploration of these various types of movement-images and their potentials 
for various kinds of expression may yet also be of interest for aspiring CCT 
videographers. From this perspective, a Deleuzean cinematographic 
philosophy can provide novel tools in a plentiful fashion, while much of the 
profound granularity in his arguments may be afforded a lesser amount of 
emphasis for our purposes here. But let the curious reader beware (or 
perhaps be further intrigued by), the amount of different concepts for the 
types and contents of the movement-images is truly voluminous (Bogue 
2003). Having said that, the publications by CCT scholars on videography 
are, to date, virtually void of differing approaches for frame and shot 
composition at such a workbench level. We will return to the practicalities of 
constructing these kinds of varying movement images in the chapter on 
Production (see IV). For now, let us attempt a brief exploration of how 
Deleuze conceives them conceptually in his philosophy of the movement-
image. 
 
2.6.1  Perception-Image 
 
Through shots, which Deleuze (1986) conceptualizes as perception-images, 
the moving image connects to the Open Whole of other images and the 
outside world (Bogue 2003: 4). It is the aesthetic of the subjective view of the 
camera lens, a shot where something is perceived, a perspective into the 
mobile slice that has been cut out of the Open Whole. This can present a very 
realist perspective (e.g. a motionless camera showing what happens in a 
room) or a very subjective and fetishistic camera where the perspective 
assumes agency (e.g. a first-person viewpoint or a ‘sinister’ viewpoint – the 
looming first-person [camera lens] perspective of an evil gaze – an ominous 
subjective onlooker without a character). Whether of more neutral 
disposition or of particular subjectification, these images allow for various 
kinds of audiovisual experiences of seeing ‘what’s going on’. Yet, the camera 
perspective is always semi-subjective, a point of view of something among 
those in the frame (Bogue 2003: 72). For Deleuze, this seems to consist of a 
parallel with his style of writing of “free indirect discourse” (Deleuze 1986: 
73), as in his texts, the form of the writing, in its inaccessibility is this ‘third’ 
entity – something not of the writer or what he writes about but rather of new 
potential relations. So perhaps even further than semi-subjective, this is a 
process of double subjectification as there is a viewer (the camera) and the 
viewed, both autonomous but within the same heterogeneous system. This is 
in line with the hermeneutic emergence of the storyteller (the researcher) and 
those of whom the story is told (the ‘objects’ in a crudely spatiotemporal 
sense) – but there is always also the third, a kind of triple hermeneutic, as the 
camera viewpoint lurks under a veil of powerful agency as well. 
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This ‘perception’ of a ‘perception’ Deleuze calls a “dicisign” (Bogue 2003: 
73). This sign extends to the perception of the audience and the perception of 
their audiences – and again finally to the Open Whole of the durée. There 
seems to be an additional and interesting reversal of binaries here. What we 
as viewers tend to think of as the ‘objective’ image (the camera as the recorder 
of real-life events), consists the most subjective one for Deleuze, and what we 
think of a ‘subjective’ image (e.g. an artistic representation of a hallucinogenic 
dream) is the most objective one (Bogue 2003: 73), or as Deleuze (1986) 
states: 
 
“a subjective perception is one in which the images vary in relation to a central and 
privileged image; an objective perception is one where, as in all things, all the 
images vary in relation to one another, on all their facets and in all their parts” (p. 
76, emphasis in original) 
 
One could interpret the reason for this being the nature of any reference point 
(a camera view) as subjective and ‘political’ (there is a reason for every shot 
and every camera angle), and that only when the (artistic) scene makes no 
attempt to connect with realistic spatial (sensory-motor schema) coordinates 
it becomes ‘objective’, as it then belongs into the realm of the durée where all 
relations connect first in the image and then through the audience and 
beyond. The sense (shifting intensities making for potential audiovisual 
experiences) is real as it makes its attempts to connect directly to infinity, not 
to an illusion of reality. 
Yet, for Deleuze, there is more to the perception-image. It simultaneously 
consists of opposing and intertwining signs as its components. The ‘dicisign’ 
(perception within a perception) denotes a kind of subject-object position, 
where the perspective of the camera becomes of importance in its deliberate 
assuming of a perspective (Bogue 2003: 74). Through the sign of the moving 
image called the ‘reume’, that flowingly leads the perception within 
perception, it extends to perception within things (the objects in the image), 
which he calls the gramme (ibid.). In the ‘gramme’, perception has shifted to 
the perceptions between the objects (human and nonhuman) in the shot, and 
the original perceiver(s) have become constituted by the agency of their 
spatiotemporal surroundings (e.g. how the knife and the dark alley constitute 
the to-be victim). This can be viewed as a linkage to the inherent agency of 
the material surroundings in line with non-representational theory, which we 
will explore further (see 2.9.2). One can also go further by saying that our 
experience hovers between the ‘dicisign’, ‘reume’ and the ‘gramme’, thus 
rendering them entwined shifting powers that produce an infinite array of 
potential changes in intensities and therefore indeterminate possibilities. 
This moves the perception-image from Sausserian signifiers and signifieds 
into emerging and diachronic experience of shifting relations. 
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Videography note (5): 
 
As examples of the use of perception-image in our PTS project, we show the presence of 
researchers and the cameras in operation and interaction with the context, making the 
illusions of video more than a research setting. Rather, it becomes elevated from a 
viewpoint into the emerging relations and hermeneutic understanding. Thus we 
illuminate that the videography is an incessant performance and that even while in situ 
a sense of artificiality remains – a fiction we attempt to tell a convincing (while 
nonrealist) story about. We can see glimpses of the perceiving lens fetishizing the 
‘objects’ (both human and nonhuman) and their stories. Furthermore, the first-person 
camera view, while expressing a viewpoint into such a possible world, simultaneously 
shows its inauthenticity – thus extending the intensity of the ‘dicisign’ into a ‘gramme’ 
by fetishizing the fetish itself (the videographic production of academic fictions). 
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The perception-image is about objects (on nouns from a linguistic 
perspective), but these objects are actualized not only as themselves but also 
simultaneously in a human form (e.g. the eye) only when external perception 
(sensation) and internal affection come together in a “center of 
indetermination” (Bogue 2003: 37). This connects the neutrality of any 
shifting of the intensity of senses to interpretation. Thus we move from an 
increasing perception (from focusing on something distant to recognizing it 
for what it is for us) to affection (and later resolute action). 
 
2.6.2  Affection-Image 
 
Affection-images connect “the living image’s outer perceptions, inner 
feelings, and motor responses to other images” (Bogue 2003: 4) with the 
intermittent state of incoming perception and outgoing action. It “is the close 
up, and the close-up is the face […] an intensive series which marks an ascent 
towards…or tends towards a critical instant […] it is a reflecting and reflected 
unity” (Deleuze 1986: 87). The affection-image thus often occupies the 
cinematographic interval in the montage between a perception and action – it 
separates these entities by assigning an emotive sense to the action that 
follows. They bridge intensities of sense to qualities of interpretation. The 
‘face’ is of special interest here, as it is:  
 
”this organ-carrying plate of nerves which has sacrificed its global mobility and which 
gathers or expresses in a free way all kinds of tiny local movements which the rest of 
the body usually keeps hidden” (Deleuze 1986: 86-87) 
 
and, 
 
“There is no close-up of the face. The close-up is the face, but the face precisely in so 
far as it has destroyed its triple function – a nudity of the face much greater than that 
of the body, an inhumanity much greater than that of the animals” (ibid.: 99) 
 
Thus often (though not necessarily), such moving images are particularly 
focused on the close-ups of facial expressions abstracted from spatial 
coordinates, as it is this surface through which human emotion (the quality of 
changing intensities) is imprinted and explicated as a pure quality (Bogue 
2003: 38). This allows for the affect to become expressed as a fluid moment 
removed from ‘causal’ (or spatiotemporally realist) relations in the moving 
image. As the close-up of the face, it becomes an emerging ‘pure possibility’ 
(sense) of affect, abstracted not only from its spatial but also temporal 
coordinates and thus becomes an immobile surface upon which motor 
tendencies bring about affective qualities or powers (Bogue 2003: 78), such 
as the increasing twinkling in a persons eyes, or the affirming broadening of a 
smile, when something amiable is perceived. One could simplify by 
purporting that such shots have a sort of momentary aloofness, hovering 
above the immediate setting to impart emotional becoming. Thus, without a 
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definite context (in the shot), the quality denotes the shifting intensities of an 
affect to another (e.g. a reflecting face transcending from slight resentment to 
intense loathing), and the power connects to the subsequent action (what 
spatiotemporal doings will the hate then amount to).  
The affection-image also assumes two qualities that in cinematographic 
expression usually follow to make the bridge between perception and action. 
A reflexive face uncontained by spatiotemporal coordinates “expresses a pure 
Quality” (Deleuze 1986: 90). This does not suggest that this type of 
expression is of the ‘object’ in thought, rather, it is of relations of a more 
abstract sensation for the audience to experience, as if an expression of an 
intensity that anxiously is awaiting to shift to a new quality. Through 
qualitative shifts in intensities, the reflexive face is intertwined with an 
opposite sense, “the intensive face [that] expresses pure Power” (ibid.) – in a 
sense the fluid movement from a neutral reflecting unity to, for example, 
intensive desire – perhaps what Deleuze suggested above as the inhuman 
animal nudity as it is of affect itself without perceptual referents. Thus, as a 
decontextualized, now a “state of Entity” (ibid.: 96) in itself, the affection-
image moves from shifting emotive expressions to a sense of what is going to 
happen when the moving image becomes recontextualized. 
The signs of the affection-image are the ‘trait icon’, which denotes the 
movement of the quality of the affect on the ‘face’ of the object, and the 
‘contour icon’, that denotes the interrelated movements of multiple elements 
that again emerge on the ‘face’ (Bogue 2003). Again we see two poles here, 
one that orients itself centripetally inwards (the ‘pure Quality’) and one that 
extends relationally beyond (the ‘pure Power’). Thus, while the affection-
image may be a close-up, it is not only limited within the frame but rather 
extends relationally beyond – as “affective energies embedded in real 
situations” (ibid.: 84). While the affect is localized in the frame of its 
simultaneous decontextualization, it is nevertheless: 
 
“independent of all determinate space-time; but it is none the less created in a history 
which produces it as the expressed and the expression of a space or a time, of an 
epoch or milieu (this is why the affect is the ‘new’ and new affects are ceaselessly 
created, notably by the work of art)” (Deleuze 1986: 99) 
 
Such facial close-ups have been rarely used in CCT videographies. The 
reasons for this may be at least twofold. Apart from the potentially more 
obvious lack of workbench approaches to video aesthetics, constructing 
videographic data with affection-based close-ups of this type are both difficult 
to shoot in uncontrolled in situ videography, and also the technologies (often 
expensive lenses with adequate amounts of zooming capability) have 
commonly been beyond the reach of many aspiring CCT videographers. We 
have attempted to conduct some limited experiments with the affection-
image in our videography projects, as the following examples illustrate. 
  81 
 
Videography note (6): 
 
While commonly pertaining to cinematography, the editing of videographies in CCT 
constructs similar visual expressions that occur during the emergent relations in the 
process of fieldwork. Yet, their usage in creating videographic expressions is always of 
intent – to tell a story. One can find examples of this in the videographies that 
accompany this study. 
 
 
In PTS we experiment with various affection-images to express the affectious 
intensities of the followers of the ‘dubstep’ music scene at party venues. While not 
necessarily affection-images in the strict sense (as something connecting to subsequent 
action), they can potentially bring about affective experiences by focusing on the 
affective motor surfaces of the face. 
 
 
In PMW the make-up artists express their thoughts about the tension of others not 
appreciating their occupation in the video industry. After this utterance, they fall silent 
and extend a sullen gaze that surges outside the shot. While this shot does not remove 
the spatiotemporal coordinates of the affection-image in their entirety, the intensities 
of the affect can be seen as potentially very relational. 
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As noted in the agency of things regarding the perception-image, qualities 
and powers are not only limited to human faces for Deleuze, for whom 
“making visible, say the ‘glistening’ of a leaf, the ‘sharpness’ of a knife […] the 
close up is the face in that the close-up facializes, or converts a concrete entity 
into a decontextualized immobile surface with motor tendencies that express 
the quality/power” (Bogue 2003: 79). One must note that this kind of 
material agency needs to be purely aesthetic and devoid of textual 
representation, for the description of such power will a priori close the 
power’s potential within the author who wishes to express it – making the 
potential not a Deleuzian affect, but rather a predetermined state. Thus the 
opportunity of relations between perceivers (persons, objects) becomes 
curtailed in limited possibility (see 3.2). As stated before, we have very little 
vocabulary for expressing these emergent relations. 
Finally, the affection-image can be seen not to necessarily consist only of 
the one of close-up, for it just requires the decontextualization of the object 
and the foregrounding of quality/power. When this expression emerges, we 
see the potential of an “any-space-whatever” (Deleuze 1986: 109), denoting 
only the shifting intensities of the affect and how it becomes separated from 
the sensory-motor schema (a realist image) by connecting its intensities to 
somewhere beyond the frame (e.g. a gaze toward the virtual future). Put in 
more simplistic terms, it occurs when the affect denotes something beyond 
what can be directly seen in the image – when the shifting emotion connects 
to the durée and thus becomes of pure undetermined possibility. 
 
2.6.3  Action-Image 
 
The last type of movement-image in this higher-order tripartite is the action-
image, “which structures the space surrounding the living image” (Bogue 
2003: 4) and “concerns determinate milieus and actual behaviors” (ibid.: 85). 
This is the moving image, where the causality of the world comes into its 
explicitness through the agency of the ‘objects’ (human, nonhuman) and their 
material surroundings. This occurs when “The realism of the action-image is 
opposed to the idealism of the affection-image” (Deleuze 1986: 123), or when 
the agentic action provides for more clear-cut relations with ‘outside’ forces: 
 
“Qualities and powers are no longer displayed in any-space-whatevers, no longer 
inhabit originary worlds, but are actualized directly in determinate, geographical, 
historical and social space-times. Affects and impulses now only appear as embodied 
in behaviour, in the form of emotions and passions which order and disorder it” 
(Deleuze 1986: 141) 
 
Additionally, the action-image denotes determinate causal relations and 
“entails an encompassing milieu of forces and the related actions/reactions of 
an individual or individuals” (Bogue 2003: 86). Thus, in this type of image, 
which one could argue to be a more philosophically straightforward 
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movement-image, more explicit relations between objects and the 
spatiotemporal emergence of forces that affect them take place (e.g. a shot of 
a car chase depicting the distance between the partaking cars). Here ‘objects’ 
are located in discernable milieus, not ‘any-spaces-whatever’, act upon it or 
are acted upon by it, thus altering the original state of things. For Deleuze, the 
action-image is constructed as an expression of either the ‘Large Form’ or the 
‘Small Form’ (Deleuze 1986). 
The ‘Large Form’ is cinematographically composed of an initial situation, a 
duel of forces in action and thereafter a changed situation (S-A-S’), which can 
be exemplified as an hourglass where all the relations of an originary 
situation reside on the top part, but are transformed to novel situational 
relations through a specific act of action in a duel that is “simultaneously 
correlative and antagonistic” (Deleuze 1986: 142; see also Bogue 2003). For 
Deleuze, the two poles of the action-image are these oppositional, yet 
simultaneously flowing signs of the ‘synsign’ and ‘binomial’. Here the 
‘synsign’ expresses the power-qualities of the objects relative to the milieu, 
and the ‘binomial’ expresses their designation as a duel of forces. The ‘Small 
Form’ reverses this sequence, making it local rather than global. For Deleuze, 
this moving image expresses action, which transcends into a situation and 
thereafter into a change in action (A-S-A’), illustratable for example by 
detective films where fragmentary acts intertwine into mysterious situations 
that change the nature of subsequent actions leaving the audience to pick up 
the pieces of the plot as clues pass by, or often in the style of situational 
comedy. Its sign is the “index” (Deleuze 1986: 160), which one could describe 
as the emerging clues that potentially let the viewer infer ‘what is actually 
going on’.  
In our fieldwork experience, constructing shots of straightforward action-
image of either the ‘Small’ or the ‘Large Form’ would often have a scripted 
and well-managed scene as a prerequisite. While such scene management is 
the very nature of the cinematographic moving image, we as CCT 
videographers do not operate in such controllable circumstances with 
predefined outcomes. Deleuze, in fact, makes a note of this when deliberating 
on the classic anthropological film Nanook of the North by Richard Flaherty, 
where many heroic acts of the Intuits actually emerge as an incessant struggle 
against the relentless nature – without the subsequent situation changing the 
overall context (a situation, action and a persistent similar situation calling 
for endless struggle, or S-A-S). This difference notwithstanding, possibilities 
remain for such videographic expressions, when the shots are of relational 
nature, entailing, for example, multiple participants interacting with the 
contextual material surroundings in an emergent performance relevant to the 
account we (as videographers) wish to construct from the particular social 
context of consumption. This would be another suggestion to go beyond the 
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commonplace ‘talking head’ interview form of videographic expression in 
further efforts to recognize the potential of the methodology for expressing 
spatiotemporally emerging performances; not only retrospective interviews 
with (at worst) decontextualized ‘heads’ (not to be confused with the 
affection-image). 
Thus, as I will further argue, videography could move towards two poles to 
become of more a relational medium in CCT. First, by bringing about new 
types of ‘realist’ action-images by adopting ideas from practice theory (see 
2.9.1) and non-representational theory (see 2.9.2), so as to express the 
emergence of relations, not only between the ‘researcher’ and the 
‘researched’, but the spatiotemporal, cognitive, and indeed affective relations 
of the agents constituting the social phenomenon the researcher(s) are 
attempting to empathically and reflexively understand. Second, in line with 
novel approaches for expressing research (e.g. Belk 1998; Schouten 1998; 
Sherry and Schouten 2003; Ellis and Bochner 2003), CCT videographers 
could further embrace artistic expression and to rid themselves of quasi-
realistic underpinnings by utilizing, for example, metaphoric images (to 
transcend the purely descriptive naively realist video), to allow for the 
possibility of viewing experiences that not only resist the confinements of the 
audiovisual moving image within the frames, shots and montage, but would, 
without hesitation, encourage new relations beyond them. This consideration 
will be our project in the subsequent section on the time-image. 
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Videography note (7): 
 
Even if not in a strict action-image (as the change in the situation is not contained 
within a shot but presented as an outcome through montage, we can illustrate an 
example of the Large Form (S-A-S’) in PTS. Here we shot a radio show featuring two 
DJ/producers, including our autoethnographic participant (third author). We can see 
glimpses of how the show starts by the DJ/producers introducing themselves to the 
audience, negotiating their cultural position by sharing exclusive cultural knowledge, 
and finally thanking their quasi-virtual audience by commenting about their buzzing 
activity on the internet forums during the show – thus expressing another 
contextualized (even if translocal) cultural performance. 
 
 
Scene of ‘Basso Radio’ broadcast – with the show about to begin. 
 
 
Scene of Basso Radio – end of the show. 
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Similarly, in BIP, we see a montage of a game in an international tournament. We see 
how the players of the team assemble their equipment, enter the field, commence with 
the game play and emerge victorious – thus finally congratulated by the opponents – 
again expressing another contextualized cultural performance. 
 
 
Scene of a match in BIP – the game play about to begin. 
 
 
Scene of a match in BIP – the game is over, Helsinki Cyclone (the autoethnographic 
member’s team) congratulated by the opponents. 
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2.6.4  Reflection-Image 
 
Apart from the tripartite movement-images, Deleuze also constructs 
additional ones that he situates in the interstices of the three that make up his 
grand scheme (the ‘impulse-image’ is omitted in this consideration because it 
is difficult to see how one could apply it in videographic research, unless the 
whole scene is considerably predetermined by scripting). The reflection-
image denotes the space after action that, for Deleuze, often begins to assume 
more artistic takes on the medium. It expresses the situations where the 
illusion of the sensory-motor causality of agency and its surroundings is 
broken (Bogue 2003: 92), which “goes from action to relation, [and] is 
composed when action and situation enter into indirect relations” (Deleuze 
1989: 33). The reflection-image seems to often constitute a kind of 
metaphoric clue stretching to the past action and directing the flow of the 
narrative to oncoming action. It thus often seems to emerge as elaborate 
combinations of the ‘Large’ and the ‘Small Form’, pushing the action-image 
beyond its limits. Bogue (2003) highlights a scene from Ivan the Terrible 
where Ivan is to confront his enemies. Yet, before this outcome is to actualize, 
there is a sequence of dance and pantomime where the “boyars [are] 
sanctifying their companions who have been beheaded […] with an infernal 
performance by clowns and circus” (Deleuze 1986: 181), so as to select the 
oncoming action (although a musical, Žižek [2006] notes the vulgarity of this 
scene as a celebration of the madness of violence in its primitive nature). 
The reflection-image, as the moving image of metaphor, or as “in allegory, 
hyperbole, and irony” (Bogue 2003: 94), thus seemingly serves as a Deleuzian 
space for the actualization of new relations through humor or by other 
indirect means (see 2.4.3). Metaphor, in its visual form assumes an image, a 
discursive figure denoting something else beyond the frame, and is thus “the 
direct reflection of an indirect relation between action and situation, the 
explicit presentation of what is implicit and presupposed in all the figures of 
the reflection-image” (Bogue 2003: 96-97). Such techniques can have a 
powerful impact, as they can propose many a question that “haunts the 
situation” (Deleuze 1986: 191) and thus opens possibilities for new intensities 
of experience. 
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Videography note (8): 
 
In the PTS videography, we have attempted to establish something of a reflection-
image in the final section that contains the narrative of ‘discussion’, the visuals are 
blended together to depict the ‘dubstep’ electronic music scene blending together in its 
state of ‘cultural acceleration’. 
 
Sneak peek: In our, as of yet up-and-coming, idea for a videographic project in the 
context of the musicians of a symphony orchestra, we hope to uncover some emerging 
tensions and storytelling specifically from the perspective of ‘demonization’ in an 
organization-theoretical vein. The stories of tensions are planned to be supplemented 
with reflection-images from the orchestra playing in a concentrated fervor – 
highlighting how the tensions within the community establish connections throughout 
in emerging series. 
 
 
 
Reflection-images could constitute another underutilized possibility that can 
open up opportunities for CCT videographers to construct evocative and 
convincing scenes of more artistic nature. Even though such narrative visuals 
of the moving image can be most readily applicable to cinema, we can explore 
the potential ramifications of the usage of metaphoric images (even as this 
does require a brazen move from the descriptive to more narrative 
storytelling in videography research). Indeed, from a descriptive perspective 
we will continue to pose questions about social practices in consumption 
contexts (sensory-motor expressions), but what remains to be further 
discussed, as we have seen, is the role of the artistic moving image in our 
research that could utilize other elaborate and evocative storytelling 
techniques (Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Shankar and Patterson 
2001), in order to raise awareness and surprise (Thompson 1990; see also 
Brown 1998; Goodall 2000), and go further to potentially convince the reader 
(Holt 1991).  
 
2.6.5  Relation-Image 
 
The last form of the moving image is the relation-image, the one where all 
what was before is subsumed into meditation, interpretation, thought and 
representation (Bogue 2003: 99) (though never in a single logocentric sense) 
– and thus enter into a flux of relations that relate to the audience connecting 
to notions of familiar habits or habits in the making. For Pierce, from whom 
Deleuze adapts the notion from, the nature of this relation is the intelligible 
relation between the object and its interpretant (Bogue 2003: 100). This is 
where the relationship between the constituents of the moving image and the 
audience becomes analyzed (while still being underpinned in the intensities 
of senses) in terms of thought and new ideas – the evoking of intellectual 
feelings. 
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The concept of the relation-image is by far the most complex and abstract. 
It does not note any specific shot but rather a cinematographic stance, where 
nothing is presented as causally simple or obvious. In a relation-image there 
is always a ‘third’ (often mysterious) relation that constitutes the perception, 
affection, and action, or the like. This is also where the subjectivity of the 
‘camera eye’ plays an especially powerful relational role. Through its 
viewpoint and the cuts it expresses, it often reveals more to the audience than 
any cinematographic character (in fiction or nonfiction), or as Žižek (2006) 
notes, that even when we implicitly sense the fictitious nature of the scene 
and even when we know what will happen, we still choose to believe it – 
sometimes even more so. This is very much in line with the overall Deleuzean 
perspective discussed above, and he uses the following allegory to depict it: 
 
“The forger will thus be inseparable from a chain of forgers into whom he 
metamorphoses. There is no unique forger, and, if the forger reveals something, it is 
the existence behind him of another forger” (Deleuze 1989: 133-134) 
 
The compositional signs of the relation-image are the ‘mark’ and the 
‘demark’, where the ‘mark’ is a semiological sign of a natural relation, an 
expression to become understood as commonsensical, whereas the ‘demark’ 
brings about an obscure relation that upsets this obvious harmony to arouse 
an unfamiliarity in the moving image, and thus potentially brings about new 
ways of thinking (e.g. Hitchcock’s windmill turning against the wind in 
Foreign Correspondent) (Bogue 2003). Then there is also the genetic sign, 
the ‘symbol’, that points to the abstract relation to express reasons for the 
upset of the otherwise ‘normalized’ order of the ‘mark’ through the ‘demark’ – 
which ushers the audience to think (ibid.). 
Thus, the relation-images are of the relations emerging beyond the frame of 
the moving image, indeed to what is beyond the montage of shots – the open 
potential that goes beyond any notion of ‘representation’ or anything 
‘contained’ by the frame itself. It is the space of relational potential, the Open 
Whole extending to us through its intensities, and then beyond – both 
connecting us and extending us simultaneously. Through these symbolic and 
complex images, the entire cinematographic story becomes a higher order 
metaphor – an endless string of relations within the moving images cut from 
the Open Whole. Yet, this layer of relations is the layer that asks the 
audiences to ponder and meditate, again to allow for new relations that 
extend beyond through the relations they encounter and enact in subsequent 
events. Such forms of videographic expression have not commonly been 
utilized in CCT, but such constructions that can potentially ‘make strange the 
everyday’, could constitute powerful ways of encouraging the audience to 
reconsider that what is often deemed to be ‘normal’ social behavior. Our 
tentative attempts at this follow: 
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Videography note (9): 
 
For example, in PMW, to construct relational images in a Deleuzean sense, we utilized 
images that bring about dialectical expressions, where the role of the viewer is 
particularly foregrounded. 
 
 
Two commercially successful video makers enter into a dialectical relation with their 
pursuits of authenticity (seemingly surprising even themselves in this moment of 
realization). While perhaps not a relation-image in the purely cinematographic sense, 
the ‘mark’ could be seen to be the natural everydayness of the interview, and the 
‘demark’ the sudden realization of the impossibility of an authentic persona in the 
industry (‘commercializing what we are’). This dialectic is expressed in the videography 
for the audience to discover it themselves – the audience as the ‘third eye’ in the 
potential for emerging new relations of thought – thought that now sees the impossible 
in the success of the authentic in the context of video industry. 
 
 
In making interpretations of the dialectical relations in the concluding section, we 
made attempts to express the fetish of authenticity by showing the protagonist, the 
autoethnographic member observing a video (‘mark’) shoot from the shadowy sidelines 
(‘demark’) – as a cultural agent attempting to maintain his authenticity via a heroic 
narrative of striving, even as the very nature of this negotiation is a fetishistic pursuit, 
where he is always bound to remain in the liminal (‘symbol’). He is now the active agent 
stripped into the sidelines of his quotidian presence. The scene ends with a taunting 
relational question directed at the ‘third eye’ of the viewer – “what is the fantasy we 
make do with?” 
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Through these three categories (six, the liminal types not excluded), and a 
totality of possibly more than 14 signs (as it is often difficult to make the 
distinction) of the movement-image (Bogue 2003), Deleuze has constructed a 
taxonomy of signs of cinematographic expression. Furthermore, each of the 
movement-image types is composed of its constituent signs, producing a truly 
exhausting multiplicity of concepts that break cinema into a wealth of 
conceptual orders and categories. While any taxonomy is structural, this 
should not be seen as Deleuze’s purpose. Rather, “his taxonomy is a 
generative device meant to create new terms for talking about new ways of 
seeing” (Bogue 2003: 104). Therefore, one must be ever vigilant to avoid a 
grand misunderstanding – while the images can be conceptualized in such 
distinct categories, the event that undergirds and originates the relations for 
such expressions through video media always contains elements of them all, 
or: 
 
“The essential point, in any event, is that of action, and also perception and affection, 
are framed in a fabric of relations. It is this chain of relations which constitutes the 
mental image, in opposition to the thread of actions, perceptions and affections” 
(Deleuze 1986: 200) 
 
All relations are transformed into symbolic acts through emergent 
performances, and thus the subconscious emerging through the shifting 
intensities of sense becomes always woven within and beyond action and its 
subsequent consideration in thought. The categories of the movement-image 
become, when used in aesthetically convincing and evocative ways, 
workbench level building blocks for the creative construction of relational 
videographic work. They entail, in (and beyond) their very nature, a relational 
function of the three: the producers and the context, the medium, and the 
audience.  
Like most of Deleuze’s writing, his taxonomy of the moving image is 
difficult to get around, fluid in its ontology, and littered with novel and 
complex concepts, to the point where “the branchings of Deleuze’s schema 
may resemble a Porphyrian tree, [yet] his complex discussions of specific 
images and signs ensure their interplay is acentered, rhizomatic 
combinations” (Bogue 2003: 104). It may not need to be reiterated here that 
this indeed can be considered to be his ultimate purpose – to conceptualize 
meaning while simultaneously liberating its unstable nature. In so doing, 
Deleuze seems simultaneously structuralist and poststructuralist in his 
underpinnings. While many of the Deleuzean concepts on cinema resist 
straightforward and simplistic application to ethnographic research on video, 
a more stratified and fine-grained consideration of how different types of 
movement-images may have powers to express and relate experiences could 
be of assistance for CCT videographers concerned about the aesthetic 
potential of their work. Furthermore, outside a (in a simplistic sense) 
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superficial consideration of embellished shots alone, there may be something 
to be said about how such aesthetic work enters far more profound realms in 
its potential to connect to powerful embodied experiences. Let us turn to 
these questions after briefly considering another side of Deleuze’s philosophy 
of cinema – how it transcended from movement to the question of time itself 
– the time-image. 
 
 
2.7  Types of Time-Image 
 
“Art in post-modern times is concerned with occupying time, rather than occupying 
space” (Kip Jones) 
 
“For to see what is in front of our eyes requires thinking – and thinking about 
thinking – in different ways” (Nigel Thrift) 
 
Even as the nature of video can be conceptualized as movement itself, the 
‘shock to thought’ (e.g. Evens 2002) it provides is through the displacement 
of time – how the notion of time itself becomes transcended in the flux of 
shots in the cinematographic montage (Deleuze 1989). At the outset, this 
seems fairly obvious. Through speeding and slowing the shot, through 
combining various shots (to construct nonlinearity of time), and utilizing the 
dark moments between them, the moving image enters into completely 
different epistemological relations as compared to its qualities of movement 
alone. In so doing, it becomes no longer fixated on specific movements and 
their relations, but indeed the abstraction and collapsing of commonsensical 
and rationalistic notions of time and the novel relations this entails. In a 
simple sense, the abstraction of time occurs when the sensory-motor (the 
‘causal’, the ‘realist’) schema breaks down, or: 
 
“What has happened is that the sensory-motor schema is no longer in operation, but 
at the same time it is not overtaken or overcome. It is shattered from the inside. That 
is, perceptions and actions ceased to be linked together, and spaces are neither co-
ordinated nor filled” (Deleuze 1989: 40) 
 
The montage has thus come to incorporate more relational content than its 
directly movement-oriented signs, which we saw in the movement-image. 
These abstract manifestations of time go beyond previous analysis in as much 
as they can now be seen as how the “movement-image [that] offers an 
indirect image of time as the open whole” (Bogue 2003: 107). This is the 
time-image, or: 
 
“This is what happens when the image becomes time-image. The world has become a 
memory, brain, superimposition of ages or lobes, but the brain itself has become 
consciousness, continuation of ages, creation or growth of ever new lobes, recreation 
of matter as with styrene […] The image no longer has space and movement as its 
primary characteristics but topology and time” (Deleuze 1989: 125) 
 
  93 
What we also see here is the foregrounding of thought and imagination. What 
started from the subconscious relations of the shifting intensities of sense has 
extended to the creative relations of thought put in novel motions by the 
abstract time-image. And to continue his taxonomic work, again, Deleuze 
goes into intricate (and at times exhausting) detail in his conceptualizations 
of the various forms and signs of the time-image. Similarly to my reading 
regarding the movement-image, for the purpose of videography in CCT, I will 
only attempt to provide a brief overview, while attaching the most applicable 
parts to extant and future research on video. 
What the time-image brings about, is the destabilization of the 
commonsensical and causally descriptive images of objects (both human and 
nonhuman) in the artificially closed in the system of the frame, set in 
movement in the shot. To contrast this form of the image and to further enter 
into the consideration of montage (how shots are linked together in 
cinematographic expressions), we can first briefly consider the most 
straightforward breach of ‘linear’ time in a montage sequence. Thise are the 
‘recollection-images’, which could also be called ‘flashbacks’ that “intervene in 
automatic recognition; they insert themselves between stimulation and 
response, and contribute to the better adjustment to the motor mechanism by 
reinforcing it with a psychological causality” (Deleuze 1989: 47). The 
flashback operates with a linear narrative, exposing a history that has a 
correspondence to the present situation in the montage (a memory, a 
expression of destiny). Even as still contained in a narrative sequence, this is 
when we begin to see the breach of linear time, as: 
 
“Subjectivity, then, takes on a new sense, which is no longer motor or material, but 
temporal and spiritual: that which ‘is added’ to matter, not what distends it; 
recollection-image, not movement-image” (Deleuze 1989: 47) 
 
Recollection-images (flashbacks), as they would seem to assume expressive 
forms of the narrative script, and like most of Deleuze’s philosophy of the 
moving image, have their most obvious place in cinematography. Yet, such 
visuals could also be employed in videographic research in CCT, even as such 
aesthetic perspectives have not been widely utilized to date. One possibility 
for this could be historical footage (such as from one’s childhood) that could 
be added to the montage so as to build a potentially more convincing and 
evocative story. At present, I am involved in the planning of one such project 
that would explore how ‘retired’ paintball practitioners negotiate the ‘loss’ of 
a social consumption practice that they were profoundly invested in for over a 
decade. Footage from past tournaments, and other experiences involving the 
whole team could be inserted to supplement (and deterritorialize) present 
day narratives of how former players negotiate this fossilized past (see also 
Videography note 13 in 2.8.2). Yet, in their potential spirituality, these 
moving images do not only point to a recognizable past. They have the power 
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to bring about new thinking – both in terms of aesthetics and infinite 
potential circuits of expressive orders. This is where the time-image opens up 
and breaks its conceptual ties to the movement-image. 
While there is a great amount of interesting Deleuzian conceptualizations in 
his work on the time-image, the concept of images of convincing non-realist 
time, the “powers of the false” (Deleuze 1989: 126), seems to have the greatest 
bearing on how we understand the nature of the moving image in terms of 
any corresponding link to ‘captured reality’. Deleuze conceptualized the 
‘organic regime’ as the images where ‘representation’ and thought play a 
game of tag with each other. This game sets the moving image on two poles, 
the ‘representational’ actuality and the emergence of consciousness in the 
virtual – in other words, what the moving image expresses (as ‘truth-like 
reality’) and what creative thought such expressions can bring about. 
These powers are also linked to particular aesthetics, the most important 
being the break-down of the realist conceptualization of the moving image 
(e.g. an artistic image of abstract texture). Here is where the actuality of the 
‘representation’ and the creative potential of consciousness intertwine to 
bring about new intensities and potential relations. Deleuze conceptualizes 
this as the ‘crystalline regime’ or the “pure optical and sound situations” 
(Deleuze 1989: 9), which consist of nonobjectified optical and sonic images in 
which the sensory-motor schema breaks down (Bogue 2003), or, in other 
words, moving images devoid of a spatiotemporal frame, so as to be 
recognized ‘as this-or-that type of expression’. Thus, we now have a 
completely different type of expressive schemata of moving images, ones in 
which: 
 
“We no longer have an indirect image of time which derives from movement, but a 
direct time-image from which movement derives. We no longer have a chronological 
time which can be overturned by movements which are contingently abnormal; we 
have a chronic non-chronological time which produces movements necessarily 
‘abnormal’, essentially ‘false’ […] If time appears directly, it is in de-actualized peaks 
of the present; it is in virtual sheets of the past” (Deleuze 1989: 129-130) 
 
The point seems to be that when our montage-cuts assume the roles of shifted 
time (the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ blending almost seamlessly), we are 
producing an entire viewing experience that is removed from any linear 
narrative and spatiotemporal order. We are producing stories, where the 
problem is no longer of discerning between the ‘true’ and the ‘false’ moving 
image, but rather constructing an aesthetic and a narrative “labyrinth of time 
[…] the line which forks and keeps on forking, passing through incompossible 
presents, returning to not-necessarily true pasts” (Deleuze 1989: 131). A 
montage thus becomes of a purely symbolic order, distanciated from a 
correspondence with reality, not only in terms of subjective perspectives (of 
the ‘camera eye’), but of (impossible) orders of nonlinear time itself. 
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As with the movement-image, Deleuze’s conceptualization of the time-
image consists of various types of aesthetic expressions of time. These are the 
crystal-image, or ‘hyalosigns’, which breaks down time in an object or person, 
the ‘chronosigns’, which have to do with the nonlinear orders of time, the 
‘noosigns’, which connect thought and images, and finally the ‘lectosigns’, 
which manifest in the new relations between the visual and the sonic (Bogue 
2003: 107-108). Let us briefly visit each of these in turn. 
 
2.7.1 Hyalosigns: Time as a Break in the Sensory-Motor Schema 
 
The most approachable concept of the breaking down of the sensory-motor 
schema is the ‘hyalosign’ denoting visual storytelling (cuts and montage), 
where the linearity of time seems to no longer apply and the objective causal 
relations in the setting become ambiguous – where the “world takes 
responsibility for the movement that the subject can no longer or cannot 
make” (Deleuze 1989: 59). Something more than the linear, commonsensical 
and rational emerges. “For when the sensory-motor schema begins to 
disintegrate, and with it the interconnecting links that hold action and the 
situation together, the only totality remaining that can provide coherence and 
coordination of space and time is either a network of circulating clichés or a 
conspiratorial system of surveillance” (Bogue 2003: 108). With ‘hyalosigns’ 
we enter into metaphoric, even artistic visuals brought about to construct 
something more than simple sensory-motor relations between the objects 
(human and nonhuman) in the frame. 
As one might expect with Deleuze, ‘hyalosigns’ come in many forms, the 
first (and the conceptually simplest) being the ‘opsign’. In such visual 
moments of the moving image, the setting becomes decontextualized to 
reveal something beyond the immediate realist space and agency – a 
character or the subjective camera suddenly becoming aware of the Open 
Whole. Bogue (2003) describes an example of Rosselini’s Europa 51, where a 
wealthy housewife undergoes a series of purely optical moments as she sees 
the misery of poverty when she is made to stand afore “housing projects […] 
grim buildings and razed wastelands” (p. 109). In effect, the ‘camera eye’ 
extends into her contemplation of how she sees humankind as the wreckage 
of the slum stares back at her. It may resemble the perception-image (see 
2.6.1), but it goes further as it extends beyond the immediate perception and 
into the Open Whole of all being and relations. One can find the same type of 
thinking in Žižek’s (2006) analysis of Hitchcock’s Birds, where in the opening 
scene (an accident and a fire at the gas station), the camera suddenly lunges 
into the sky (revealing the whole town), and suddenly a flock of birds emerges 
hovering towards the town. This is the ‘eye of evil’, an overarching malevolent 
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force surrounding all of humanity in transcendence into something concrete 
(Žižek 2006). 
As with these examples, the ‘opsign’ differs from a perception-image in its 
potential to connect beyond the immanent contextual situation. This 
connection is marked by the overflow of intensities, something so unbearable 
that it exceeds our sensory-motor capabilities through its connections to 
affects beyond the immediate situation (Bogue 2003: 110). The difficulty here 
is one of distinction. Indeed, it can be difficult to construct when an image 
becomes an ‘opsign’ by connecting to the Open Whole in its unbearability. 
More similarities can be noted between the aforementioned recollection-
image (see 2.7) and the ‘purely optical and sound situations’. But whereas the 
recollection-image, like other movement-image has its primary domain in 
some spatiotemporal relations between the shots that accompany it, “it is not 
the recollection-image or attentive recognition which gives us the proper 
equivalent of the optical-sound image, it is rather the disturbances of memory 
and failures of recognition” (Deleuze 1989: 55). Thus, “there is at a deeper 
level and insuffiency in the recollection-image in relation to the past” 
(Deleuze 1989: 53, emphasis in the original), and here the ‘hyalosign’ goes 
conceptually further, beyond the causality of the narrative, or the linearity of 
destiny. This is to draw further attention to the comprehensively abstract and 
artistic nature of the ‘purely optical and sound situations’ that make up the 
time-image. They are completely deterritorialized from the spatiotemporal 
flow, thus enabling the viewer to enter beyond them in thought – to uncover 
and establish wholly new relations. These have less to do with any attentive 
recognition and identification of a narrative flashback, but on the contrary, 
the forces of unbearability of not remembering. 
As academic research in the videography form has primarily followed what 
could be described as a documentary format, it may seem easy to dismiss this 
type of abstract and even artistic use of the moving image. Certainly, my 
videographic productions that accompany this study are commonly engaged 
in making use of the sensory-motor schema and, therefore, (too) often a kind 
of implicitly ‘realist’ imagery. In my published work, the understanding of the 
non-realist illusion of the videographic methodology has been mostly 
concerned with my (and my research fellows’) interpretations and our ways of 
constructing a narrative form of storytelling from our emergent perspectives. 
Additionally, as with fieldnotes, I have argued that the very nature of the 
video technology gives us no privileged access to any reality – only an 
interpreted abstraction that is nevertheless very powerful in the sense that it 
expresses highly convincing illusions of our emerging relations in the field 
and the role of the spatiotemporal context in the social relations among 
people. 
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But, if we take a more artistic approach to videographic work seriously 
(which is certainly my goal), what could it mean? If we could express 
convincing and novel relations with metaphoric and artistic moving images, 
could our research become to constitute more evocative efficacy? In academic 
text we conventionally do this through (often dry and rationalistic) accounts 
of interpretations – connections to what our participants ‘really mean’. Also, 
on video, if interpretation is made in narrative ‘voice of god’ format, we 
similarly redirect ourselves back towards textual expression. The future will 
show if we can (or should) be liberated from such objectivist images. 
  
2.7.2  Chronosigns: Time as a Break in Linearity and an Extension 
into Relation 
 
Deleuze’s ‘hyalosigns’ are of shots of cinematographic expression that have to 
do with the “mirrors or seeds of time” (Deleuze 1989: 274), which by going 
beyond the sensory-motor schema, reveal relations of the Open Whole by 
stretching to past relations of memories and the future yet to emerge.  
‘Chronosigns’, on the other hand, are similar in that they visually combine 
relations of the past and the present, but they are denoted by the trueness or 
falseness of the images as they break the linearity of time (Bogue 2003: 135). 
They break down the relation between the realness of the present and the 
virtual memory of the past so that it becomes “undecidable or inextricable” 
(Deleuze 1989: 274). Thus, whereas ‘hyalosigns’ have to do with the breaking 
down of the real and the imaginary, ‘chronosigns’ break down the distinction 
of the true and the false, “in other words, a narrative’s verisimilitude, or truth 
likeness, depends on its adherence to the commonsense coordinates [the 
sensory-motor] of space and time” (Bogue 2003: 147, emphasis added). Thus 
by breaking both Euclidean space and chronological time, they render the 
present abstract – one that may only peak intermittently from shot to shot. 
‘Chronosigns’ come in two forms that intermingle to no longer represent 
linear time, or even true or false events, so as to be no longer of a “coexistence 
of sheets of the past, but the simultaneity of the peaks of the present” 
(Deleuze 1989: 101). The moving image thus becomes something of a 
kaleidoscope of potential possibilities, where many events take place, but 
where we as the viewers have little guidance for understanding their ordering 
or actuality. We must thus by ourselves construct an imagination out of these 
possibilities. The two forms of the ‘chronosigns’ are the ‘aspects’ (regions, 
layers) and the ‘accents’ (peaks of view) (Deleuze 1989). While Deleuze does 
not offer much specificity for these concepts, I read them to entail something 
like the following. The ‘aspects’ are expressions of a moving image where 
different events are contextualized so that their ordering becomes obscure 
(did this event already happen, is it happening now, is it going to happen at 
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all). The ‘accents’ are the different constructed realities for each of the 
‘aspects’ (e.g. through narration), so as to make them occur simultaneously, 
but always without a distinction in terms of their actual ordering or veracity. 
They emerge simultaneous and distinct at the same time, something of a 
relativist image, “Distinct and indiscernible” (Deleuze 1989: 104, emphasis in 
original). 
Similarly to ‘hyalosigns’, this type of abstract imagery that could be seen to 
denote the breaking down of the expression of both time and the true and the 
false, has not been utilized in CCT research in videography form. While 
acknowledging the fictional basis of any logos or truth-effect of our 
expressions, the most common moving image we see consists of contextual 
(or worse, decontextualized talking heads) social practices in their directness, 
the image thus emerging into a description of the ‘real’ situation. Perhaps this 
is what the academic community has deemed convincing, an implicit 
connection to a type of storytelling that sets up a type of verisimilitude with 
the context. Yet, while our focus as videographers commonly remains at the 
level of the sensory-motor schema, our constructions of linear time are 
naturally mere illusions, as we construct interviews by combining different 
sentences and reshuffling the order of fieldwork to create more cohesion in 
our narratives. 
 
 
 
Videography note (10): 
 
Indeed, in our PTS project, we have deliberately reorganized the order of temporal 
events. While our videography portrays the sequence of time as a spatiotemporal 
movement from Finland-London-New York-Finland, the order of London and New 
York was, in actuality, reversed and the Finnish material was shot intermittently. Yet 
this ordering of time, from our perspective, creates a more compelling truth likeness, at 
the same time displaying the powers of the false in audiovisual expression via the 
moving image. By constructing a videography that would entail ‘chronosigns’ and 
‘hyalosigns’ can offer much potential in future work, especially if the more abstract and 
artistic expressions can be seen as evocative and compelling and can therefore be 
foregrounded. 
 
 
 
In 1.1, I raised several often-resurfacing questions posed to me when 
attempting to argue for videography in CCT. The form varies, yet the content 
always seems the same: “Isn’t it possible to fake everything on video by 
(re)creating the scene and the ambiance, by picking and choosing the truth 
you wish to tell?” At this present point, I will no longer linger on defining the 
ontology and the possibility for any stable and lasting ‘truth’, but, in addition, 
is not the same exactly true, and additionally accomplished with relative ease 
in textual representations of research? What stops one from writing whatever 
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they want (and perhaps more alarmingly, what they assume as the ‘truth’)? As 
Belk and Kozinets (2005a) note, our writings (in CCT) are to be understood 
as rhetorical devices, and therefore it may be possible that the “‘cults of 
criteriology’ that lobby for the regulation of inquiry and removal of doubt” 
(Sherry and Schouten 2002: 220) are finally on the vane. At least, they have 
not been successful in maintaining any philosophically defendable positions 
via postmodern frameworks. 
 
2.7.3  On the Limits of the Time-Image: Images as Thought, Sight 
and Sounds 
 
The last of the signs in the Deleuzean taxonomy of the time-image have to do 
with audiovisual moments where all expressive coordinates of space, time 
and causality are broken. These time-images no longer take place in any type 
of directly signifying system of cinematographic expression, but rather extend 
to take place in pure thought itself, in the intense experience and cognitive 
recollection and thought of the viewer(s). In so doing, and somewhat 
confusingly, they are also ‘chronosigns’ – but it is in this category of the 
moving image in which a Deleuzean ontology leads us furthest, yet never 
disconnects, from the subconscious of the sense and their emergent 
intensities. For these are not images that extend to thought, they are 
embodied thought in and of themselves. So what could such further-moving 
image categories add to our conceptual resources? In entering into the 
potentials of creative imagination, these types of ‘chronosigns’ denote the 
“thinking image […and a] readable image” (Deleuze 1989: 165). This effort 
makes linkages with Deleuze’s takes on material becoming and the becoming 
of the mind and imagination, for now, like a Deleuzean ‘poststructuralist’ 
perspective to language itself, we can conceptualize cinema as an emerging 
flux of audiovisual concepts, or “from the image to the thought, from the 
percept to the concept” (Deleuze 1989: 157). This seems one of the most 
important ‘shocks to thought’ in Deleuzean thinking, for he postulates that 
‘noosigns’ and ‘lectosigns’ extend beyond thought, to and beyond possible 
thought, and this shock comes about due to the agency of the moving image 
itself, an inescapable and captivating “subjective and collective automaton for 
an automatic movement” (ibid.: 157) that gives rise to a spiritual automation 
in us, the ‘shock to thought’ itself, or: 
 
“what constitutes the sublime is that the imagination suffers a shock which pushes it 
to the limit and forces thought to think the whole as intellectual totality which goes 
beyond the imagination” (Deleuze 1989: 157) 
 
Thus, these types of moving images are not about visuals and affects that are 
of the ‘possible’ kind (the world as we know it to be in our everyday 
experiences), but rather come about to portray unfathomable and impossible 
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combinations of times, pasts and presents. These glide throughout our 
experience in a flux of audiovisual expressions that do not form stable images 
that could be directly read as a realist image. While photography certainly 
moves one’s thinking, it is not animated (Barthes 1981/1980), and thus, in 
this sense, does not consist of the spiritual automation. One could say that 
while the photograph (or the text) invites the viewer/reader, the audiovisual 
moving image goes on, in its own agency, to engulf or even kidnap the viewer. 
Whereas “the movement-image constitutes time in its empirical form, the 
course of time: a successive present in an extrinsic relation of before and 
after, so that the past is the former present, and the future is the present to 
come” (Deleuze 1989: 271), this schemata now breaks down to give us more 
radical ‘hyalosigns’ and ‘chronosigns’ that make the cinematic montage thus 
always a collision of individual-like expressions of a “vague and non-rational, 
as much felt as thought, a kind of dreamlike, intuited affective totality that 
gives each image its sense of ‘rightness’” (Bogue 2003: 169). This false 
illusion of ‘rightness’, through the convincing and evocative ‘shocks to 
thought’, can potentially “inspire action, that critical awareness should lead to 
a revolutionary consciousness” (ibid.: 169). Here, in the liberation of thought, 
we can spot some similarities even to critical theory (Murray and Ozanne 
1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; cf. Hetrick and Lozada 1994), but 
more in line with Deleuze, this consciousness is not necessarily one of 
emancipation of a system of politics – rather a creative liberation of thought 
from any stable conceptual system. Now with such breaks from 
representation and causality that was the hallmark of classical cinema, as 
Bogue (2003) notes, we are not only faced with the reading of ‘impossible’ 
images, but, in fact, we become faced with a our relations to what was 
previously an understandable and stable experience of the world. Therefore it 
can no longer consist of any type of potential ‘representation’ of a possible 
world, but indeed the opposite, forcing us to negotiate and think along 
impossible worlds of discontinuous time and relation, or: 
 
“there is no longer any movement of internalization or externalization, integration or 
differentiation, but a confrontation of an outside and an inside independent of 
distance, this thought itself and this un-thought within thought” (Deleuze 1989: 278) 
 
We have been thrust into new possible imaginations, the “intolerable and 
unthinkable” (Bogue 2003: 170), but this does not consist of some great 
horror; rather the opposite – we become faced with the banality of our 
ordinary experiences as if we, in our realities, “are living in a second rate film” 
(ibid.: 171), where “The intolerable is no longer a serious injustice, but a 
permanent state of a daily banality” (Deleuze 1989: 170). And is it not the 
hallmark of CCT videographies (or CCT research in general) to venture into 
the contexts of social practices, and ‘make strange the everyday’ in order to 
overcome banality by dialectically reversing itself? After all, we can 
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potentially produce impossible illusions of banality that have novel and 
evocative senses and meanings (even theoretical) in our banality as 
researchers. Yet, the impossibility of the image, the orchestration of the 
montage in ways that invokes new thinking and relations, presumes that we 
can intellectually relinquish our grasp of the realness or the purely descriptive 
nature of the moving image. 
These new images of thought come in montages simultaneously separated 
and linked by the following forms: the ‘point-cut’, the ‘re-linkage’ and the 
‘white or black screen’ (Bogue 2003). These denote the various interstices 
between shots, where the ‘point-cut’ is the irrationality of the combination of 
distinct (and seemingly disconnected) shots, the ‘re-linkage’ is the irrational 
interstice and its possible non-arbitrary relations from shot to another then 
made visible by the ‘white or black screen’ (the interval or the transition 
between shots). Thus, the moving images become possibilities of times and 
places, held together by these interstices that extend to and beyond thought. 
In contemporary moving images, we have become faced with these spaces 
between the shots themselves, as they are no longer there to ensure the 
smoothness of causal actions, but rather to be relational differing spaces that 
in their emptiness open up the possibility for associations between the 
discontinuous and irrationally cut shots of the montage (Bogue 2003). Thus, 
“The interval is set free, the interstice becomes irreducible and stands on its 
own” (Deleuze 1989: 277). When the black space between shots gains 
autonomity, the viewer is thrust into an internal space with an origin in 
consciousness that is no longer a mirror or ‘representation’ of anything that 
needs to be signified. This is conceptualized as the “crystal” (Deleuze 1989: 
274, emphasis added) of the ‘chronosign’ that fragments rather than focuses 
thought and launches it into new series and trajectories – not a mirror of 
‘representation’, but rather a prism of possible relations. “The direct time-
image or the transcendental form of time is what we see in the crystal; and 
hyalosigns, as well as crystalline signs, should therefore be called mirrors or 
seeds of time” (Deleuze 1989: 274). These dreamlike states are succinctly 
described by Bogue (2003): 
 
“In sheets of the past, diverse planes of past time, each a slice from the great cone of 
the virtual past, are juxtaposed and interconnected through transverse passages that 
produce incompossible combinations of coexisting past times. In peaks of the 
present, incompossible presents-of-the-past, presents-of-the-present, and presents-
of-the-future are treated as simultaneous present moments, and through abrupt 
leaps from peak to peak mutually exclusive points of time are put in relation to one 
another […] True and false are also undecidable in the chronosigns of time-as-series, 
those signs in which the vital becoming of time subsumes a retained past and a 
projected future within a mutative present” (p. 200) 
 
While considerably abstract, this also applies directly to videographic 
research. According to this account of Deleuzean reading, the future is open 
in a resonating rhizome of relations, under constant negotiation, drawing 
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from all events, whether true or false (in a cinematographic sense) – our 
‘truth’ on a videographic expression must be an illusion – an endless 
simulation, and simultaneously it must be the ‘truth’ in all the relations it 
goes on to bring about. These ‘truths’ while unstable and nonrepresentative 
are thinkable and readable through and beyond a creative imagination. But 
this is as far as we will take the Deleuzean ontology of cinema regarding this 
current project on videography in the CCT. One more consideration remains, 
however, and it seems to be one of the most neglected kinds. So before we 
wrap up the section regarding an account of Essence(s), let us briefly visit the 
aural, the sonic, the sound of the moving image. 
 
2.7.4  Relinkages of the Aural Dimension of the Movement-Image 
 
“who can conceive a voice without a body” (Mary Ann Doane) 
 
Let us move on to consider the notion of sound with respect to the moving 
image. Here I will primarily follow Deleuze to provide a brief overview of how 
sound gives us new potential to escape the linearity of the realist image. In 
terms of a Deleuzian reading, sound adds to the potential of the moving 
image by expressing new possibilities for escaping the notion of 
‘representation’, or as Evens (2002), elaborates: 
 
“To the extent that something moves in music, something which makes it more than 
a measureable aggregation of continuous sounds, but brings it together, relates to its 
outside, to that extent, music is expressive. It is the expression in sound which cannot 
be measured, the expressive dimension that operates in conjunction with a person a 
listener who brings something to the sound. Where sound involves percepts and 
affects, where it presents a world one could be in, there is only a person can go” (p. 
173) 
 
A more practical perspective on sound and the visual experience is provided 
in the Production chapter (see IV). Deleuze reminds us that in sound(s) 
“there is just one soundtrack, but at least three groups, words, noises, music” 
(Deleuze 1989: 234), which, in line with his relational epistemology, “rather 
than invoking the signifier and the signified […] all form together one 
component, a continuum” (ibid.: 235). Through the addition of the sonic 
layer, the moving image entered into a vast new spectrum of possible 
relations. While there are many perspectives into experiencing sound and its 
relationship with the visual moving image, many scholars on cinema and 
communication studies agree that the aural has been conventionally 
subjugated to the visual (Doane 1980; Metz 1980; Jones 1993) or too hastily 
assumed to be an “equal partner with the image in some grand democracy” 
(Branigan 1989: 311) and “constructed largely as a function of the 
representative realism effect” (Pisters 2003: 178).  
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Videography note (11): 
 
While retorting to staging and expressing performances that would imply a realist take 
on epistemology is certainly inconceivable for this project, there is an interesting 
affective nature of the sound accompanying the moving image. Why is it that we, as an 
audience, seem to be willing to accept granulated and low-quality footage as long as the 
soundtrack remains undistorted and unvarnished to some substantial degree? Could 
we speculate that we, as audiovisual perceivers and embodiers of our perceptions have 
evolved a certain generosity towards visual experience that does not apply similarly to 
what we require from auditory experiences? In situations of corporeal danger (say 
darkness), have we not acquired the capacity to ‘make-do’ with distorted and 
compromised visual cues (say, escaping in the dark)? But is it not the very nature of 
sound experience itself, that when dubious (say digital distortions of a shoddy 
recording), tells us exactly the opposite – that the event is not ‘real’; does that not 
scream fabrication? The problem with ‘bad’ sound is that it rids us of our embodied 
experience, and makes us reconsider the situation. The sound could thus be the 
‘realism-check’ par excellence. While this may be to the videographer’s advantage when 
constructing ‘purely optical or sound situations’, it acts as a potent disturbance in, for 
example, action-images. In this perspective “your audio is more important than your 
video” (Artis 2008: 145). 
 
While we often film in demanding contexts (e.g. electronic music clubs) in terms of the 
sound, we have decided not to introduce ‘lavalier microphones’ (i.e. microphones 
attached to the participants’ shirts), as we feel that such a procedure would do much to 
take away much of the fluid relationality of the settings by turning them into something 
too much interview-like (rather than ‘conversation-like’ in an emergent sense). Instead, 
we have used high quality microphones and the post facto services of professional 
audio engineers to ‘resurrect’ some of the audio files that have suffered from too much 
background noise. The reader may evaluate the results by viewing, for example, the 
PTS videography. 
 
 
 
However, in addition to contextual tremors, sound may have many qualities 
that can stand alone in and of themselves, for it is the addition of sound 
(music as well as autonomous speech acts and narration) that is “an act of 
myth or story-telling which creates the event, which makes the event rise up 
into the air, and which rises itself into a spiritual ascension” (Deleuze 1989: 
279). 
Sound can thus be seen as a part of the moving image, but also something 
that simultaneously stretches beyond the visual, while bringing back to the 
visual relations its nonarbitrariness – its ‘eventification’. As already seen 
above, taking a stance contra text, Christian Metz’s (1980) seminal work 
proposes that the very nature of Western culture (the embeddedness of the 
subject-predicate-object structure) emphasizes the visual and ‘adjectivises’ 
the aural as a property of some existing object, but never a state of being as its 
own. In his terms, objects have a tendency to become explained when 
described linguistically, whereas a sound that is heard is understood only 
when its source is objectified, as “Culture depends on the permanence of the 
object, language reaffirms it: only the adjective is varied” (Metz 1980: 28). 
Importantly, however, he sees sound as an “autonomous aural object” (ibid.: 
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24), something that is not part of the visual experience, but rather something 
imprecise (see also Branigan 1989), a presence that readily diffuses into the 
surrounding spaces and is thus not in any way contained by the visual. Doane 
(1980) notes that the expression of recorded voice is, in its fluidity, in 
perpetual contradiction with the two-dimensional screen, and, therefore, 
there is always a divergence between bodies and voices. In addition:  
 
“sound […] acts as it does because of the space it has as its context […] all around us 
and from within us. Analogies to visual experience break down, for the visual only 
comes from within us when we are hallucinating” (Jones 1993: 248) 
 
He adds, in line with Baudrillard’s (2006/1981) simulacra, that we have come 
to accept the most authentic sound experience as something recorded in the 
abstraction of studio environments, then only later imprinted on the moving 
image and engineered so as to sound like reality. It thus becomes, like the 
video image, doubly abstracted. 
As we have already seen, it is what these scholars have often left as the 
metaphysical (what is the nature of the dissolution of the sound and the 
dream-like ‘hallucinatory’ moving image) that Deleuze focuses on. It is these 
notions of the illusory nature of sound and how it transcends the visual of the 
frame to defuse in the surrounding space of the moving image that 
particularly interested Deleuze. While scholars have also concentrated on 
what would consist of a more realistic representation of sounds emanating 
from localized bodies (e.g. Doane 1980), Deleuze would again emphasize the 
nonlocalized and relational (nonrealist) as more real, as what opens a 
connection to the infinite Open Whole (see 2.4.1). For Deleuze, this 
distinction is again relational, as all soundscapes and visuals blend together. 
And yet more strikingly, Deleuze’s (1989) point is that the aural experience is 
always autonomous from the visual moving image, as: 
 
“What constitutes the audio-visual image is a disjunction, a dissociation of the visual 
and the sound, each hetautomous, but at the same time an incommensurable or 
‘irrational’ relation which connects them to each other, without forming a whole, 
without offering the least whole. It is resistance stemming from the sensory-motor 
schema, and which separates the visual image and the sound image, but puts them all 
the more in a non-totalizable relation” (p. 256) 
 
This has to do with the final time-image, the ‘lectosign’, and, even if it was 
only vaguely conceptualized by Deleuze, it has been interpreted to closely 
associated with the ways sound connects and actualizes new relations as it is 
intertwined with the moving image (Bogue 2003). The ‘lectosign’ is described 
to be the incommensurable limits of visual and sound – instances that 
reattach them together, yet the place where they stay perennially apart, such 
as when “the common limit: the visual image become stratigraphic is for its 
part all the more readable in that the speech-act becomes an autonomous 
creator” (Deleuze 1989: 279). As Pisters (2003) notes; “when the sound takes 
over from the image, this opening is created, an opening to something beyond 
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the image, a connection with the earth or even the cosmos” (p. 190). Indeed, 
here Deleuze is speaking about how sounds (such as autonomous speech) 
teach us something about the visual, as “a sonic continuum accompanies the 
visual image, a continuum that includes dialogue, sound effects, and music in 
both the relative and absolute out-of-field; and on the other hand that music 
has the ‘specific autonomous power’” (Bogue 2003: 186). In my view, we see 
Deleuze arguing for paying special attention to the aural realm, not as 
secondary to the visual, but independent and opening new potential to go 
beyond the visual frame, and into the relations that surge beyond. Indeed: 
 
“consider sound in its potential force to engender all kinds of molecular becomings. 
Furthermore, an important aspect of music is its power to create territories and, by 
the same token, its power to deterritorialize” (Pisters 2003: 188) 
 
In contrast, other scholars have drawn dichotomous lines between the 
signified and nonsignified sounds. In Zettl’s (2008) terms, sound can have a 
diegetic directional and assignable point of origin (whether directly visible or 
not), such as a cat’s purr or the sound of traffic in a city flat, or a nondiegetic 
origin that cannot be defined (comical sound effects, mood enhancing 
background music) (cf. Pisters 2003). In any case, for Deleuze, sounds and 
music “encompasses a gamut of possibilities, ranging in function from sonic 
component of the onscreen scene, through harmonious reinforcement of the 
film’s rhythms, to autonomous ‘foreign body’” (Bogue 2003: 186). The sonic 
continuum can thus enhance the sensory motor experience and also again 
connect to the Open Whole through difference, nonlinearity and the irrational 
incongruence with the observable. For Deleuze, music is indeed about the 
Dionysian, as it creates immediate moods in and of itself while being 
potentially completely incommensurable with the visual moving image 
(Deleuze 1989; Bogue 2003). With the breakdown of linear time in modern 
cinema, both the visual and the sonic become autonomous (when the moving 
image assumes the ‘purely optical and the sonic’ to express complete 
noncorrespondence to the spatiotemporal coordinates), thus becoming first 
experienced through the intensities they invoke, then to be read and 
interpreted (Bogue 2003). They must be reconnected with some world by the 
mind, as they have become stripped of their own spatiotemporal coordinates 
or the sensory-motor schema. There will thus never be a commensurability 
between the sonic and the visual, but rather a complimentarity where there is 
always a space that has the potential to connect to the infinite, or how 
“incommensurability denotes a new relation and not an absence […] which 
forms the non-totalizable relation, the broken ring of their junction, […] this 
is a perpetual linkage” (Deleuze 1989: 279). 
In the time of silent films, speech was always subordinate to action (Bogue 
2003). With the advent of the ‘talkie’, a new realm of affect came about, as the 
characters were now able to lie, hint and misspeak, as “the naturalness of the 
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characters’ expressive bodies is thereby infected with a potential artificiality 
and deceptiveness” (Bogue 2003: 185). In addition to other nondiegetic 
sounds (including music), narrative voices occupy the ‘absolute out-of-field’ 
by bringing about the nonlinearity of no physical presence of reminiscence, 
reflection and commentary (Bogue 2003) – thus again connecting the 
experience to the Open Whole. The modern cinema, and with it all 
contemporary audiovisual expressions of the moving image, thus has the 
potential to “[through ‘lectosigns’ to] exploit the power of a disjunction of 
sound and sight” (Bogue 203: 194). As is the case with video media 
altogether, there is no “clear origin or final destination” (Bogue 2003: 195), 
and no clear beginning or end of a videographic expression.  
Here we can take a quick glance back (see 2.3.6), as it must be noted that we 
have mostly been covering cinematographic considerations on the film 
format. Yet, Deleuze also anticipatorily touches upon the digitalized video 
format: 
 
“And the screen itself, even if it keeps a vertical position by convention, no longer 
seems to refer to the human posture, like a window or painting, but rather constitutes 
a table of information, an opaque surface on which are inscribed ‘data’, information 
replacing nature, and the brain-city, the third eye, replacing the eye of nature” 
(Deleuze 1989: 265) 
 
Likewise to the aforementioned notions of thinking the unthinkable when 
faced with the automaticity and agency of the audiovisual moving image, 
digital video as a relational, rearticulatable, and remashable medium holds 
tremendous potential, in both creating and making us question the nature of 
reality. Unlike film, video is not merely a relational medium in its aesthetics, 
art, and possibilities for compelling fictions; it becomes a medium of relation 
through its endless possibilities of recreation. Thus, we seem to have come 
full circle to return to the famous 1967 McLuhanian pictographic handbook, 
“The Medium Is The Massage” (Joseph 2008: 101). Yet, in digital expression, 
this must also be considered in a relation to the ‘hyperreal’, the generation of 
‘real’ experiences without origin or actuality (e.g. Baudrillard 2006; see also 
2.9.2), where we see “a double logic of remediation. Our culture wants both to 
multiply its media and to erase all traces of mediation: ideally it wants to 
erase its media in the very act of multiplying them” (Bolter and Grusin 2000: 
5). As we have seen (see 1.1), video, in its impossibility to be situated to stable 
locations or structures, is by nature truly inherently deterritorialized, and, 
from a more optimistic perspective, evermore democratic.  
 
 
  107 
 
Videography note (12): 
 
In our PTS project we wish, in our road trip format and a tentative stab at producing 
‘noosigns’ and ‘lectosigns’ , to bring about readable and thinkable moving images. The 
central argument of this work was one of cultural acceleration facilitated by the 
digitalization of cultural artifacts (music files, online discussions) in the ‘dubstep’ 
electronic music genre.  
 
 
By, at times, utilizing a ‘mosaic’ image, it is our aim to express thinking about the hectic 
speed of the evolution of the cultural relations. In addition, these ‘chronosigns’ attempt 
to express an account of our involvement and hermeneutical development in these 
cultural relations. We attempt to recreate the flux of the cultural phenomena in a flux of 
imagery.  
 
  
 
In addition, the commonly utilized narrative form of videographic 
expressions in CCT warrants some further considerations. In line with 
Deleuzean thought, such ‘voices-of-god’ can do much to break with the 
representational ‘truthlike’ realist underpinnings – yet only to the extent that 
they open up possibilities for thought, and not to construct a declarative 
‘final’ argument. If one wishes to conform to the present epistemology, these 
narrations can now rather consist of “voices of reminiscence, of reflection or 
of commentary […] In this way the spoken word enhances the visual 
movement-image by emphasizing its continuity with the open Whole, of 
which each shot is an expressive unfolding” (Bogue 2003: 185). Doane (1980) 
makes a distinction between the internal monologue of cinema narrative and 
the ‘disembodied voice’ of documentary narrative. For her the first is a 
representation of the inner life of a character that expresses the homogeneity 
of the diegetic space, the latter “is necessarily presented as outside that space” 
(ibid.: 42). Following Deleuze, such narration should be relational and 
emergent from at least two perspectives: 1) how the narration produces new 
relations in the visual moving image and 2) how the narrative would express 
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the hermeneutic relation between the voice of the ethnographer, the research 
participants, and the spatiotemporal settings. Indeed, how do these new 
relations emerge in an ethnographically empathic sense, and what new kinds 
of relations do they resonantly bring about with and beyond the immediate 
audience(s)? How do horizons become fused in the videographic expression 
and do they extend further to fuse yet more? 
Finally, complementing the moving image with the auditory is another 
avenue of experimenting with the relationality of the video medium. Sounds, 
such as music, add more voices and more interaction in constructing the 
story. These denote novel emerging relations among producers on the editing 
table, where the moving image and its soundtrack is supplemented with 
musical expression, making both the video montage and music enter into new 
relations. Thus, while credit needs to be shared by all, the ‘subject’ of 
production becomes an increasingly multiplied voice that further relates to 
the multiple voices of the audience (Evens 2002). 
While Deleuze offers several considerations on the cinematographic moving 
image and its relation to thought, he places less emphasis on how the moving 
image can be seen as embodied in the viewer’s experience. These 
considerations have been further developed by various contemporary 
scholars of the cinema – to which we shall turn next in order to further our 
understandings of how the audiovisual moving image can constitute very 
different epistemological experiences contra the conventional academic form 
of relating knowledge products (textual expression). 
 
 
2.8  Moving Image as an Embodied and Co-creative Experience 
 
“Film is the greatest teacher because it teaches not only through the brain but 
through the whole body” (Vsevolod Pudovkin) 
 
“Consumers have always lived in an experience economy. Consumer researchers have 
just begun to understand the sensuous negotiation that life demands” (Annamma Joy 
and John Sherry) 
 
2.8.1  Reciprocity of the Cinematographic Experience and its 
Qualities 
 
Through a Deleuzean reading, we have been gradually approaching the way in 
which the moving image can be seen to constitute a very different experiential 
potential as compared to, for example, textual or photographic 
representation. We have also seen how experiencing the moving image can be 
seen as ontologically different due to the inherent nature of mostly non-
linguistic emergence and the movement itself that is what constitutes the 
medium. One could say that the moving image has a specific agentic quality 
of its own, for it does not wait for the audiences’ discretion, as it comes to 
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grasp attention in so much as eyes are kept open and hands from muffling the 
aural projections ears are so keen to collect (certainly a reciprocal experience 
is of ‘acceptance’ as well), or: 
 
“It is this capacity, this power, and not the simple logical possibility, that cinema 
claims to give us in communicating the shock. It is as if cinema were telling us: with 
me, with the movement-image, you can’t escape the shock which arouses the thinker 
in you” (Deleuze 1989: 156) 
 
Now, having briefly considered various ways in which the moving image can 
be conceptually typologized into relational expressive elements, we need to 
further construct the experiential qualities of the moving image itself. It is 
therefore appropriate to continue our investigation into what constitutes such 
a ‘grasping’ or ‘forceful’ experience when the moving image engages the 
viewer, or as Kozinets and Belk (2006) note, “Videographies can provide 
audiences with a vicarious sense of experience that deepens understanding 
and fosters empathy” (p. 340; see also Belk 1998). In further considering the 
workings of such an experience, we can be informed by scholars from the 
fields of cinema theory and communications studies who draw diversely from 
phenomenology, semiotics, linguistics and even brain research, as their 
underpinnings – and, in doing, often come to adopt forms of Deleuzean 
thinking. Specifically, the works of Laura Marks (2000), Jennifer Barker 
(2009) and Torben Grodal (2009), among others, have amounted to 
extremely interesting and useful accounts of how the moving image relates to 
the viewer, specifically from the perspective of how the moving image 
becomes embodied in the act of experiencing it. It must be also noted that 
such considerations were not an sich unfamiliar to Deleuze, for “‘Give me a 
body then’ […] It is through the body (and no longer through the 
intermediary of the body) that cinema forms its alliance with the spirit, with 
thought” (Deleuze 1989: 189). However, while starting from the ontology of 
the subconscious, it was specifically the realm of creative thought, where 
Deleuze chose to direct most of his attention. And it may be remembered here 
that he constructed the subconscious intensities of sense as always being 
neutral (see 2.4.1), as it is conscious thought that assigns qualitative 
differences in their unfolding as events, for: 
 
“there is nothing remarkable or exceptional in life, that the oddest adventures are 
easily explained, and everything is made up of ordinary things. It is just that we have 
to admit that, because the linkages of the terms is the series are naturally weak, they 
are constantly upset and do not appear in order […] It is men who upset the 
regularity of series, the continuity of the universe” (Deleuze 1989: 15) 
 
But what about these emergent bodies then – the body of the viewer and the 
‘body’ of the moving image itself? This question has, as we will later see, 
profound implications for the consideration of differences between the 
moving image and the textual expressions, and also, the uneasy nature of 
‘representation’ with a relational epistemology in the production and 
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expression of academic vidoegraphies in CCT research. For the 
aforementioned authors, who have come to emphasize these questions, the 
point of departure is to move beyond the modernist view of the viewing 
experience, as limited to the passively receptive or merely cognitive, towards 
experiential relations that become embodied through all senses. Following 
these scholars drawing from various disciplines, the moving image becomes a 
question of 1) a reciprocal experience, 2) the screen as a ‘skin’, a surface 
experienced as a haptic, tactile and visceral experience, and 4) the experience 
as a mimetic and action-inducing exchange. 
The experience thus becomes something that does not wait for the viewers 
attention but grasps it in its own right, as “we meaningfully (and feeling fully) 
move across and through immediate and mediated attentional spaces […] 
Contrary to myth, video is not a passive medium; we do act and move in using 
the technology and in response to its images and sounds” (Lemke 2007: 40). 
For Deleuze, the primary focus was on the infinite relations in the creative 
processes of the mind, whereas the authors here take the question of the 
feeling body head on. Yet, this is by no means a work of re-establishing the 
Cartesian dualism – rather it simply denotes different emphases on the 
emergence of the body and mind in their spatiotemporal becoming, or as 
Marks (2000), who uses a Deleuzean foundation to draw from theories of 
embodied spectatorship, phenomenology and feminist criticism, puts it: 
“Deleuze's characterization of time-image cinema describes avant-garde 
works that, in their suspicion of representation, force the viewer to draw upon 
his or her subjective resources in order to complete the image” (p. 42). 
Therefore, “If one understands film viewing as an exchange between two 
bodies – that of the viewer and that of the film – then the characterization of 
the film viewer as passive, vicarious, or projective must be replaced with a 
model of a viewer who participates in the production of the cinematic 
experience” (p. 149-150). And thus, this analysis takes the form of operating 
between two poles, the mind and the bodies (both the one of the viewer and 
the one of the moving image), but one where both are also inseparably 
intertwined in an emergent relationship.  
Marks (2000) expands her perspective in her construction of mimetic 
embodiment of the cinematographic experience. For her, mimesis can be 
described as an indexical relationship, where a story becomes “sensuously 
remade in the body of the listener” (p. 138), and, contra text, the very 
physicality of the moving image has the potential to bring about a heightened 
and more bodily mimetic experience. Importantly, the underpinning of the 
concept can be seen to be anti-modernist (or nonpositivistic), as it denotes “a 
form of yielding to one’s environment, rather than dominating it, and thus 
offers a radical alternative to the controlling distance from the environment 
so well served by vision” (p. 140). Thus the moving image becomes evermore 
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a body of agency in its machinic autonomous movement, and the viewer’s 
experiential embodiment becomes a holistic anti-Cartesian undertaking, 
involving the subconscious, reflex-like bodily alignments as well as memories. 
In order for such mimesis to make sense, the surface of the moving image 
also needs conceptualization as something more profound than a two 
dimensional screen of electronic flashing light. Indeed, the idea of an 
‘objective’ form of distanced speciation must be overcome by allocating the 
audiovisual moving image a ‘body’ of its own, where the: 
 
“cinematographic encounter takes place not only between my body and the film’s 
body, but my sensorium and the film’s sensorium. We bring our own personal and 
cultural organization of the senses to cinema, and cinema brings a particular 
organization of the senses to us, the filmmaker’s own sensorium refracted through 
the […] apparatus” (p. 153) 
 
This embodiment becomes ‘forced’ upon the viewer by the means of “haptic 
visuality” (p. 162) that can become related by various types of aesthetical 
dispositions of the moving image (see 2.7.3) via its autonomy, and enters a 
reciprocal relationship that invokes memories of touch and affect.  
In addition, drawing primarily from the phenomenological works of 
Merleau-Ponty on perception and cinematography, Barker (2009; see also 
Joy and Sherry 2003) further constructs the film as a profoundly embodied 
tactile experience, as “Love, desire, loss, nostalgia, and joy are perceived and 
expressed in fundamentally tactile ways, not only by characters but also, and 
even more profoundly, by the film and viewer” (p. 1). Thus the experience of 
perceiving the moving image becomes elevated from classical notions, in to a 
reciprocal event where the tactile experience between the viewer and the 
moving image takes precedence as textures, spatial orientations, 
comportments, rhythms and vitality. These emerge as shared qualities due to 
the nature of cinema as a multi-sensory medium involving seeing, hearing as 
well as physical and reflective movement. The tactile embodiment is also, to a 
degree, precognitive and emergent, shaped and enabled through intimate 
“engagement with and orientation toward others (things, bodies, objects, 
subjects) in the world” (p. 22). This emerges as a connection between our own 
bodies as viewers, and the body of the moving image in a complex 
relationship that is marked as often by tension as by alignment, by repulsion 
as often as by attraction.  
Adopting views from both Jennifer Deger, who termed the participatory 
viewing experience as a “transformative space of betweenness” (Deger 2007, 
cited in Barker 2009: 12), and Anne Rutherford, who conceived the viewing 
experience as a “movement or displacement of self” where the experience “is 
not conceived as a physical movement across a physical space: no empirical 
measurement can discern it” (Rutherford 2002, cited in Barker 2009: 13), the 
point here is to combine both the spatiotemporal body and the cognitive mind 
in nonreductive emerging relations. Similar notions can also be found in 
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Ranciére (2009), whose work on audiences focuses on theatre, where the 
relationship is equally active and reciprocal, and the distance between the 
viewer and the performance is the nature of all communicative acts. For him, 
contemplation about the nature of the distance presents a type of paradox, as 
“is it not precisely the desire to abolish the distance that creates it” (p. 12). 
The viewing experience thus becomes a dislocated and emergent state of 
being, where ”We are embedded in a constantly mutual experience with the 
film, so that the cinematic experience is the experience of being both ‘in’ our 
bodies and ‘in’ the liminal space created by that contact” (p. 19). As we have 
seen, following these philosophical positions, there is always the ‘third’ in 
experiencing the moving image, a subliminal nonreductive space constructed 
between the viewer and the racing surface of audiovisual imagery, or as 
Cubitt (1991) notes addressing video directly:  
 
“The homologue to this in the video apparatus is the constant becoming of the viewer, 
addressed in the fading as a becoming. In the dialectic of identity, as the on-screen 
image fades, it enables the viewer to become” (p. 143) 
 
Such positions resonate both with the aforementioned nonempiricality of 
Rutherford and with a Deleuzean philosophy of infinite relations and 
constant becoming in nonlinear temporality, and continues the present work 
of constructing a distinction between the reading of textual accounts and 
video experiencing. And accordingly, it lays further groundwork for 
constructing an epistemology of spatiotemporality (through practice theory 
and non-representational theory [see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2]), and providing a 
foundation for the level of analysis at which video can be assessed in a holistic 
context of videographic research in CCT. 
 
2.8.2  Moving Image as Tactile/Haptic Surfaces 
 
“We never perceive cinematic and televisual worlds as two-dimensional surfaces, but 
always as three-dimensional spaces that are worlds in their own right and, at the 
same time spatial extensions of our own local places” (Jay Lemke) 
 
“Do we know, as the senile know, that we are forgetting?” (Sean Cubitt) 
 
It was Deleuze who called for a ‘body’, but how have notions of an emergent 
body or bodies been constructed in the abstract distances between the screen 
of the moving image and the one of the viewer? Marks (2000) sees the 
relation between cinema and the viewer as a metaphysically transformative, 
but most interestingly as something that can be conceptualized as involving 
an embodiment of ‘touch’, a haptic sensation: 
 
“The contingent and contagious circumstances of intercultural cinema events effect a 
transformation in its audience […] The very circulation of a film among different 
viewers is like a series of skin contacts that leave mutual traces […] the body is a 
source not just of individual but of cultural memory […] memory is embodied in the 
senses” (p. xii-xiv) 
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This haptic sensation moves forward and backward in time in its fictitious 
reinventions of history, in present, and in glimpses of potential futures, and 
thus “performs a multifaceted activity of excavation, falsification, and 
fabulation, or the making up of myths” (p. 26). And so the focus is thus not 
one of a truthful representation of a past reality, but of a fictitious yet 
powerful relation to the tactile experience of the past that goes on to bring 
about new relations that converge into the future. Therefore: 
 
“At the moment that the video is shot, the two aspects of time look the same; but the 
present-that-passes can never be recalled (I feel ill; I am angry at my mother), while 
the past-that-is-preserved (we gathered around the table, smiling) becomes the 
institutionalized representation of the moment. Virtual images tend to compete with 
recollection-images – the memory I have of the gathering is not captured in the video 
– and, as we know, their power is such that they often come to stand in for our 
memories” (Marks 2000: 40) 
 
In a very tangible sense, therefore, one can fathom how what-was-recorded is 
always a spatiotemporal emergence of some performance, whether enacted 
for the camera or for the social relations expressed by the moving image. And 
such performances are inherently reciprocal, or as Cubitt (1991) notes, “This 
is the power of the flickering image: though, paradoxically, based on mutual 
recognition of difference, it is an invitation to become the same; to become 
Black, a woman, working class, gay…at the moment of the video fading” (p. 
143). Similarly, Marks’s (2000) notion of intercultural cinema is one that 
does the work of “inventing histories and memories in order to posit an 
alternative to the overwhelming erasures, silences, and lies of official 
histories” (p. 24). The audiovisual moving image in its inherent relational 
agency seems to call to us – to invite us into the performance and resurrect it 
in all its truth-resembling-falsity in the present. But how are such 
performances embodied in the viewer’s being? What is such an experience 
like? Here we return to her treatment of mimesis, a discussion of the visual 
surfaces of artifacts expressed in the moving image, and how they have the 
potential to carry powerful resonances in the tactile sensorium of the 
audience. 
By constructing the cinematographic experience as a tactile encounter that 
is ‘felt’ rather than merely cognitively recognized, Marks (2000) makes 
another distinction with respect to the modernist movement of rational 
thought, as “‘Sensual abandon’ is a phrase of Enlightenment subjectivity, 
implying that the senses (except maybe vision, and possibly hearing) dull the 
powers of the intellect” (p. 118). Following Deleuze, she makes a specific point 
about the tactile nature of objects expressed by the moving image by basing 
her analysis on a Bergsonian notion where memory is embodied in the 
senses. Her interest is in how objects carry memory-based tactile relations to 
‘fossils’ and ‘fetishes’ (p. 84-85; see also Pels, Hetherington and 
Vandenberghe 2002). Therefore, objects presented as cultural artifacts in the 
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expressions of the moving image have a dual relation with the past, as they 
simultaneously connect memories in a reinforcing way to times of yore to act 
as recollection-images, and also (more strikingly) remind us about a past 
forgotten, as: 
 
“These images refer to the power of the recollection-images to embody different 
pasts. When an image is all that remains of a memory, when it cannot be ‘assigned a 
present’ by an act of remembering but simply stares up at one where it has been 
unearthed, then that image is a fossil of what has been forgotten. It is possible, 
though as Deleuze warned, dangerous, to examine these images and learn the 
histories they have witnessed” (p. 84-85) 
 
The danger is the recognition of loss, but manifests only when a past is 
treated as a stationary and fixed state. Thus, the cultural tension we see 
around us, as expressed by the moving image is one of fossilization, when 
people experience how familiar and active objects are eroding in their cultural 
agency and becoming the “abandoned wreckage” (Thrift 2008: 8) of a 
decaying social practice. Yet, as stated, “The cinematic fossils I examine here 
do indeed have an unsettling effect, but they are only as destructive as the 
material they assault is rigid” (Marks 2000: 92). For if there can be no 
repetition (in a strict sense), all that can remain is infinite difference. Thus, it 
is not a question of a possibility for ‘saving’ a cultural practice in a static form, 
as through every act of social agency every social practice is renegotiated and 
reinvented, and constituted in performative experiential bodily events 
(Williams 2008). Every difference is a new opportunity for novel relations, 
but equally, every opportunity marks a destruction of another. Experience of 
culture is a flow of relations that can become ephemerally localized in the 
moving image. Yet, it is the constant fossilization of these cultural images that 
opens the possibilities for the erosion of the present (active cultural artifacts) 
and a thrust into a novel future. Thus, to locate the underpinning connections 
to a Deleuzean ontology seems not to constitute a burdensome undertaking.  
Marks (2000) continues that fetishes are relational surfaces that get their 
power by contact between surfaces, again a very Bergsonian notion of 
memory embedded in the embodied sensorium, not a representation of an 
object itself. “Fetish objects can encode knowledges that become buried in the 
process of temporal or geographic displacement but are [relationally] volatile 
when reactivated by memory” (p. 85). While fossils can constitute anxious 
voices from a forgotten history, fetishes are relations between surfaces that 
undergo potentially swift qualitative changes as social interest in the relations 
change, or: 
 
“Fossils retain the shape of the cultural upheaval, perpetually inviting decoding of 
past conflicts. Their ‘radioactive’ quality may diminish as connections are made to the 
historical stratum in which they were created, but they do not go away. Fetishes, 
although they are similarly dense with meaning, tend to dissolve away after the need 
for them has dissipated” (Marks 2000: 124) 
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As we have seen (see 2.2.1), the key ontological concern of documentaries 
often seems to involve some type of indexical veracity. And it is this 
aspiration to the external world that carries with it the illusionary trappings 
of realism in its most fetishistic form (what that reality has to do with the 
viewer’s perceived reality). However, “All documentary images are fetishes, 
insofar as they are indexes of the event documented. However, they do not 
transparently reflect it, but opaquely encode it. When documentary is 
accused, as it often is, of fetishizing the people and events it represents, this is 
because it maintains the fetish in a state of fixity” (Marks 2000: 125; see also 
Nichols 1991). And yet, following a Deleuzean ontology, it is this logocentric 
and synchronic notion of social ‘fixity’ or stableness that must be overcome 
first. And as we have seen, the moving image has remarkable “powers of the 
false” (Deleuze 1989: 126; see 2.7) when it, in its agency, grasps the viewer to 
accept its illusions as ‘truthful’ accounts of events and social relations long 
lost. Thus, we see decaying fossils and fetishes, “as properly the product not 
of a single culture, but the encounter between two, and how fetishes are 
produced not only in the course of built-up time, but also in the disjunctive 
movement through space” (Marks 2000: 89), or as Thrift (2008) states, 
where forsaken social understandings linger for their time while leaving as 
resources “abandoned wreckage behind them which can take on new life, 
generating new hybrids…which still have resonance” (p. 8). Moving images 
conceptualized as fossils or fetishes are thus by definition of relational 
becoming, not of synchronic representation. 
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Videography note (13): 
 
 
In the PTS videography, we see glimpses of many fossilizing artifacts, most notably the 
practice of pressing music tracks on ‘dubplates’ for selective and exclusive circulation 
among DJs. The practice is a fetish, and these artifacts are fossilizing due to the 
increasing preference of practitioners to share and listen to music tracks in digital 
formats. There is a sense of nostalgic wreckage about this practice, as the DJ/producers 
recollect how the ‘dubplate’ culture used to constitute one of the foundational cultural 
practices in the ‘dubstep’ genre. 
  
 
On a very personal note, having been the autoethnographic member in the PTS 
videography, the very tribal practice of paintball constitutes a powerful fetish to me. 
This past history long lost has a dual resonance in my thought, as it has enabled me in 
many ways in my academic pursuits, but now remains a remnant of a long experiential 
journey of past youth, never to be relived again. It is a joyous outcome and 
simultaneously a study of tremendous loss. 
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This is, indeed, both the limitation (from the realist perspective) and the 
profound potential of the moving image as the invoker of gripping and even 
tactile embodied experiences. As we have seen in Deleuze, we can never 
represent the unfolding of past events as ‘truthful’ accounts. What we see, are 
ghosts of the past surging out to perform in the minds of the present, 
unaware of their subsequent surging to possible futures through the novel 
relations they bring about. 
What can we take away from this in terms of understanding videography in 
CCT? Perhaps most obviously and importantly, we may find further reasons 
to loosen our ties with the indexical and representational nature of video. As 
such, videographic expression cannot simply be seen to produce ‘more’, 
‘better’ or ‘more truthful’ accounts of the recollected past. Rather, it may be 
seen to provide an expression of very different types of sensory links that 
haptically engages the viewer, and potentially sensitizes reflexive 
remembrance of past fictions. In Marks’s (2000) terms, these are the 
threateningly ‘radioactive’ pasts that portray times lost and, perhaps, to a 
culturally endowed viewer, memories of what can no longer be uttered, as 
they are veiled behind the ‘accepted’ memory of the embodied expression in 
the present. This, through expression of artifacts and decaying social 
practices, brings to the viewer a potential haptic experience that merges the 
memory of the past with the longing of the present, only to lunge forward into 
future relations. It brings forth haptic and aesthetic epistemological relations. 
These notions are in line with Deleuze’s recollection-images, where the 
‘realness’ of the past event becomes substituted with possible manifestations 
of memory in the present from various possibilities of a ‘truthful’ image, or: 
 
“We are in the situation of an actual image and its own virtual image, to the extent 
that there is no longer any linkage of the real with the imaginary, but indiscernability 
of the two, a perpetual exchange” (Deleuze 1989: 273) 
 
Thus, as a reciprocal experience, we find that the viewing of a moving image 
can be understood in terms of Deleuzean relations that go on to emerge into 
novel series on, beneath and beyond the surface of the moving image on the 
one hand, and the illusionary expressions it constructs on the other. 
Simultaneously, this moving machinery has the potential to tear the viewer 
into a relation with the past surfaces that depict the fetishes and fossils of 
social relations long lost as a simulated tactile contact. As with Cubitt’s (1993) 
example of the wedding video (see 2.2.1), it is ‘in-your-face’ showing the 
viewer illusions of institutionalized ‘false’ histories that radiate as a vanguard 
into the present in ways that can no longer represent any veracity underlying 
the past performances of social practice, what they were or what they perhaps 
meant then. Additionally, in line with non-representational theory (see 2.9.2), 
this involves a type of privileging the material (also bodies) and their 
embodied and emergent relations through the flux of time. In Marks’s (2000) 
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haptic analysis of the tactility of cinematographic images, we see a kind of a 
foreword to the body and its processes of embodiment, yet it is Barker (2009) 
who, building on Marks, develops these notions further. 
 
2.8.3  Types of Embodiment 
 
For Marks (2000), the hapticality of experiencing the moving image has to do 
with how we connect to its surfaces as a type of ‘skin’ that involves tactile 
experiences – not limited to cognitive reasoning but a relational embodiment 
felt by the whole body. She argues that we form special relations to the 
moving image that come about when the spatial coordinates of the image are 
lost (such as extreme close-ups of textures and blurring of the focus) – 
similarly to Deleuze’s (1989) “purely optical or sound situation” (p. 9). 
Whereas Deleuze conceptualizes the ‘sensory-motor’ and ‘purely optical’, 
Marks (2000), somewhat confusingly, uses “optical” and “haptic” (p. 163), 
respectively. This seems to come about due to their slightly different 
emphasis. In Deleuze, the haptic links to an image that requires novel 
thought. Marks (2000) does not pursue thought similarly, as her point is to 
argue against the semiological, where the moving image can be 'read'. For 
Deleuze, it can surely be read – yet what it reads as goes beyond any stable 
readability, into everything and indefinitely into the ‘real’. Thus, when 
Deleuze focuses on the destabilization of representative notions of thought, 
Marks places emphasis on the embodiment of the experience, making a link 
between fetishes and fossils to the senses cinema cannot technically 
represent: the senses of touch, smell and taste (Marks 2000: 129). In so 
doing, she eschews the “‘Sensual abandon’ [that] is a phrase of 
Enlightenment subjectivity, implying that the senses (except maybe vision 
and possibly hearing) dull the powers of the intellect” (Marks 2000: 118; see 
also Sunderland 2006), for “Objects also have a life independent of the 
human relations they encode, beyond their discursive and narrative 
significance” (Marks 2000: 120-121). Here she approaches both Deleuze and 
Thrift (see 2.9.2), who see nonhuman matter and objects as having an agency 
of their own. This is an agency different from the roles we cognitively assign 
them, for they now also have great agency towards us at a subconscious level. 
This subconscious is experienced through our bodies precognitively, and 
becomes linked to a Bergsonian underpinning where memory is embodied 
[subconsciously] in the senses. How do these embodied senses come about? 
For Marks (2000), the moving image works like a tactile skin that touches 
our eyes – “It is a brush with involuntary memory, memory that can only be 
arrived at through a shock” (p. 81) in order “to disrupt the commonsense 
patterns of sense experience, making room for new cultural organizations of 
perception” (p. 195). This haptic visuality is most forcefully brought into 
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being when the viewer is forced out of the ocularcentric mode of cognitive 
analysis from the distance, which affords the breaking of the subject-object 
relation, as “Haptic looking tends to move over the surface of its object rather 
than to plunge into its illusionistic depth, not to distinguish form so much as 
to distinguish texture […] that moves on the surface plane of the screen for 
some time before the viewer realizes what she or he is beholding” (p. 162-
163). These seem to be closely linked to the dreamlike and hallucinatory time-
images of Deleuze. In Marks’s analysis, this deterritorialization can result 
from the decay of the film or video, but it can also be machinated by blurring 
the focus or the exposure. The point is to make the moving image enter a 
haptic and cognitively indistinguishable relation with the viewer’s senses. 
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Videography note (14): 
 
In PTS, in an admittedly tentative fashion, we experiment with visual expressions of the 
haptic moving image by supplementing a montage of party scenes, starting with a 
blurred deterritorialized image that subsequently is gradually focused to make its 
spatiotemporal coordinates more readily recognizable. Through this haptic visuality we 
wish to bring about more evocative experiences of tactile embodiment by momentarily 
destabilizing the commonsensical subject-object space. 
 
 
Party scene (Desto’s live set): Moment 1 (unfocused image of haptic visuality [Marks 
2000]) 
 
 
Party scene (Desto’s live set): Moment 2 (focused optical image [Marks 2000]) 
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Such haptic moments emerge into the potential to bring about relations that 
are different from cognitive perceptions of what is seen, for it can potentially 
invoke memories encoded in the embodied senses that are precognitive. The 
power of the audiovisual moving image, although illusory, becomes from 
these shifts in form – a sensory-motor/optical image to be analyzed and 
thought about and the haptic/purely optical or sound images that are 
embodied, and thus potentially constitute events for the viewer, now 
emancipated from the straightjacket of the rational that contains the moving 
image within itself (and only to be gazed at from a distance). These are, to 
date, underutilized tools in the works of videography in CCT, which have 
often carried with themselves “the tendency to fix its object in a harsh light, 
or conversely flatten its objects into a broad projection screen” (Marks 2000: 
193), even as foundational work bringing in videography to CCT emphasized 
the freedoms of expression and its relatively unproblematic relation with art 
(Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; see also Belk 1986, 1998). 
These considerations are further developed in Jennifer Barker’s (2009) 
project, where the notion of the embodied experience is considered in far 
more detail. Embodiment, for her, occurs through experience with the 
moving image on three levels: 1) haptically, on the surface of the body in 
relation to the film’s own body of shimmering nitrate with its scratches and 
fibers, 2) kinaesthetically, as movement grips the viewer’s muscles, tendons 
and bones in relation to shifting spatial conditions between living and 
mechanical bodies depicted entering and escaping spatiotemporal contours, 
and 3) viscerally, where the rhythms of the cinematographic experience cause 
responses and re-enactments “in the murky recesses of the body […] heart, 
lungs, pulsing fluids and synapses” (p. 3) through the shifting rush of the 
moving image. For her, affects originate from the dualistic, yet emergently 
reciprocal nature of the viewing experience of the viewer, contra the displayed 
moving image of the cinema, thus following Merleau-Ponty’s notions of 
reciprocality within emergent surroundings: 
 
“Rather, we are in a relationship of intimate, tactile, reversible contact with the films 
body – a complex relationship that is marked as often by tension as by alignment, by 
repulsion as often as by attraction. We are embedded in a constantly mutual 
experience with the film, so that the cinematic experience is the experience of being 
both ‘in’ our bodies and ‘in’ the liminal space created by that contact” (Barker 2009: 
19) 
 
As we saw in Deleuze (see 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7), the viewer occupies a kind of 
liminal existence external, in between, and within the cinematographic 
experience that is, at one pole of the experiential continuum of both emergent 
subconscious, and at the other of emergent ideas in thought. Thus: “We are 
immersed and involved in the space and time of the events of the film, but 
without a single body with whom to align ourselves unequivocally – be it a 
character in the scene or neutral camera – we are moved, both emotionally 
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and physically in two directions at once. We are rendered conceptually and 
physically ambi-valent, drawn in two opposing directions at once” (Barker 
2009: 6). This is the agentic quality of the moving image and the multiple 
subjectivity involved in the viewing experience, the viewer’s, the camera’s 
(moving) point of view, and the relationships between the characters moving 
and moved as the images race on by. Barker (2009) illustrates the workings 
of these reciprocal processes through an abundance of examples adopted 
from cimematographic classics. In the following, I will provide a brief 
exploration of how similar affects can be adopted into the perspective of 
videography in CCT. 
 
2.8.4  Skin 
 
Barker (2009) makes an explicit move away from the conventional linguistic 
analysis of reading the film as a kind of text where the visual, aural and 
narrative dimensions become reductionistically separated from their 
intertwined context within an experience of a moving image, and from the 
reciprocal embodiment by the viewer in this experience (p. 25). For her, the 
moving image seems to constitute an emergent body, one that resonates 
between and within the viewer and the surface of the moving image. Films 
become not texts that can be read or which are imposed to passive observers. 
Rather, her position of the moving image as skin is of hermeneutic, yet tactile 
becoming, where “The film’s skin is a complex amalgam of perceptive and 
expressive parts – including technical, stylistic, and thematic elements – 
coming together to present a specific and tactile mode of being in the world” 
(p. 29). This is very much like Marks’s considerations of fetishes and fossils 
(see 2.8.2) and, as for Barker, the surface of the film teases us into a tactile 
relationship that the enabling body of the viewer, thwarted by the liminal 
distance, can only urge to actualize. 
 
 
  
Videography note (15): 
 
In PTS, we radiate between the roughness, darkness and loudness of the contexts of the 
electronic music scene. In this context, while directly taking away from the quality of 
the footage, we can potentially offer some relational arguments for exclusively 
producing footage in situ, no matter how adverse the conditions may have been, if one 
takes pristine clarity of the videographic material as an unquestioned hallmark. Such 
clarity could have been easily produced by decontextualizing the data production to, for 
example, interviews in a studio, but then we would have lost much of the relational 
potential of the context – we were there not producing an account of the scene, but 
rather involved in the relational production of the scene itself. And certainly, while we 
can never ‘get there’ in any comprehensive sense, at least we may have expressive 
glimpses of what we will forever be missing. 
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But there seems to be more to tactility. A tactile experience has the potential 
to become truly affective, as “All disgust is originally disgust at touching […] 
Both pleasure and horror arise from the skin’s function as a boundary – as 
something that keeps the carnality of the world at bay – but also as something 
that brings us into contact with the things in us and around us at the same 
time” (Barker 2009: 55). As ethnographic researchers in the CCT field, we 
may not often work in situations where such types of images would be 
abundant, but such affective experiences attest to the potential power of the 
moving image with appropriate types of (un)aesthetics. They act as relational 
images that most forcefully bring about the agency in matter. While a 
cognitive mastery of the context through videographic ‘representation’ 
eschewed by Marks (2000) would be of the analytical, where “the act of 
reasoning requires distance from immediate experience” (p. 58), these kinds 
of tactile responses open up the world of different types of relations. In these, 
touch becomes central in both subconscious and thought, making the skin “a 
container not just for blood and bone but also memory and history” (p. 63). 
Indeed, our remembrance can be rationally formulated in cognitive terms, 
but what is it about the elusive tactile memory that language fails to convey, 
ignited suddenly by the impulse of a tactile experience – that very literally can 
make our skins crawl? 
Following both Marks (2000) and Barker (2009), one could ponder, in 
Deleuzian terms, that the tactile level of the skin, the experience of the 
moving image is one of two poles, the skin of the viewer and the skin of the 
tactile surface of the moving image. An indiscernible olfactory space in 
between remains, yet it is a space we inhabit in our embodiment, as “The 
viewer’s skin and the film’s skin allow a fleeting, incomplete kind of access to 
the other, which is pleasurable in its impermanence and incompletion” 
(Barker 2009: 30). We can thus never be certain of the relations between a 
true or a false image in their simultaneous becoming in montage, for 
“indiscernability constitutes an objective illusion; it does not suppress the 
distinction between the two sides, but makes it unattributable, each side 
taking the other’s role in a relation which we must describe as reciprocal 
presupposition, or reversability” (Deleuze 1989: 69). This could be described 
as the space of both subconscious emergence and the liberation of thought, as 
it applies to tactile memories. Memories, again, are thus not about a relation 
of verisimilitude with an objective past, but a negotiation about possible 
pasts, and how they intertwine to ephemerally constitute relations in the 
immediate present. 
As we noted when considering the ‘haptic visuality’ of Marks’s (2000) 
surfaces of texture, this form of visual expression has been to date 
underrepresented in videographic research in CCT. This may be due to the 
technical (as it is difficult to get close shots), but also, we have too often 
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undertaken projects of framing reality in its totalizing spatiotemporal 
settings. And indeed, such approaches may do away with some of the 
possibility of assessing the hermeneutic nature of how the viewer changes, 
through new thoughts, in the process of the experience (let alone the 
collective relationships of the audiences, as they undergo changes within 
themselves, between the cinematographic experience and also between each 
other)? 
 
2.8.5  Musculature 
 
When considering the experience of the moving image from the perspective of 
musculature, Barker (2009) is referring to more tangible relations, such as 
the way our bodies become agitated, and even move involuntarily in a reflex-
like manner, as they become gripped by the agency of the audiovisual moving 
image. Indeed, our evolutionary perception does not consist of analytic 
appreciation of the moving image (Grodal 2009), as it can become fooled by 
the ‘powers of the false’ and act accordingly. The moving image can ‘take us 
in’ through a reciprocal physical experience, as “we and the film have a 
muscular empathy for one another, which is derived from similarities in the 
ways the human body and the film’s body express their relation to the world 
through bodily comportment” (Barker 2009: 73). This empathy of muscular 
pulsation is formulated similarly in Marks (2000), and constitutes a 
kinaesthetic memory, a compelling “oscillation between difference and 
similarity, proximity and distance” (Barker 2009: 73). 
For Barker (2009), the musculature performs gestures that are “expressive 
bodily movements that are ‘intentional’ [as they reflect the orientations of our 
bodies sensing and being in the world], in that they are directed toward a 
world, but not always ‘intended’, in the sense of being consciously chosen and 
performed” (p. 78). Thus, there is an embodied mimetic link between the 
alignments of our body and the alignments of the subjective ‘camera-eye’, as 
already described in Deleuze (see 2.6.1). It is of mechanistic mimesis, where 
the viewer embodies a contextual technological subjectivity and creates 
relations with it – intended, perhaps, but not necessarily intentional. The 
‘camera-eye’ becomes the viewer’s perspective, while not relinquishing to be 
somebody else’s, in simultaneous becoming. But we may also orient to the 
context without direct contact with the moving image, for “at the beginning of 
a suspense film, for example, [we] subtly encourage our own feelings of 
unease, long before the suspense story gives us a reason for feeling uneasy. 
We turn to express that unease with our own gestures: perhaps we tense our 
bodies, cross our arms protectively over our chests, or warily sink lower into 
our seats” (Barker 2009: 80). We become to emergently embody, even with 
distance, the moving image within and between – when the moving image 
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grasps us and ‘tells’ us how to react and become oriented. It seems that the 
illusions of the moving image are such that spatiotemporal configurations, in 
their agency, go on to actually ‘demand’ a body for their experiencing. Thus, 
any lingering notion of the mind-body dualism from the perspective of this 
ontology becomes increasingly muddled, for if we accept the tactile and 
haptic relation between the body of the moving image and the body of the 
viewer as a reciprocal surface, we must have a body to tell us about us in the 
world. And to follow Deleuze, we must also have a mind to extend into new 
lines of thought in infinitely open systems to new series of relations.  
Similarly, for Barker (2009), our perception of the ‘reality’ around us can be 
seen not as closed system of points to act on in linear fashion; rather, it is a 
contingent relationship of intensities, where some become actualized (see 
2.4.1), for “In a dream/fantasy, we mistakenly believe we can occupy ‘that 
space there’. But in the experience of film, we can and do, because ‘that space 
there’ is fully embodied, inhabitable possibility” (p. 104). Yet, she notes that 
even though cognitively we do know the impossibility, at a subconscious level 
we often do not feel it. It is rather that “disbelief on our part is a function of 
reflection [but] If we really felt this way, movies wouldn’t move us” (p. 104). 
Indeed, how much of the experience of the moving image do we lose when it 
becomes our inclination to force an intellectual analysis upon it? Am I doing 
such devil’s work here? 
 
2.8.6  Viscera 
 
Through her body-perfurating journey, Barker (2009) finally arrives to its 
most murky conceptual crevices. How is the moving image experienced on 
the visceral, the virtually completely involuntary level within the tactile 
surface of the body? For Barker, “We and the film open onto each other 
completely, ‘denuding and dispossessing’ ourselves to the other so that we are 
absorbing/absorbed through our skin and holding/held close in a muscular 
embrace; once there, the similarities and differences between our visceral 
rhythms deepen the connection in a way that’s both startling, unsettling, and 
seductive” (p. 123). But while the visceral seldom enters our cognitive field, it 
may be that our surface senses are in similar ways lost in our cognitive being 
– we perceive the world through them, not by them. And even if given only 
scant attention, the act of haptic, tactile and muscular embodiment must also 
entail the visceral – indeed, if the former can be accepted, how could the 
latter be denied? 
And certainly we do attain visceral responses from textual expressions as 
well – we can become aroused (e.g. hormonal) or scared (e.g. heartbeat). Yet, 
there may be something in the agency of the moving image that is of different 
nature. As stated, its ‘powers of the false’ are compelling enough for our 
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senses to induce all the aforementioned forms of mimetic embodiment, or as 
Marks (2000) notes: “Cinema, by virtue of its richer and muddier semiotic 
relationship to the world, is all the more an agent of mimesis and synthesis 
than writing is” (p. 214). But what might this mean? Could it be that it is 
precisely the potential of the gripping agency of the moving image that forces 
embodied participation in the ‘powers of the false’, which can set our beings 
astray? The subjective camera-eye, the speed of the film, the extra-human 
capabilities of movement of the apparatus are all vehicles of displacement, 
and still they are the same ones we feel emergent embodiment with, whether 
in the ‘optical and sound image’ of Deleuze or the ‘haptic visuality’ of Marks. 
Indeed, “camera movements are not only ontologically ambiguous but also 
thematically ambivalent: they express, in muscular terms, the simultaneous 
but contradictory experiences of curiosity and claustrophobia, freedom and 
restriction, vitality and death” (Barker 2009: 140). There is a powerful 
Deleuzian connection here, for even as we enter the layers of the body with 
Barker, it must be noted that this type of embodiment can certainly not be 
reductionistic. Embodiment, in this sense, is holistic and extensive, for “what 
is at stake here are not only the stranger’s body, the woman’s body, or even 
viewer’s body and film’s body, but also the larger system of which each of 
these is only one part, and which brings us all into being” (Barker 2009: 152). 
In addition, Marks (2000) seems to be equally wary of the potential 
reductionistic knowledge of the inner movements of our bodies, for “Medical 
technologies such as X rays, ultrasound, CAT scans, and colonoscopy render 
our viscera visible. They offer not an embodied visuality, but a visuality that 
makes our bodies objects to us” (p. 190). Thus, if a Deleuzian underpinning is 
accepted, it is difficult to fathom how notions of embodiment could be used in 
other than holistic ways – at least on an ontological level. 
What should be fairly clear at this point, is that no amount of videographic 
research can epistemologically bring us ‘more or better representations’, even 
if some researchers in the field are still inclined to propose such (e.g. Lemke 
2007). Yet, even for such voices, one can surmise that this ‘better’ 
representation is often a qualified one. Indeed, how much is unaccounted for 
in text, of our experience of actual being? The moving image may be richer in 
detail and spatiotemporal contexts than text – yet it tells more about the 
viewer’s being than the being of anything ‘recorded’. This is of both the falsity 
of the realist position of the moving image as a ‘truth’ account, and a further 
reason for taking the epistemology of relation seriously as a possible 
perspective.  
So far, we have seen how the moving image engages our whole being 
through a holistically embodied experience. But there (certainly) remains 
more to explore with regard to how we perceive the moving image both 
consciously and subconsciously. Therefore, before concluding this chapter, let 
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us take a minor detour to assess a recent account of the cinematographic 
experience from a biocultural perspective that draws from more naturalistic 
account of our biology. 
 
2.8.7  Experience of Mimesis as the Evoker of ‘Action Tendencies’ 
 
“By close-ups of the things around us, by focusing on hidden details of familiar 
objects, by exploring commonplace milieus under the indigenous guidance of the 
camera, the film, on the one hand, extends our comprehension of the necessities 
which rule our lives; on the other hand, it manages to assure us of an immense and 
unexpected field of action […] The painting invites the spectator to contemplation; 
before it the spectator can abandon himself to his associations. Before the movie 
frame he cannot do so. No sooner has his eye grasped a scene than it is already 
changed […] This constitutes the shock effect of the film, which, like all shocks, 
should be cushioned by heightened presence of mind” (Walter Benjamin) 
 
As we have seen above, drawing from Deleuzian philosophy of the cinema, 
Marks (2000) and Barker (2009) develop the argument that the moving 
image has special (contra text or photograph) powers to invoke a haptic, 
tactile, and even visceral experience through the connection between surface 
of the moving image and the senses and the viewer’s body. Specifically, Marks 
(2000) argued that when the visual sensorium becomes of haptic (close to the 
‘optical and sound situation’ in Deleuze, see 2.7.3) expression allowing the 
moving image to become embodied as a tactile surface – the skin of the film 
that resonates with a virtual body between the screen and the viewer. This 
haptic experience is not a realist image that can be objectified and discerned 
in a directly cognitive fashion. Rather, it often is an opaque image of textures 
and surfaces that is initially devoid of its spatial coordinates, as I illustrated in 
my PTS example (see Videography note 14 in 2.8.3). For Marks (2000), these 
surfaces of the moving image are constituted of fossils and fetishes that call 
for mimesis in their haptic interaction in the viewer’s embodiment. The 
viewer thus becomes to feel the surface, and in a Deleuzean vein, is then able 
to project his/her cognitive reflections beyond the screen, into relations 
beyond any representation of a signifier and signified. Mimesis, as shown 
above, breaks down the Western modernistic binary of subject-object or 
perceiver-information to invoke a haptic sensation of culture within the body, 
a universal visceral immediacy, not something that will deliver meaning (or 
represent), but rather something that means in itself. Barker (2009) 
developed these thoughts further by providing a refinement of this relation as 
a typology of how the moving image has tactile, muscular and visceral levels. 
In this consideration, the experience of the moving image thus becomes 
thoroughly embodied. 
We must develop the notion of mimesis further here. As we have seen, both 
Marks and Barker build on this concept to argue for how the human body 
becomes in a profound reciprocal relation with the screen of the moving 
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image. It is time now to experiment by adding a more biological character to 
our exploration. 
In his important work, Grodal (2009) considers the question of reciprocal 
embodiment from a somewhat different perspective. Borrowing from brain 
science, he shows how Marks’s (2000) mimesis and Barker’s (2009) visceral 
embodiment constructs yet another experience particular to the moving 
image – its powers to invoke ‘action tendencies’ in the viewer. For Grodal 
(2009), there is a process in the human brain that becomes activated when 
the moving image is experienced. Interestingly, while he states to diverge 
from Deleuze, as he draws his biocultural position from the natural sciences 
(p. 5), namely neurocognitive theory, a close reading offers an interpretation 
of somewhat similar argumentative outcomes. It must be remembered that 
while Deleuzian metaphysical position is underpinned in the subconscious, 
Deleuze does not eschew the pragmatism in research conducted in artificially 
closable systems (see 2.4.2). While the underpinnings are no doubt different, 
Deleuze still comes to argue the following, when considering the difference 
between a still and a moving image: 
 
“[A still image has a kind of movement that] no longer depends on a moving body or 
an object that realizes it, nor a spirit that reconstitutes it […] But pictoral images are 
nevertheless immobile in themselves so that it is the mind which has to ‘make’ 
movement […] It is only when movement becomes automatic that the artistic essence 
of the image is realized: producing a shock to thought, communicating vibrations to 
the cortex, touching the nervous and cerebral system directly” (Deleuze 1989: 156, 
emphasis in the original) 
 
For Deleuze, this constitutes of a “spiritual automation” (Deleuze 1989: 156) 
that does not wait for a cognitive mind for its realization, but rather takes on 
the perceiving mind to actualize it on various levels of both the subconscious 
and, subsequently, the conscious domain of thought. Similarly, Grodal (2009) 
focuses on the subconscious and conscious experiences, the difference being 
that he is looking for naturalistic rather than metaphysical explanations to 
secure his position (even though he notes that neurocognitive theory is in line 
with postmodern frameworks as it posits “no fixed mental center” [p. 155]). 
Therefore, even as Grodal thus emerges as somewhat more orthodox, his 
work can also be extremely informative here. 
Similarly to Marks (2000) and Barker (2009), Grodal (2009) focuses on the 
perception of the moving image as a thoroughly embodied experience, for 
“When we watch a film, our heart rhythms change, we sweat and our muscles 
alternately tense and relax throughout” (p. 4). Yet, his theoretical 
underpinning comes from brain research, and he thus conceptualizes a 
PECMA (Perception, Emotion, Cognition and Motor Action) flow to describe 
how: 
 
“Audiovisual experiences are therefore intimately related to the types of action they 
afford, and central aesthetic phenomena are linked to manipulations of the way in 
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which what is seen or heard prompts action or – as happens in film – prompts 
vicarious action in diegetic worlds” (Grodal 2009: 145) 
 
The PECMA flow can be described in evolutionary terms, for information 
transferred via the optical nerve is first processed in the: 
  
1) visual cortex (analysis of visual forms), then the 
2) association cortex (memory matching), then the 
3) prefrontal cortex (cognitive appraisal and reality status 
evaluation), before finally being processed in the  
4) motor cortex (only fully activated in real life). 
 
Through stages 1-3 there is also a circuit to the emotional system (limbic 
system) in the old subcortical parts, primarily located in lower central part of 
the brain “which may in turn prompt actions that that implement the 
preferences of agents […] Emotions are tendencies for action […] guiding the 
body what to approach and what to avoid” (Grodal 2009: 146). The stage 2 
associations come from memory tags, and thus do not require cognition, 
rather operating in a reflex-like fashion to allow for quick action orientation, 
“because memories are always stored with an emotional tag or a marker that 
indicates how to relate to the object, a tiger match will typically evoke a state 
of frightened awareness” (ibid.: 149). Importantly, at stage 4, the motor 
cortex that processes abstract cognition does not have this circuit, rather: 
 
“If films allow for matches with stored memories but do not support a narrative, we 
will get lyrical-associative feelings of the kind induced by some music videos, certain 
art films, and subjective episodes in mainstream films […] The saturated emotional 
change of the associative networks therefore fuels the brains hermeneutic machinery 
and provides feelings of deep meaning […] because the images and scenes are 
underdetermined” (Grodal 2009: 149) 
 
Here we find another link to the Deleuzean distinction of ‘sensory-motor 
situation’ and ‘optical and sound situation’. As we have seen, the ‘sensory-
motor situation’ of the action-image pertains to the illusion of a real world 
situation with causal agency – a realist image, whereas the ‘optical and sound 
situation’ denotes dream-like images without spatiotemporal coordinates to 
align oneself with. On the realist sensory-motor stage, this is also a link to 
Barker’s muscular embodiment, being the circuit to the emotional system 
that points to future possible actions embodied in the muscles, as “it is the 
muscles, whether in the arms or legs or in the speech organs, that implement 
our preferences, and thus this muscular intentionality colours the experience” 
(Grodal 2009: 150). Similarly, for Barker (2009), a space needs not be 
objective in abstract terms, but, rather, of possible points toward which action 
can be directed. And like Grodal (2009), this action naturally needs not rise 
from conscious deliberation, but rather “A gesture is an expressive bodily 
movement that is ‘intentional’, in that it is directed toward a world, but not 
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always ‘intended’ in the sense of being consciously chosen and performed” 
(Barker 2009: 78). And certainly, while the moving image may sometimes 
bring about even visual muscular movement on part of the viewer, it must be 
remembered that a wide array of action tendencies keep constantly firing, 
“the motor centers are only resonating, not executing” (Grodal 2009: 150). 
While this can be seen as an undergirding tendency for mimesis in Grodal’s 
approach, there is also a difference. Grodal (2009), who draws from more 
objective notions of action tendencies due to his underpinnings in brain 
science, a subjective image (again, ‘haptic image’ for Marks, ‘optical and 
sound situation’ for Deleuze) does not invoke an action tendency. Yet, such 
images, due to their circuits to the brain’s hermeneutic machinery can, due to 
their lack of a real-world referential object, draw inward and invoke deep 
meaning sometimes associated with certain types of epileptic seizures of 
“extreme vividness and also feelings of truth” (Grodal 2009: 149).  
For further developing my reasoning regarding the differences in 
experiencing video (as in moving image) and text (or photography), one key 
contradiction needs resolving here. While it is certainly not my purpose to 
argue that textual expression cannot invoke haptic or visceral experiences, or 
that it can not move the reader’s subconscious and conscious experience into 
relations far beyond the black and while markings on the page, I will argue 
that the 1) audiovisual expression of spatiotemporal relations, the 2) haptic 
experience of mimesis and the 3) action tendencies allow for a profoundly 
different, and in some sense deeper experiences in the moving image. I will 
return to points 1) and 2) in chapter III, but, for now, the notion of the action 
tendency needs further development and clarification. I argue that the 
potential for embodied action tendencies is firmly established when 
considering what Marks would call the ‘optical image’ (in contrast to the 
‘haptic image’) and what Deleuze has constructed as the ‘sensory-motor 
situation’ (Deleuze 1989: 272). What these describe is the realist image of 
sensory-motor relations (the action-image [Deleuze 1986: 141]), where 
spatiotemporal coordinates and flows resemble a potentially actualizable 
real-world situation. 
But what about the moving image that expresses no discernible connection 
to a real-world situation, where spatial coordinates are broken, such as a 
hallucination, a dream or an abstract surface? These are the moving images 
that force us to think while they have the power to constitute a haptic and 
visceral experience. But what about the action tendency? Do these moving 
images only move the viewer subconsciously, and push the cognitive thought 
to explore new relations, without invoking any action tendencies whatsoever 
(as Grodal [2009] seems to argue)? And if these dreamlike images produce 
no action tendencies, in what way can their difference be defended against 
other expressive media, such as, for example, text or photography? 
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While it seems fair to say that the relationship between an action tendency 
and an abstract and non-spatial moving image is difficult to fathom, I will 
also argue for its place here, while such a position is certainly complex to 
maintain. Certainly, the ‘sensory-motor situation’ of the action-image has 
such elements (one reacts when watching a roller-coaster ride, one begins to 
sweat when confronted with the audiovisual expression of the roar of an 
approaching mob) unlike text, even as text can invoke feelings as well. I 
would argue that such a response is differently embodied, however, as text 
needs the reader’s agency for its expression, and it can not compel the 
musculature to react as a response to its agency). But text can make the 
reader excited, it can arouse the reader, and it can certainly make the 
cognitive imagination race without a realist illusion of presence). In abstract 
moving images devoid of spatiotemporal coordinates, can such subconscious 
visceral and imaginary processes still be different in nature in terms of how 
they invoke action in the viewer? For Grodal (2009), the answer would be a 
qualified no, as there are no spatial coordinates for the viewer to refer to. Yet, 
the PECMA flow brings about many experiences: 
 
“its relation to the architecture of the embodied brain provides a series of aesthetic 
options: to cue an intense focus on perceptual processes; to evoke saturated emotions 
linked to affect-charged associations; to evoke tense, action-oriented, and goal-
oriented emotions; to elicit relaxation through laughter by blocking goal achievement 
in an active setting; to elicit sorrow and tears by blocking such achievement in a 
passive setting” (Grodal 2009: 151) 
 
While perhaps not of action tendencies in his words, plenty of room for the 
participatory agency of the moving image seems to remain. For Marks (2000) 
and Barker (2009), the question of a quantitative action tendency is not of 
primary focus, as their epistemic interest is more in the real world action that 
will come about through new thoughts derived from the experience 
relationally. Grodal (2009) also constructs an evolutionary perspective, when 
he argues that, due to the unchanged nature of human biology for the past 
50,000-100,000 years, our innate dispositions have much to do with why a 
moving image provides such compelling realities for us. For him, during film 
viewing the action tendencies of emotional system in circuitry to the visual 1) 
and association cortex 2) go on to resonate before the processing in the 
PECMA flow comes to evaluate the ‘realness’ of the experience in the 
prefrontal cortex, which “actually demands a modification of belief or a 
suspension of belief [rather than disbelief] so that film viewing does not 
produce full-scale illusions” (Grodal 2009: 154). It would seem that our 
subconsciously embodied experience thrusts us into the liminal before we 
cognitively gather our resources to completely fathom the illusion of the 
moving image. We as humans have evolutionarily learned to ascribe reality to 
what we gather through subsequent cognitions of our highly selective and 
actively constructive perceptions (see also Thrift 2008; Raichle 2010). In fact, 
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what we experience as a truthful account of reality is a “‘true world’ [that] 
does not exist, and, if it did, would be inaccessible, impossible to describe, 
and if it could be described, would be useless, superfluous” (Deleuze 1989: 
137). The moving image with its action tendencies and sense ‘filling’ 
expressions comes to resemble our innate evolutionary makeup in such ways 
that bring us liminal to the ‘real’ – close enough for a convincing experience, 
but beyond in ways so as not to completely act out our action tendencies, or to 
enter into a completely hallucinatory state. It potentially embodies our being 
holistically, yet maintaining a threshold of being where our thinking can catch 
up.  
I will attempt to unravel this conundrum by drawing on a Deleuzean notion 
of the relation of embodiment and the moving image: 
 
“Whether it is visual or of sound, the image already has harmonics which accompany 
the perceived dominant image, and enter in their own ways into suprasensory 
relations […] this is the shock wave or the nervous vibration, which means we can no 
longer say ‘I see, I hear’, but I FEEL, ‘totally physiological sensation’. And it is the set 
of harmonics acting on the cortex which gives rise to thought, the cinematographic I 
THINK: the whole as subject […] The cinematographic image must have a shock 
effect on thought, and force thought to think itself as much as thinking the whole. 
This is the very definition of the sublime” (Deleuze 1989: 158) 
 
The metaphysical question of how we experience the moving image, whether 
of abstract or realist orientation, does not reduce, if we follow Deleuze’s logic, 
to a matter of how much (quantitative) action tendency it may entail. Rather 
it seems to be a question of how the embodiment (be it the surfaces, 
musculatures or visceralities) of the moving image – through its compelling 
‘powers of the false’ and gripping agency – has the potential to provide 
experiences of irreducible shifts (abstract/realist) of both physiological and 
thought, a gripping flux of action tendencies and orienting embodiment to an 
illusion of a world, haptic orientations to textures and dreams that we 
experience on our embodied bodies, and thought connecting to infinite series 
of histories and, thereafter, potential futures. Even Grodal (2009) seems to 
admit to this (and simultaneously seems to build a link to the subconsious 
metaphysic of Deleuze): 
 
“Language is not important for those mechanisms that underpin our arousal and 
hormonal activation in strongly emotion-evoking episodes, in the feelings of intensity 
that precede meaning and are due to perception alone […making film viewing…] a 
biopsychological simulation in a very direct sense, and [to] involve levels far below 
language and consciousness […] In film, language is part of an experiential totality 
that, for instance, includes vision, action, body language, and affective outbursts” 
(Grodal 2009: 12-13) 
 
Thus, if one chooses to follow my reasoning as adapted from these authors, 
the key difference between the experiencing of the audiovisual moving image 
from the perspective of embodiment contra, for example, a textual or a 
photographic experience, surges from its primary ontology – the gripping 
mechanistic agency of movement itself, “That goes beyond the psychological 
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individual just as it makes a whole impossible, “a non-totalizable complexity, 
‘non-representable by a single individual’, and which finds its representation 
only in the automation” (Deleuze 1989: 269). This movement can be 
conceptualized as different from inherently stationary representations, for it, 
through the continuum of subconscious haptic and tactile intensities to 
creative thought, having to now think the possibility of impossible worlds, 
creates a virtual body that radiates between the poles of the ‘sensory-motor’ 
and purely ‘optical and sound situations’ to destabilize connections between 
illusions of commonsensical worlds and relations of novel creative thought. 
This makes the embodied experience of the moving image that incorporates 
these cinematographic elements the true shock to thought! This shock entails 
the breakdown of the objectifying subject-predicate-objective structure of 
conventional Western linguistic expression into a holistic visual experience of 
relational becoming (or shifting between action/thought). In addition, it 
involves all the elements of the mechanistic agency of the medium and its 
racing connections to the subconscious that goes on to sensitize creative 
thought, so as to establish novel relations between both the spatiotemporally 
sensical and the contextually abstract images. These relations are 
summarized in the following illustration, where textual expression occupies a 
less destabilized and shifting position, beyond which the embodied 
experience of the moving image both surges and leaks: 
 
 
Image 1 – Experiencing embodiment of the video medium (video as extra-
textual experience) 
 
By modulating between the purely optical and the sensory-motor, the agency 
of the medium becomes doubly distanced from expressive media such as text 
or photography. Thus its embodiment, its very shock to thought is the bodily 
experience of shifting action and mimesis. 
What I propose that we still require, in videographic research in CCT, are 
ethnographic video directors who can utilize these conceptual tools to embark 
on projects that could potentially produce such novel shocks to thought. This 
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is certainly a demanding task, as it will require much consideration of the 
aesthetic components of the montage, as well as more advanced equipment 
than what is usually available to researchers, in order to make the production 
of such footage more readily possible. In any case, this brief overview of 
visual components and experiencing the moving image is intended here as an 
encouragement to go beyond description, even to the very limits where 
artistic images would be readily included to take full advantage of the 
medium’s evocative and convincing potential for storytelling. What perhaps 
needs no repeating, is that we need to go beyond expressing our research to 
cognitive minds, and thus to invite more holistic embodied experiences 
through novel aesthetic storytelling emanating from our research contexts – 
taking seriously both the potential of postmodern frameworks and the 
videographic medium itself. 
  
 
2.9  On Social Practices and Space 
 
“Spaces are constituted by series and events – rather than containing them” (James 
Williams) 
 
Let us now further explore the epistemic question of ‘why video?’, more 
directly from the perspective of CCT in particular. What is it that video media 
would be especially suitable for in expressing consumption phenomena – and 
in so doing, what would its potential advantages be compared to textual and 
other forms of expression? We have already touched upon the topics of the 
distancing effect of the purely abstract and thus even sanitized nature of text, 
the potential of ‘uncomfortable’ illusions of reality provided by the video 
medium (see 2.2.1), visited notions of how the visual can break down the 
deeply embedded objectifying linguistic structure of western language (see 
also 3.2), and how different shifting modes of the experiential embodiment of 
the audiovisual moving image has the potential to invoke powerful shocks to 
thought (see 2.7 and 2.7.3). Yet, departing somewhat from the aesthetics and 
experience, what theoretical stances of expression might such a medium most 
readily welcome? As it stands, contemporary videographies seem to still 
struggle with what it is that the medium could show that would be especially 
convincing (I recently sent in a critical review of one work submitted to the 
ACR 2011 conference, where the footage consisted exclusively of 
decontextualized ‘talking heads’ and perspectives of action [see also Heisley 
and Levy 1991; Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006]). What I 
will now propose is that video has tremendous potential for expressing 
convincing academic fictions from perspectives that highlight emerging social 
practices, without neglecting the material contexts where such phenomena 
occur. 
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I will approach social practices through practice theory, which through the 
work of Theodore Schatzki (1996, 2001, 2002, 2010), has recently received 
growing interest, especially in the field of organization theory (e.g. 
Whittington 2006), and has also become increasingly cited in CCT (e.g. 
Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010; Halkier 
and Jensen 2011). In fact, practice theoretical work championed by Eric 
Arnould won a best paper award at the recent ACR 2011 conference. While 
the literature in practice theory places conceptual emphasis on the material 
surroundings of social practices, I will add further conceptual resources from 
non-representational theory, heralded by Nigel Thrift (2008) in the field of 
human geography. These theories, although boasting much in common, 
should not be confused with the widely known actor-network theory (ANT) 
crafted by Bruno Latour, for it levels the agency of humans and matter in its 
dehumanistic ‘radical symmetry’, rendering all constituents of a system into 
neutral effects (e.g. Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; Kirsch and 
Mitchell 2004). This ontology would flatten and neutralize a Deleuzian 
perspective of liberating the creative potential of thought, and while both 
practice theoretical and non-representational accounts take similar positions 
regarding the emergence of human and material relations, they remain 
considerably more humanistic, as practice theory places emphasis on the 
contextual social rituals, performances and meaning-makings, and non-
representational theory has a political underpinning of human emancipation 
from oppressive spaces and technologies. Let us briefly explore these 
approaches in order to further construct what it is that CCT videographies 
could express about consumption. 
 
2.9.1  Practice Theory 
 
“Even the most perfect reproduction of a work of art is lacking in one element: its 
presence in time and space, its unique existence at the place where it happens to be” 
(Walter Benjamin) 
 
When constructing videographic expressions of the social contexts of 
consumption, what types of relations would the video material theoretically 
be particularly adept in expressing? Could the unfolding social phenomena be 
best suited for the production of evocative and efficacious experiences? Here 
we can visit the theorizations of ‘social practices’ that have long constituted a 
focal concept in social sciences and are also beginning to be increasingly 
explored in the field of consumer research (e.g. Bourdieu 1990; Giddens 
1984; Holt 1995; Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009). However, what has been 
described as the ‘practice turn’ (Schatzki 2001; Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina and 
Von Savigny 2001; see also Reckwitz 2002a) is still relatively new in CCT. The 
problem with practice-oriented analyses has long been their confusing variety 
and differences in their vocabularies, assumptions, scope, levels of 
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abstraction, and nature (e.g. the unconscious or conscious). Also, lack of 
synthetic approaches has further fragmented practice-theoretical accounts 
(Schatzki 1996, 2002; Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005; Halkier and Jensen 
2011). In addition, as I will further speculate, there may be something 
intrinsically related to the practice theoretical ontology that resists textual 
accounts about it. 
Practices have been conceptualized as routinely expressed activities that 
entail an intertwining (and thus an anti-Cartesian) of the mental and the 
bodily in an agent’s shared beliefs, habits, knowledge, competence and 
desires (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Schatzki 2002; Warde 2005), organized in “a 
routinized type of behavior which consists of several elements, 
interconnected to one another: forms of bodily activities, forms of mental 
activities, ‘things’ and their use, a background knowledge and understanding, 
know-how, states of emotion and motivational knowledge” (Reckwitz 2002a: 
256). Importantly, Warde (2005) defines practices as collective 
achievements. Here, practices are important for consumption: “therefore the 
practices rather than individual desires […] create wants” (Warde 2005: 137). 
Additionally, Schau, Muñiz and Arnould (2009) argue that the social 
practices themselves underlie the social negotiation of value in consumption 
experiences, not the orthodox notion of possessions and associated consumer 
needs and wants. 
In contrast with research stemming from social construtivism on the 
cognitive symbolism and identity-formation in consumption prevalent before 
the turn of the millennium, the radical idea in the practice approach is that it 
treats ‘practices’, or the actual ‘doings’, as the site of the social instead of 
placing the social into the minds, texts, or social interactions (Reckwitz 
2002a; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011). It 
offers potential epistemological insights for CCT in the sense that it focuses 
analysis on the social/cultural via practice. The social world consists of 
diverse social practices, which are ‘carried’ and negotiated through 
explorative social performances between agents (individuals). These actors 
perform practices via performative events in ‘sites of the social’ (Schatzki, 
2002). According to Schatzki (2002), sites in general are where things exist 
and events spatiotemporally emerge – where entities are intrinsically 
intertwined as parts of their own context. Therefore, as an analytical 
framework, social practices can be seen as consisting of the simultaneous 
intertwining of contextual human action (situated understandings, routines, 
skills and knowhow), and the material arrangements this action occurs in 
(e.g. Schatzki 2002; Reckwitz 2002a, 2002b; Warde 2005). As learned 
routines, they thus often consist of ‘learned doings’ that are socially and 
contextually conducted and negotiated, both cognitively and subconsciously – 
thus again ontologically breaking down the Cartesian mind-body dichotomy. 
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According to Schatzki (2010), material arrangements and spaces are 
contemporarily seen to constitute room for movement, set bounds on 
movement and importantly, “set stages” (p. 19) for mutually negotiated social 
practices, and, therefore, as Halkier and Jensen (2011) note, practices should 
be seen as “performances” (p. 118) where data is “produced” (p. 118). The key 
distinction between practice theory and a Deleuzean ontology seems to be the 
level of analysis. Whereas both have to do with emergence and non-objective 
situatedness in the world, many practice theoretical perspectives tend to 
assume methodological individualism (Halkier and Jensen 2011), and to 
focus solely on doings and meaning-makings, thus eschewing the role of 
emotion, as the action is assumed to take precedence, for “actions that 
emotions determine are usually done for an end” (Schatzki 2010: 121). In 
contrast, a Deleuzean ontological perspective could be seen to be of the 
shifting subconscious intensities of sense that emerge via affects into thought 
– and perhaps could be described as being postrationalized into emotions. 
Additionally, practice theoretical accounts place epistemic emphasis on social 
practices embedded in cultural structure (e.g. Halkier, Katz-Gerro and 
Martens 2011), thus constituting, in a sense, a more stable structuralist 
backdrop. 
The constant negotiation of context-dependent social practices makes them 
evolutionary (Rokka, Hietanen and De Valck 2010), temporal time/space 
situated in human life itself – not as an objective linear externality (Schatzki 
2010: 9, 27). Indeed, our spatiotemporal surroundings are constantly rebuilt 
as our cultural negotiations and doings as social performances are 
experimented in social agency. Yet, to date, research on communities of 
consumption has offered only few insights into how the social practices of 
cultures of consumption evolve. In our BIP videography, we argue that a 
practice theoretical approach would open up valuable insights in this regard 
by examining the hybridization, bifurcation, fragmentation and 
appropriation, coherence, conflict, insemination, media of communication, 
and politics of practices (Schatzki 2002: 252). And while BIP lays down the 
groundwork for the analysis of social practice on videography, we have 
attempted to continue the work in our PTS videography, which illustrates 
how the negotiation of changing technologies (material arrangements) and 
the understandings of appropriate doings (social practices) undergo 
simultaneous negotiation that drives cultural evolution. 
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Videography note (16): 
 
 
Our practice theoretical framework (adapted from Schatzki 2002) in BIP that aims to 
provide a tentative exemplification of how social practices could be typologized from 
the perspective of videographic research in CCT. 
 
  
 
As we highlight in BIP, with its potential to express convincing illusions of 
social doings within spatiotemporal relations and embodied materiality, 
videography could provide further approaches for practice theoretical 
research. As such, the video medium could be a novel vehicle capable of 
providing epistemological perspectives for interpretation and understandings 
of marketplace cultures. But, most importantly, it could facilitate the breaking 
down of the objectifying linguistic form of conventional academic expression 
(see 3.2), and thus provide a very different and potentially convincing 
experience contra textual expression of knowledge products. Videographic 
research could become a toolkit for expressing these unfolding relations in a 
Deleuzean sense – seeing various types of moving images constructing an 
evocative and contextually situated story. If such depictions of human 
relations are found convincing, ethnographic data collection must be 
extensively planned to consist of footage showing these ongoing and 
unfolding relations in situ. In this view, cognitivist perspectives of past action 
as postrationalizations in interview settings are perhaps no longer similarly 
convincing and sufficient in and of themselves – especially as it can then 
always be questioned why video was chosen as the medium in the first place. 
Rather, we need in-depth and contextual expressions of social practices as 
they happen in their respective embodied material surroundings. Certainly 
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not an easy task, but perhaps one well worth pursuing (and as we have 
tentatively attempted in our PTS videography). 
Contemporary research utilizing practice theoretical frameworks has mostly 
concentrated on its conceptual and epistemological underpinnings – 
empirical work has been less common (Halkier, Katz-Gerro and Martens 
2011; see also Reckwitz 2002a; Schatzki 2002; Warde 2005). Additionally, 
perhaps due to its difficulty to be vibrantly described via text, it seems that 
the material arrangements and spaces where social practices occur have 
received less attention than human agency (Shove and Pantzar 2005; Halkier, 
Katz-Gerro and Martens 2011; see also Schau, Muñiz and Arnould 2009; see 
Reckwitz 2002b; Magaudda 2011 for notable exceptions). As we have seen 
from a Deleuzian perspective, we lack such concepts (see 2.4). Videography 
may constitute a novel possibility for experiencing the unfolding contextual 
relations where the agencies of social practitioners intertwine with the agency 
of the material surroundings. In line with Deleuze, I will thus briefly 
emphasize this elevated role of material arrangements and the relations that 
emerge from the agency of things through non-representational theory.  
 
2.9.2  Non-Representational Theory 
 
“Whatever they do with their objects must also happen to them, since subject and 
object come into existence as the torn halves of a single relationship. Even though 
they have been artificially separated in the society of the spectacle, subject and object 
are still the matching parts of a primary unit, and their unity still controls the way in 
which whatever happens to one of them will happen to the other” (Sean Cubitt) 
 
"To balance our accounts of society, we simply have to turn our exclusive attention 
away from humans and also look at nonhumans. Here they are, the hidden and 
despised social masses that make up our morality" (Bruno Latour) 
 
I have proposed that by expressing the unfolding social and material 
relations, video can offer novel potential for epistemic interpretation of 
consumption phenomena from the perspective of practice theory. Yet, there is 
more to the potential of both the aesthetics of the medium and the embodied 
experience that video can offer, and thus it is useful to mine for more 
conceptual resources that are particularly related to do how we understand 
the material arrangements that intertwine with meaning makings, skills, 
routines and knowhow. As stated above, CCT research utilizing a practice 
theoretical ontology has generally placed emphasis on human action (often 
starting from meaning-making), and not as much on the embodied material 
arrangements that intertwine with social practices (e.g. Schau, Muñiz and 
Arnould 2009), and has tended to emphasize the conceptual rather than the 
empirical (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Warde 2005). In a recent account, Schatzki 
(2010) has also turned to pursue these questions, as he argues through the 
concept of ‘timespace’ that no human activity (or practice) occurs in a space 
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and time, but rather constitutes it emergently and indeterministically. Also, 
as Deleuzean ontology makes little distinction between the human and 
material agency (if the creative potential of thought is excluded), the relations 
and agency and the role spatiotemporal arrangements have in our social 
constructions of social practices need further scrutiny for the purposes of this 
exploration. Following his emphasis on the emergent intensities of sense, 
there are no a priori qualities that people assign to things, and as we have 
seen, there is no linearity in relation (as there is no before-present-after but 
rather extending relations through senses): 
 
“Each trajectory itself constitutes a machine, in which man is a cog between the 
different elements: [...] the trajectory-gag and the machine-gag – are two aspects of a 
same reality, a machine which produces man 'without a mother', or the man of the 
future” (Deleuze 1986: 177) 
 
This relational movement of agency (human, nonhuman) is always 
intertwined with the shifting intensities of sense in the subconscious (see 
2.4.1). I have thus proposed (as one potential perspective) that the 
videographic methodology set forth in this work could be of great potential, 
as it has the power to produce convincing illusions of how actions, spaces and 
things intertwine and constitute the emergence of relations in and beyond 
communities of consumption. 
I will further adopt elements from non-representational theory introduced 
by Nigel Thrift (2008) in his seminal work, which constructs something of a 
practice-based “non-epistemic ontology-activity” (p. 113) by drawing on 
pluralistic sources, such as theories of practice, biology of inspiration and 
illustration, feminism and anthropological discourses. Here the non-
epistemic seems to denote emergence itself, as Thrift ventures to describe an 
ontological position that foregrounds considerations of emergent relations 
(between humans but also non-human objects) that reduces the importance 
of representation as a category of thought. In addition, much of the non-
representational thinking follows Deleuzean notions of the emergent 
subconscious and how relations are constituted through the endless 
differentiation through events (see 2.4.1 and 2.4.4). Thus, unlike many 
perspectives of practice theory, the conscious agency and the individual are 
decentred. Additionally, in line with Deleuze, non-representational theory 
continues the logic of practice theory to decidedly concentrate on the 
precognitive emergence of the social where the embodiment within material 
arrangements is primary, cognition always secondary, and can only be seen as 
a postrationalist illusion of past events and agency.  
Following Thrift (2008), in non-representational theory consciousness 
becomes nothing more than an illusionary fallacy, a window of very short 
time spans where only a few things can be addressed, and is easily 
“distracted” (p. 6) and “fragmented and volatile” (p. 36). Additionally, it is 
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argued that human action takes place from 0,8 to 1,5 seconds before the agent 
is cognitively aware of it, but academically there has been very little emphasis 
in this pre-personal dimension of existence (Thrift 2008: 58; see also 
Anderson and Harrison 2010: 9). Put radically, humans construct their 
consciousness of imagined histories, fluently blending fact and fiction. From 
this recognition, it follows that research utilizing only interview-based 
descriptions of past action (for Thrift [2008], “probably 95 percent of 
academic thought has concentrated on the cognitive dimension of the 
conscious ‘I’’ [p. 58]) becomes highly suspect, especially if knowledge claims 
for accurate ‘representation’ or ‘reproduction’ of events are assumed (see also 
Hudson and Ozanne 1988). But even as that may be the case, it does not 
diminish the importance of taking the nature of cognition as a form of 
storytelling and meaning-making negotiation, when the level of analysis is 
placed in the stories themselves. Such accounts of the conscious mind must 
be, and indeed are in many interpretive perspectives, understood to contain 
stories about stories of what is remembered about past performances 
reconstituted as further performances in the immanent present. As 
perspectives of action, they are important for the interpretation of the 
meaning-makings of the participant, but to be able to interpret the event 
itself, the actuality of the act (or social practice), consumer researchers may 
want to place more emphasis on the perspectives in action – the very essence 
of participatory ethnography (e.g. Wallendorf and Belk 1989; Belk and 
Kozinets 2005a; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006), even as these observations 
remain performative accounts of yet more performances themselves (Halkier 
and Jensen 2011; see also Cho and Trent 2009). Yet, when conducting 
research in situ there is more to interpret than only the perspectives – there is 
the whole emerging material surrounding, both relationally enabling the 
social practice and becoming transformed by it. 
Thus, non-representation goes further than the social constructivist 
position, as it concentrates on the subconscious and emergent being in the 
world. The construction is always second, always a story or a performance to 
validate a sense of purposeful intention and causality of human action (see 
also Kavanagh 1994). Through these lines of thought, we can further consider 
what videography in CCT can learn from both moving on from (but not 
discarding!) 1) cognitive meaning-makings to 2) the (material) preconscious, 
and raising further doubt on any conceptual stability of ‘representation’ (see 
2.4.4). 
In problematizing the representational accounts (or the originary truth that 
could lie behind it), social constructivism has been seen by some non-
representational scholars as a convenient shortcut, as it focuses on the 
representation of symbols and structures behind it (Anderson and Harrison 
2010). Similarly to Schatzki’s (2010) recent notions, in non-representational 
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theory, constructivism becomes ‘radicalized’ to break down the Cartesian 
mind-body dichotomy upheld in much modernist thought, to consider the 
human as a part of the on-going becoming of worlds (Anderson and Harrison 
2010: 11). It is ‘radical’, because it goes beyond the ‘social’ in terms of what it 
is that is constructed (ibid.: 18), or: 
 
“If thinking was not quite what we thought it was, if much of everyday life is 
unreflexive and not necessarily amenable to introspection, if, as shall be claimed 
below, the meaning of things comes less from their place is a structuring symbolic 
order and more from the enactment in contingent practical contexts, then quite what 
we mean by terms such as ‘place’, ‘the subject’, ‘the social’ and ‘the cultural’, and quite 
how ‘space’, ‘power’ and ‘resistance’ actually operate and take-place, are all in 
question. For now, however, our question becomes how are we to think of this 
‘background’, how are we to characterize it beyond the somewhat limited and limiting 
definition ‘non-representational mental capacities’, and so gain some purchase 
therein?” (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 7) 
 
For my purposes, much of this ‘background’ becomes of importance, as I 
(adapting Deleuzean thought) focus on the non-representational implications 
on social practices and spatiotemporal embodiment. In doing so, I will 
tentatively attempt to further several conventional interpretative approaches 
to videographic work in CCT. As I and others have argued, video, as a 
(epistemologically) non-representative media can bring about new relations 
by offering rich contextual accounts of such practice-oriented phenomena as 
the material context of settings, proxemics, kinesics, and social activities 
(practices) of human agents in interaction with these material contexts, 
including tools and spatial structures (see Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets 
and Belk 2006). While not eschewing the meaning-making dimension of 
practice theory entirely, considering the ontology of non-representational 
theory highlights agency as continuous rhizomatic movement, contextually 
manifesting social performances within limiting and liberating material 
spaces, which have the potential of making events “eventful” (Thrift 2008: 
114; see also Cho and Trent 2009) – when having become assigned qualities 
by retrospective thought. Performance focuses on the emergent, subconscious 
and even accidental, “which make each moment a new starting point” (ibid.: 
21) or where the social actor is to be understood as a “body as being 
expressive without being a signifier” (ibid.: 14), such as in performing a 
dance, or: 
 
“Epistemologically, this means that the ‘action’ is not in our bodies, habits practices 
and behaviours (and surroundings). Indeed the decisive analytic gesture of social 
constructivism is to make the latter an expression of the former” (Anderson and 
Harrison 2010: 5) 
 
Agency of Things 
As discussed above, Schatzki (2002) constructs social practices into emergent 
meaning-makings, skills and routines and the ‘site’ which consists of the 
material arrangements that can restrict and liberate the human agency. Thrift 
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(2008), in turn, emphasizes his notion of ‘machinic humanism’ by giving 
primary emergent potential to the material surroundings themselves. For 
him, the body is not a separate entity in a world, but, rather, in itself, ‘The 
human body is a tool-being” (Thrift 2008: 10; see also Gherardi 2000). Thus, 
all the things around us ascribe their purpose on us, and we our doings on 
them simultaneously – but matter takes some precedence as it ‘tells’ us our 
potential for action before we can cognitively sense our actions and ascribe 
the reasons for our purposeful agency back to them. While Schatzki (e.g. 
2002) primarily concentrates on the social nature of the meaning-makings 
and understandings in practices, these notions bring the interaction of the 
body with the surrounding material things (and other humans as physical 
things) to the forefront. Such interaction remains considerably precognitive 
and emergent for Thrift (2008), however, as he can imagine little focus on 
human agency, as ‘The unchosen and unforeseen exceed the ability of the 
body to contain and absorb” (p. 10). The conscious is therefore not before or 
after a practice, but always emergently intertwined, even as subordinate to 
the emergence itself. The place does not contain the culture, as put forth by 
Latour, “social is not a place, a thing, a domain or kind of stuff but a 
provincial movement of new associations” (Latour 2005: 238; see also Thrift 
2008: 21). Additionally, Thrift (2008), “following Deleuzean interpretation” 
(p. 61), reverses the relation by arguing for the body not as something passive 
where society and culture is inscribed on, but something in diverse 
relationships with things surrounding us.  
In line with a Deleuzean ontology, Thrift’s (2008) non-representational 
theory is more closely affiliated with the immediacy of human life and thus 
contains strands of the phenomenological – “the lived immediacy of actual 
experience, before any reflection on it” (p. 6) and becomes “resolutely anti-
biographical” (p. 7). This emergent social interaction with other human 
agents encapsulated in material surroundings Thrift calls “material 
schematism” (p. 8, emphasis in the original), as for him objects make the very 
possibility of thought “do-able” (p. 60). Yet, Thrift does not jettison the 
subject entirely, and thus maintains a “sense of personal authorship” (p. 13, 
emphasis in the original), where “conscious awareness is repositioned as a 
means of scrutinizing and focusing these actions” (p. 58), even as no 
logocentric static states of a subject or object remain to be analyzed and 
quantified. 
The reason for maintaining the importance of ‘personal authorship’ – the 
truth of a constructed past for Thrift (2008) seems to be of pragmatic and 
political nature, “Because how things seem is often more important than what 
they are” (p. 13). Here Thrift seems to resist the dehumanizing potential in 
allowing for a completely machinized world, which for him seemed to lead 
into idealized bourgeoisie communities and the automatization of the 
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industrial society or the neutralizing and dehumanizing effect of “one of the 
most damaging ideas that has swept the social sciences and humanities has 
been the idea of a disenchanting modernity” (p. 65; see also Horkheimer and 
Adorno 2002/1987; Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; Kirch and 
Mitchell 2004). In non-representational theory, humanism that needs a 
human agent capable of questioning boundaries, rather then becoming 
completely abstracted within them, thus remains. Thus, in a Deleuzean vein, 
also the unquantifiable ‘magic’ of ritualistic practices, such as art, dance and 
music become of importance as they are “virtual actualizations” (p. 67) of 
time which allow consciousness to become acute without necessarily being 
directed by drawing on the non-cognitive, or: 
 
“Art does not imitate, above all because it repeats; it repeats all the repetitions, by 
virtue of an internal power (an imitation is a copy, but art is simulation, it reverses 
the copies into a simulacra). Even the most mechanical, the most banal, the most 
habitual and the most stereotyped repetition finds a place in works of art, it is always 
displaced in relation to other repetitions, and it is subject to the condition that a 
difference may be extracted from it for those other repetitions” (Deleuze 1994: 293) 
 
Similarly to Deleuze, they consist of moments of no intended representation 
(no signifier-signified) and thus become more ‘real’ (as they connect beyond 
any structure through affect) than the folly of the notion of the ‘truth’ behind 
a representation. 
 
On Representation 
“The primacy of identity, however conceived, defines the world of representation. But 
modern thought is born of the failure of representation, of the loss of identities, and 
all the forces that act under the representation of the identical. The modern world is 
one of simulacra” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
In line with a Deleuzean ontology, the scholars of non-representational 
theory have needed to consider what the emergent ‘event’ consists of – as 
their social world is a materially embodied flux of performance with every 
new performance constituting a novel event that connects to everything 
through the new relations it brings about. If everything can be seen as a kind 
of a performance, what is it that is possible to express with them? We have 
already seen that, in line with Deleuze and other scholars we have followed, 
representation as a conveyer of a truth or a repetition of the same is highly 
problematic – even philosophically indefensible. When we attempt to 
represent something, it is never the same materials or language that 
constitutes this representation assumed to repeat, rendering all acts 
performative and even playful expressions that reconstitute social orders and 
material spaces. Additionally, all relations in the world among people (and 
matter) have hermeneutically ‘moved on’ so the outcome is a new set of 
resonating relations, not a return to any originary innocuous state. Indeed, if 
one attempts repetition as representation in this framework, what does it 
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mean to keep the “copies in order: to ensure that they do nothing more than 
return originals, identities and givens” (Doel 2010: 118)? 
In line with Deleuzian ontology, the notion of a representation that repeats 
is eschewed (see 2.4.4). There is a caveat, however, as this is (again) not to 
mean that ‘anything goes’, or that non-representational theory is a refusal of 
representation per se – rather the refusal of the naïve realist notion that 
anything can be represented in absolute terms or as the same (Doel 2010). 
Again, in line with Deleuze, Doel (2010) notes that we certainly think in 
representation, and we have a tendency to think about the fidelity of any 
performance to its origin. But as we have seen, none of the same origin to 
return to exists. Rather, it invokes the Baudrillardian notion of the ‘simulacra’ 
(Baudrillard 2006), which is the ‘hyperreal’. As stated above, the ‘hyperreal’ is 
a copy that assumes the reality of the original, even as it bears no direct 
resemblance to it – or indeed has never really existed in the first place. “The 
simulacrum is not a degraded copy. It harbours positive power which denies 
the original and the copy, the model and the reproduction” (Deleuze 1990: 
262). What remains is the potential for new relations, as the representation 
does not call back to an original, but rather creates new ‘realities’ of its own.  
As we have seen in Deleuze (see 2.5 and 2.5.1), video indeed has no access 
to any type of originary truth. It is an interpretation we construct as simulacra 
in the form of storytelling. The epistemic focus should thus reside in the types 
of relations it generates. Again, this is not to say we do not attempt to 
represent, but rather it shifts the level of analysis to the poststructural 
emergence from the illusion of the assessment of the ‘veracity’ of any 
particular representation (Doel 2010). 
 
“And so even representations become understood as presentations; as things and 
events they enact worlds, rather than understood as presentations; as things and 
events they enact worlds, rather then being simple go-betweens tasked with re-
presenting some pre-existing order or force” (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 14) 
 
Any stab at representation thus becomes an ephemeral relational 
performance, emergence of social practices generating (rather than reducing 
to) some a priori order that can be reconstructed as a perfect copy (Anderson 
and Harrison 2010). As we have seen in Deleuze, copies of such type cannot 
be conceptually maintained, as they have to assume a stagnant world, where 
those who experience a representation would be exactly the same as those 
who experienced the original. Worlds would need to be synchronically frozen 
and all potential human agency a constant tabula rasa. Even when we try to 
achieve a representation, it must be understood that with all the new 
relations that it arouses, it thus becomes generative rather reductive to some 
past logos. Through its inherent difference to a past, every representation 
becomes an eventful performance, and due to its inherent difference, every 
performance is an event that establishes new relations between people and 
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even material arrangements. “An event is thus not something one inserts into 
an emplotted dramatic sequence with its start and finish, for it initiates a new 
sequence that retrospectively determines its beginnings, and which leaves its 
ends unknown or undetermined” (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 22, citing 
Rajchman 1991: ix). What we are left with is the emergence of difference as 
“The same and the similar, the Analoguous and the Opposed, do not return. 
Only affirmation returns – in other words, the Different, the Dissimilar” 
(Deleuze 1994a: 299). 
Importantly, concentrating on this difference is not a new false logos. 
Difference resists conceptualization due to its very nature, as to know 
difference, there must already be some state that it can be compared to. 
Difference alone cannot be described without an ‘external’ identity, or as Doel 
(2010) concludes, “One of the great lessons of poststructuralism is that 
difference, knowing nothing of identity, is ‘inexplicable’” (p. 121). 
As, for the most part, a nonlinguistic medium, could video have novel 
potential for the production of evocative accounts of the emergence of these 
social and material contexts? And if it is to do so, what types of audiovisual 
moving images would be of the most convincing nature? In our more recent 
videographic works (especially PTS), we have attempted to express the 
potential relationality of the medium. Video does not objectify like text due to 
its linguistic structure, and video is always contextual, if the contexts are 
allowed adequate relational aesthetic possibilities in producing them 
videoegraphically (e.g. by adopting Deleuzian notions on moving image 
aesthetics). But, when constructing such aesthetics, we need to first unbind 
some of our ties with several types of moving images we have tended to utilize 
in CCT videographies. From my perspective, the primary one is fairly obvious 
and connected, that is, the overuse of ‘talking head’ interviews in 
decontextualized settings (often set up for filming). Such aesthetics 
diminishes the contextual relations with social agents in the spatiotemporal 
contexts where the relations being inquired upon (produced) occur in action. 
In addition, the common individualizing practice in a ‘talking head’ interview 
may need to be questioned further – for such perspectives of action 
necessarily entail the objectification of social consumption practices. Thus we 
attempted to produce the more interview-type situations so that they become 
exchanges of meaning-makings among social agents, constitutive of cultural 
phenomena rather than analytic of it. Thus, these events were produced so as 
to not resemble group-interviews (let alone focus groups), where the visual 
becomes a type of reformulation of the Cartesian dualism – a social agent 
syncronized out of the emergent context and assigned a kind of objectifying 
and elevated position in relation to it. Rather, we were attempting to 
relationally express not the analysis of cultural phenomena, but on the 
contrary, the active contextual and emergent production of it. As such, our 
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work is not of constructing audiovisual illusions of peep holes into 
syncronized cultural states, but of hermeneutical and material participations 
into their emergence. Here our involvement of autoethnographic members 
(see 4.1.3) in the research team became of great relational importance – 
making us perhaps less of the Western man looking to investigate far away 
cultures and their ‘primitive’ ways, but rather more immersed participants in 
the unfolding of the cultural phenomena in general (e.g. the ‘PTS’ Vimeo 
video has been viewed over 4,000 times at the beginning of 2012, and has 
been widely debated in many Internet discussion forums among the cultural 
practitioners, see Appendix 2). 
It is now time to move to a more comprehensive conclusion for the 
Essence(s) section of this study. In doing so, I will attempt to make some 
connections from all the traversed, admittedly abstract, thinking. Perhaps 
there is also room for some novel beginnings. 
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III  Videography in CCT: Elements of 
Essence(s) and Relation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1  (Post)Overview of a Heretical Journey so Far(ther) 
 
“For theory too is something which is made, no less than its object. For many people, 
philosophy is something which is not ‘made’, but is pre-existent, ready-made in a 
prefabricated sky. However, philosophical theory is itself a practice, just as much as 
its object. It is no more abstract than its object” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
In the previous sections, we have constructed the moving image (video) into 
convincing digital illusions not in any way indexical to any ‘reality out there’. 
Yet the moving image has vast expressive potential, and can be evocative and 
convincing through its relentless agency and its ability to show us the 
impossible in montage by freely blending time into possible ‘truths’ and 
‘falsities’. It thus becomes not a medium of representation but of potential 
relations that, in a Deleuzian sense, constitute the world and beyond. Let us 
briefly summarize: 
 
1. Video (as a digital medium) is not a ‘representation’ or a 
‘reproduction’ of reality but a completely abstracted medium capable 
of expressing convincing ‘illusions of reality’ through its ‘powers of the 
false’ that invoke the viewer’s creative mind to consider its 
impossibility in various novel ways 
 
2. Video thus simulates reality, but, through its illusions of space and 
time, has no correspondence to it, apart from the viewer’s experience 
(precognitive and cognitive) of the events and performances it relates 
 
3. Contra text, video is particularly potent in relating tactile embodied 
experiences – in a sense its unreality is often (through expression of 
myth, performance and fantasy) more convincing than the ‘reality’ 
underlying it 
 
4. The epistemology of relation brings together the transcendent 
emergence of people and objects – connecting it to practice theory 
through social practices and the material arrangements and to non-
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representational theory through the spatiotemporal emergence of 
people-objects 
 
5. The ontology of the moving image is movement itself as an emergent 
change without synchronic equilibrium. Different moving images can 
be used to express different kinds of relations – the most basic ones 
being perception, affection and action 
 
6. The epistemic quality of the moving image, however, is time and 
relation, as the nonlinearity of time expressed through the simulation 
of reality breaks the whole fabric of ‘reality’ down into illusion – 
which, as stated, can be more compelling than the ‘reality’ it expresses 
 
7. The moving image is constructed in frames that are illusions of closed 
systems, but via relations forcefully push out to make new relations 
beyond and until infinity 
 
8. Through the ontology of relation – metaphor, paradox, performance 
and dream are more ‘real’ than a ‘realistic’ representation of 
spatiotemporal settings as they have the potential to invoke new 
thoughts (and thus new relations) that stretch into infinity – both as 
past and future intensities simultaneously 
 
9. Thus, through relation we eschew the logocentric notion of a 
‘representation’ and focus on the emergence of new relations, and, 
from the perspective of CCT videographic research this can open novel 
epistemic interest into considering the nature of relations between the 
participants of the research context, between the connected shots in 
the montage of the moving image, and finally between the 
videography and its audience and beyond 
 
 
3.2  Video Medium Contra Textual and Photographic 
Expression 
 
“If one of the most important cognitive leaps of the last few hundred years was the 
growth of writing in its many forms, now, or so I argue, a similar change in the 
structure of cognition is occurring but as a general process of the purposeful 
production of semiosis, in which space is both template and font […] We do not 
consider the fact that there is more information in an experience than an account of 
it. It is the account that we consider information. But the whole basis of such an 
account is information that is discarded” (Nigel Thrift) 
 
Let us now summarize and briefly build on how experiencing the audiovisual 
moving image on videography can be seen as profoundly different from the 
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reading of textual expressions or the viewing of photographs. Again, I must 
admit the superficiality and shallowness of my account, for a truly in-depth 
consideration of text and photography are beyond the scope of this study. 
Additionally, I have recognized that I am thus forced to conduct analysis on 
text and photography by depending on ‘mainstream’ ideas – while still 
comparing them to a ‘radical’ Deleuzean one. I intend the following as 
something as a starting point that can potentially bring about new ideas and 
relations, not as a conclusive project by any means. And therefore, I will make 
do with what I have. 
We can now briefly revisit the early sections of this study to consider the 
initial problems of distinction among video and other expressive media. 
Scholars of videography in CCT have come to note that video is by some 
means ‘richer’ (Smith, Fisher and Cole 2007) than more conventional textual 
expressions. Photography could thus reside between these expressive entities 
(see also Peñaloza and Cayla 2006). Such distinctions sufficed as initial 
positions for entering into a conversation about these matters, but I hope that 
the turned pages of this study have brought about various problems of 
situating these expressive media on such a continuum. In fact, I feel that in 
my analysis the whole notion of ‘richness’ has lost much of its grounding, for 
considering the amount of information (however conceptualized) does not 
suffice. And while something like ‘the amount of relation’ could initially seem 
more closely aligned with my analysis, there surely could never be any stable 
criteria for making such assessments either quantitatively or qualitatively. 
These media can thus become seen as expressive styles with many 
overlapping qualities, but, equally, many differences. None of them can be 
posited as ‘better’, but they can surely co-exist and complement each other. 
Let us briefly make some comparisons. 
Text has long been the taken-for-granted form of expression in the 
construction of academic knowledge products. The scientific project of the 
logical positivists turned text into full modernist swing by advocating the 
rational reconstruction of language through logic (e.g. Schwandt 2000). In 
their (now) utopian thought, this project would have finalized the work of 
science and philosophy alike by producing a ‘true’ correspondence between 
the world, experience and its expression in formal language. This was, 
however, not to come to pass, as the work of many philosophers (see 2.3.1) 
amounted to the ‘death’ of logical positivism. Yet, as we have seen, the 
reverberations of this movement carry on to these days, and very much so in 
marketing and consumer research. In an ongoing manner, the mainstream of 
these discourses emphasizes methodological procedures adopted from 
positivistically oriented natural science, assumes the possibility for 
objectivity, reductionism, logocentric truth and a (at least approximate) 
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correspondence between language and events in the world. I have argued that 
much of this may have to do with the structure of Western forms of language. 
Adopting the notions of Metz (1980) and Marks (2000) above, the inherent 
ways in which Western culture is structured through its use of language has 
grave implications for how we tend to construct its workings. This linguistic 
system seems to place overt emphasis on the objectification and the mastery 
of the world through its very structure, which privileges the subject and 
renders the object under its causal agency (subject-predicate-object) (see also 
Hermans 1996). This individualization and the foregrounding of the mastery 
of the all-powerful subject is in line with the modernist project, as we see in 
Cubitt’s (2001) reading of Virilio as well: “But Virilio’s point is more 
fundamental than that: he argues here that this commanding gaze is the 
beginning of the geometricisation of vision as perspective in the Renaissance, 
an abstraction of vision from which commences the tendency towards seeing 
all space from a single point” (p. 63). Likewise, such a position seems to 
accentuate the vision as the primary sense under which all other cultural 
knowledge is subdued (if it has room to exist at all) (e.g. Marks 2000; Barker 
2009). In addition, through the ‘crisis of representation’ and postmodern and 
poststructural frameworks we have now come to understand language as 
simply an emergent and ephemeral code in and of itself – a contextual act of a 
social game with no more profound correspondence or verisimilitude to any 
‘reality’ that would be ‘out there’ (e.g. Firat, Dholakia and Venkatesh 1995; 
Firat and Dholakia 2006; see also Deleuze 1994a; Wittgenstein 2009/1953). 
Similarly, in Deleuze’s philosophy (‘superior empiricism’) that seems at 
times both poststructural and radically humanist, focuses on the emergence 
of relations (physical and thought, both human and nonhuman), as “text is 
merely a small cog in the extra-textual picture” (Smith 1997: xvi), for “By 
themselves, resemblances and codifications are poor methods; not a great 
deal can be done with codes [alone]” (Deleuze 1989/1985: 28). Thus, 
Deleuze’s style of writing became free indirect discourse and his emphasis 
was on the construction of concepts for their own sake – not from the 
perspective of uncovering novel ways to establish links to more rigorously 
defined external signifieds that would have ‘real’ existence in the world. 
Rather, his style of writing seems to be his way of proving this point, which is 
to show how language can in essence have no retreat to a more stable logos, 
but rather to open up new avenues of thinking (on part of the reader) through 
paradox, humor and general inaccessibility (e.g. Williams 2008; Hughes 
2009). Thus, ontology becomes of emergent relations that emanate through 
events that bring about qualitative changes in things as they resonate shifting 
intensities of sense, and these senses assume their qualities through human 
cognition, which remains an afterthought to the event itself (see 2.9.2). 
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Scholars who have adopted Deleuzian or similar ‘poststructuralist’ 
underpinnings, have extended these notions to events conceptualized as 
emergent performances (e.g. Berbary 2011; Cho and Trent 2009). When 
representation through media as an accurate means, or even as something 
that carries with itself a verisimilitude to ‘reality’, has become eschewed in a 
philosophical sense, they have turned their attention to the emergent and 
ephemeral nature of social performances themselves. Language (text or 
otherwise) has been noted to fail to their expression: “As a description of a 
dream in words never quite captures […] its feeling/picture/space” (Jones 
2006: 69), and in terms of emergence: ”Although some scholars have written 
as though performance could be treated as a form of text…its unique strategic 
properties are destroyed when it is considered as, or reduced to, text…Unlike 
text, performances are ephemeral” (Thrift 2008: 135, quoting Schieffelin 
1998: 198). Thus, to be able to read text so as to connect to some past ‘reality’ 
becomes a fantastic act of reification in and of itself. 
Yet, all this that can seem at this point an audacious bashing of textual 
expression is not meant as such. Text, like any other mode of expression, can 
(when the modernist machinistic project can be overcome) become another 
vehicle of nonreductionistic liberation of expression, and indeed we are 
seeing such inroads being made in consumer research in terms of poetic 
expression (e.g. Schuten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Van 
Maanen 1995). While not limited to poetry with the waving of some 
typologisizing magic wand, such textual approaches share much with a 
Deleuzian ontology I have been attempting to bring forth, for text could 
indeed shed some of its modernist baggage of being the reducer of thought 
(and relations) instead of a ‘crystal’ (see 2.7 and 2.7.3) that could further their 
undetermined possibilities in thought. And again, this does by no means 
entail that the orthodox academic textual form has no place; evocative 
reasons to “go beyond the fetish of the narrative as the ultimate measure of 
consumer behavior” (Peñaloza and Cayla 2006: 287) might exist, or: 
 
“In part this reflects a growing dissatisfaction with purely symbolic approaches to 
understanding material like rituals, which seem curiously robbed of life and power 
when distanced in discussions concerned largely with meaning. ‘Performance’ deals 
with actions more than text: with habits of the body more than structures of symbols, 
with illocutionary rather than propositional force, with the social construction of 
reality rather than its representation” (Thrift 2008: 125, quoting Schieffelin 1998: 
195) 
 
The moving image, through the production of illusions of social practices in 
spatiotemporal contexts, can make the emergent settings of consumption 
more than a textually objectified and reduced narrative. It can also give us a 
vista not only of human agency, but also of the relational agency of materials 
and spaces as they intertwine in the performative routines of consumption 
practices. The exploration of this potential is what this study tentatively calls 
for; nothing more. 
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Indeed, text has also many qualities that make it more accessible than 
videographic expressions. Most importantly, virtually all literate people are 
very accustomed in using it. This is one of the greatest handicaps of video 
(especially in academia), as no ‘stable’ conventions in experiencing it have yet 
emerged. To make use of, for example, Deleuzian aesthetics of the moving 
image would probably require a great deal of teaching viewers how to initially 
orient to the image to further intensify some parts of the experience (without 
becoming deleteriously over-analytic). Thus, video still becomes easily seen 
as ‘entertainment’ alone, even in academic venues (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 
2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; Sunderland 2006; De Valck, Rokka and 
Hietanen 2009; see also Cubitt 1993). Text, in its most relational form is still 
capable to let the mind roam free. 
Photography has long enjoyed a relationship alongside the conventional 
textual academic publishing format. Yet, it has often been made into 
somewhat of an unwanted sibling – progressive, but not equivalently 
accepted (e.g. Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 
2009). Unlike text, which claims the realm of pure abstraction, many scholars 
have come to consider the essence of photography as consisting of an 
indexical relationship to what was photographed or ‘captured’. The essence of 
a photograph thus becomes its very immobility – the way a photo 
“immobilizes a rapid scene into its decisive instant” (Barthes 1981/1980: 33; 
see also Leighton 2008; Sutton 2010). Indeed, in comparison to text: 
 
“Since the Photograph is pure contingency and can be nothing else (it is always 
something that is represented) – contrary to the text which, by the sudden action of a 
singular word, can shift the sentence from description to reflection – it immediately 
yields up those ‘details’ which constitute the very raw material of ethnological 
knowledge” (Barthes 1981: 28) 
 
We have already seen how the ontology of the moving image can be 
constructed as movement itself, a perpetual displacement of time and its 
conceptualization as a linear flow in a montage that fuses true and false into 
an impossible but convincing illusion. The ontology of video becomes additive 
and relational, while photography privileges the instant, its stillness, or as 
Sutton (2010) notes, “the photograph as creating an ‘immobile section’, one 
so different to the modulation created by the cinematic shot as a ‘variable, 
continuous, temporal mould’” (p. 310). As a medium that proliferated 
coinciding the modernist era, photography became to have a very 
straightforward correspondence to the real, for “Photography captured once 
and for all the instant of time. It came as a guarantee of the positivist notion 
of facts. Photography captured facts” (Cubitt 1993: 45). Equally, Barthes 
(1981) maintains a realist indexical link to the past that has already happened 
in photography – a sort of melancholy making photography into “a kind of 
primitive theater, a kind of Tableau Vivant, a figuration of the motionless and 
made-up face beneath which we see the dead” (p. 32), and “Whether or not 
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the subject is already dead, every photograph is this catastrophe” (p. 32; see 
also Benjamin 2007/1968). Photography thus becomes abstracted from life, 
for “In understanding space, time, identity – life itself – photography is an 
unnatural apprehension or means of comprehension because it cannot 
capture or represent the change that life involves” (Sutton 2010: 311). From 
my perspective, the digital moving image, in all its impossible authenticity 
and all its potential postmodern banality, is, in a positive contradiction, very 
much alive – not dead potential, but full of possibility thorough endless 
opportunities of remediation and ‘mashups’, remixing and reconfiguration. It 
does not (only) mourn the dead, but breathes life into them – as fictive media 
they are all fables. 
Scholars of photography note another important distinction between 
photography and the moving image. As the photograph expresses a decisive 
instant, it is “no longer ‘anything whatever’” (Barthes 1981: 49). As we have 
seen, this encloses the frame into a state of completeness, a “self-suffiency 
and superimposed ‘competence’ – it allows few ways, or only one way in” 
(Sutton 2010: 311). Unlike a Deleuzian conceptualization of emergent 
relational moving images; like a painting, the frame becomes the limit of the 
expression, or: 
 
“Yet the cinema has a power which at first glance the Photograph does not have: the 
screen […] is not a frame but a hideout; the man or woman who emerges from it 
continues living: a ‘blind field’ constantly doubles our partial vision […] confronting 
millions of photographs […] I sense no blind field: everything which happens within 
the frame dies absolutely once this frame is passed beyond. When we define the 
Photograph as a motionless image, this does not mean only that the figures it 
represents do not move; it means that they do not emerge, do not leave: they are 
anesthetized and fastened down, like butterflies” (Barthes 1981: 57) 
 
Yet, if Barthes (1981) would not have come to anchor himself so incessantly to 
the (quasi) realist position, his analysis might have taken a very different 
tone. For him, the photograph is as “emanation of past reality: a magic, not 
an art” (p. 88) that cannot make “us dream” (p. 49). Indeed, at times, he 
seems to come very close to a different interpretation, as “The Photograph 
then becomes a bizarre medium, a new form of hallucination: false on the 
level of perception, true on the level of time: a temporal hallucination, so to 
speak, a modest, shared hallucination (on the one hand ‘it is not there’, on the 
other ‘but it had indeed been’): a mad image, chafed by reality” (p. 115). It 
could be that the affective power of the photograph relies in its melancholy 
evoking immobility. And as it can powerfully invite the viewer into a 
contemplation of a potential past that may in some sense constitute a limit of 
its affective relation. And what matters to me in a digital world is exactly the 
opposite, for the moving image in its agency is doubly different in its relation. 
As we have seen, it does not merely invite, it forces itself upon the viewer 
through embodying experiences, and it can potentially bring about novel 
relations of thought outside and beyond itself. Not a trip to the past but a 
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relational movement to possible futures through impossible pasts. It is in no 
stable way indexical, and indeed, where would I reach for in the sheets of the 
possible futures and past in vivid montages of the moving image to uncover a 
correspondence or a verisimilitude of a fixed and linear past reality? 
Barthes (1981), again from his more realistic position (maintaining the 
authentic indexicality of the photograph), portrays the relation between 
photography and text as the following: 
 
“It is the misfortune (but also perhaps the voluptuous pleasure) of language not to be 
able to authenticate itself […] language is, by nature, fictional; the attempt to render 
language unfictional requires an enormous apparatus of measurements: we convoke 
logic, or, lacking that, sworn oath; but the Photograph is indifferent to all 
intermediaries: it does not invent; it is authentication itself; the (rare) artifices it 
permits are not probative; they are, on the contrary, trick pictures: the photograph is 
laborious only when it fakes” (p. 87) 
 
How would Barthes have needed to reconsider his position in the digitalized 
simulacra of today? By following more contemporary thinkers, we have seen 
the inherent fictivity of every performance abstracted from its emergent 
spatiotemporality, to be carried over in a flux of timeshifted media (e.g. 
Cubitt 1991, 2001). Sutton (2010) constructs a less stationary account, as, for 
him, “The photograph that appears in our newspapers or subway 
advertisements is similarly mobile, an image everywhere that more directly 
becomes an anywhere in the sense that anywhere we look, we see 
photographs that refuse to stay put” (p. 313). Likewise, with the proliferation 
of digital photography, it seems they are equally gaining a new epistemic 
stance. The photographs, lavishly shared on the Internet, may no longer 
similarly consist of privileged instants long lost, but, rather, occupy a “place 
in contemporary culture as a ‘lifeline’” (Sutton 2010: 316; see also Schwarz 
2009). 
Text is fictional, but equally so are photographs and the moving image. Yet, 
the moving image occupies a different ontological plane altogether, its 
inherent agency (‘instancy’ [Bolter and Grusin 2000; see also Belk 1998]) and 
capability to shift from the spatiotemporally defined (realist image) to 
textures and dreams (nonrealist image). As we have seen, video, as “A 
technology that had begun by trying to reveal a world too small or too fast for 
human perception ends up as a medium for inventing things with no ties to 
reality at all” (Cubitt 2001: 56). Indeed, from the perspective of the 
philosophical underpinnings utilized in this work, how laborious indeed 
would the construction of the ‘non-fake’ moving image be? From which 
stance could such a notion even find stable footing? While Barthes (1981) 
called for the indexicality of photography, these notions seem not entirely 
absent in his work, for “in the cinema, no doubt, there is always a 
photographic referent, but this referent shifts, it does not make a claim in 
favour of its reality, it does not protest its former existence” (p. 89). 
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As we have seen, the moving image is not about reality from an ontological 
perspective. Videographic expressions related to a ‘reality’ in any sense 
become of pure illusion, and as an expressive attempt this illusion constitutes 
a performative act of storytelling. Thus, academic videography is a 
constructed ‘truth’ intertwining the contextual performances of social 
practices and contextual agency of material arrangements. Every 
performance, in a sense, is an act of ‘representation’, but, as we have seen, 
representation never generates copies, as the same can never return in any 
‘real’ sense – nor can it be unproblematically seen as the agents’ purposive 
goal. Rather, every social practice is a performative (even playful) event 
generatively constructing new opportunities for new relations through the 
experience of viewing and acting upon its stories. In consumer research, these 
stories have been epistemologically focused on frameworks of cognition and 
meaning-making – the social constructivist position of symbols and some 
construction of structures they resonate with. In my account of videography, 
there is nothing per se that argues against the potential of constructing a 
convincing story through the assessment these cognitions. However, limiting 
research to such postrationalistic and non-material perspectives runs the risk 
of overlooking the experiential and relational potential of the medium. At 
worst, it can mean going after one ‘truthful representation’ of a 
decontextualized ‘talking head’ (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 
2006) after another, severing the relational performances from both their 
social and material context. 
Thus, in my account much of this potential can be found in situated 
perspectives in action that focus on social doings within material 
surroundings (practice theory), without forgetting material agency and how it 
goes on to emergently influence on a preconscious level (non-
representational theory). This notion operates between two Deleuzian poles, 
as we can both situate the scenes of our videographic storytelling so that they 
present a convincing story of the emergence of social relations among 
research participants, and at the same time we can give more opportunities to 
the material itself to become a participant with its own agency, no more 
secondary or merely objectified as an outcome of our modernist thought and 
symbol systems (language), or: 
 
“As with non-representational theory, all attempt to move away from the distinction 
between ‘individual’ and ‘society’ and all share an emphasis on the ongoing 
composition of the social from within the ‘rough ground’ of practices and the concrete 
richness of life” (Anderson and Harrison 2010: 17) 
 
When we express this emergence on video, we can find further epistemic 
grounding for what Kozinets and Belk (2006) call the “bright and noisy” (p. 
335) of consumption phenomena. While an illusion of a ‘reality’, CCT 
videographies can express the emergence of social practices in a potentially 
  157 
convincing and evocative experience differently from textual or photographic 
expression, or: 
 
“But at the very point that the image is replaced by an utterance, the image is given a 
false appearance, and its most authentically visible characteristic, movement, is taken 
away from it” (Deleuze 1989: 27) 
 
As a final note, these and similar notions may also share a link to one of the 
initial questions, or, rather, critical comments, I referred to in one of the early 
sections of this study (see 1.1). The comment often directed to me when 
discussing videography with an academic audience, was: ‘You can surely 
manipulate your audience as much as you want in video representation!’ The 
comment assumes more than it reveals, at the very least it posits 1) an 
objectifiable reality where one and one’s doings can be extracted and 
synchronized from the emergent relations of the world, 2) a reality that can 
be represented so as to erect an unproblematic verisimilitude to reality, and 
3) a ‘representation’ that can be similarly understood by all viewers/readers. 
As we have seen, due to my adoption of a postmodern and poststructuralist 
and even a radical humanist ontology and epistemology, such a comment 
does not pose serious concerns regarding this work. In line with published 
work on CCT videography, our research reports (whether video or writing) 
are thus to be seen more as rhetorical devices where the distinction between 
science and art cannot be philosophically defended (Belk and Kozinets 
2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; see also Belk 1986, 1998). When we come to 
accept the impossibility of originary knowledge or a logos, we have instead 
turned our attention away from fetishizing about better and rigorous methods 
to more pressing (even though subliminal) matters, such as whether our work 
convinces and is it evocative? And most importantly, whether it has efficacy – 
does it, even in tentative ways, bring about new relations or what Bogue 
(2003) called a “revolutionary consciousness” (p. 169). Likewise, as we have 
seen, video no longer makes claims about capturing reality, rather, through 
its “powers of the false” (Deleuze 1989: 126) it is indeed of the opposite – 
making impossible claims in such convincing ways so as to make the body feel 
and the mind to surge beyond what was possible. It is a bold illusion – an 
illusion not to be represented or understood as real/fake or true/false, but as 
their perpetual and emergent indescernability (Deleuze 1989) when invoking 
thought to go beyond itself to discover novel relations. 
It could be that the aforementioned critical comment also tells a more 
mundane story. As we saw in the brief historical overview of the CCT 
approach(es), the modernist (‘positivist’) inclination to reduce and rationalize 
reality into a concrete and uniform whole, commonly with great reliance on 
quantitiative methods, was (and still remains) reluctant to share ground with 
interpretive frameworks. The underpinnings to such resistance stem from the 
ideals of logical language (through mathematics) as the enabler of a more 
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direct correspondence with the physical world, time as linear and objective, 
thus synchronizable and the mind/body as forever separate and objectifiable 
(enabler of objective, experience in cognition) (e.g. Hudson and Ozanne 1988; 
Shankar and Patterson 2001), but such positions have emerged as 
philosophically indefensible, and thus, the challenge of the interpretative 
paradigm to these axiomatic notions was perhaps seen as too great a threat. 
Now, with the interpretive paradigm gaining traction, could we, as 
videographers, be experiencing something similar – while many have 
loosened some of their ties to the modernist ideals of science, is the threat of 
visual expression too great for some who are stubbornly embracing their 
fixation on words themselves as the bearers of knowledge products as well as 
the traditional publishing formats? ‘So, you think video will go away any time 
soon?’ 
 
To summarize: 
• Text is of abstraction and structure; it abstracts any spatiotemporal 
event into objectifiable (subject-predicate-object) and thus sanitized 
states. This structure of (Western) language gives us a world 
controlled and overpowered by man. New (to academia) expressive 
styles such as poetry test this structure, but text is not mobile, it is 
without agency of its own – it can only invite 
 
• Photography is of immobility and decisive instants frozen ‘out of time’ 
in time. The decisive instant is one of completion; the frame is of 
completeness and permanence. Photography is about actual pasts 
bringing about their melancholic ephemerality in the present – it 
cannot make us dream (or think the unthinkable) 
 
• The moving image is of movement itself, in movement it has agency, 
in montage it displaces time into a potentially convincing illusion of a 
real. In its frames it does not reduce a world but expresses a part of the 
Open (infinity) beyond it. In its agency it engulfs the viewer twice, by 
kidnapping both the body in the experience of embodiment and the 
mind by lunging it beyond the frame into the Open of new relations 
and associations. I argue that it can be particularly advantageous and 
convincing in an epistemic alliance with a practice theoretical or non-
representational ontology 
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3.3  Videography and the Epistemology of Relation – 
Implications for Videographic Work in CCT 
 
“The cinematographic image must have a shock effect on thought, and force thought 
to think itself as much as thinking the whole. This is the very definition of the 
sublime” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
This chapter has focused on constructing a perspective for a potentially useful 
ontology and epistemology for videographic research in CCT. It has consisted 
of an account of possible Essence(s) for videographic research. In so doing, I 
have attempted to bring together conceptual resources for further exploring 
what videographic expression in CCT could entail. Academic research has 
conventionally been textual and has often ignored the visual and remained 
silent, yet the social practices of consumer culture are “bright and noisy [in] a 
mass-mediated world where rich, colourful, multilayered, sound effects-
laden, quick-moving, quick-cutting, audio-visual information is increasingly 
the norm” (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 335; see also Belk and Kozinets 2005a; 
De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). Kozinets and Belk (2006) also brushed 
upon the potential differences between different types fo expressive media, 
when they considered the need to gain credibility for a videography by 
accompanying it with a textual supplement. As we have seen (see 3.2), text, 
photography and the moving image can be conceptualized to consist of very 
different kinds of expressive means. While all can be produced as separate 
accounts, there is thus no need to resist combining them ex ante, especially if 
a more convincing and evocative story can be produced with these media 
working in unison. 
We have also briefly considered the tumultuous development of the CCT 
paradigm. Ever since the proliferation of interpretive approaches in 
consumer research since the late 1970’s, scholars of what became known as 
the CCT field have drawn on pluralistic and nonfoundationalist 
underpinnings. Thus, their research activities became operationalized not in 
laboratory settings undergirded in ontological reductionism and objectivity, 
but rather in the fieldsites themselves. While there are many shades to its 
nature of knowledge production (e.g. Schwandt 2000) in CCT, this 
anthropologically guided research stream has generally followed a 
constructionist ontology and interpretive epistemology (Arnould and 
Thompson 2005; see also Hudson and Ozanne 1988; Spiggle 1994; Shankar 
and Patterson 2001; Denzin and Lincoln 2005). As CCT scholars have 
gradually moved on from the discourse’s positivistic underpinnings (e.g. Holt 
1991; Denzin 2001a; Shankar and Patterson 2001), and gained prominence in 
the turbulent postmodern debates of the ‘crisis of representation’ (e.g. Ruby 
2000: 30; see also Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986; Van 
Maanen 1995; Brown 1998b; Goulding 2003; Denzin and Lincoln 2005), the 
field has been blessed with many expressive approaches over the years. Now, 
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a decade after the inception of the videography track (the ‘Film Festival’) in 
the ACR Conference (Belk and Kozinets 2010), what could the role of 
videography be in CCT? 
We have discussed that while videographies can stage something like 
convincing “truth effects” (Shankar and Patterson 2001: 492; see also 
Deleuze 1989) in their audiovisual illusions of some true presence, as an 
abstract digital medium there is no philosophically defendable indexical 
correspondence to any logocentric ‘reality’ out ‘there’. In producing 
videographies we thus construct yet more perpetual simulations in realities of 
simulacra, which in postmodern frameworks may have become more real 
than their inherent ‘hyperreal’ falsity indeed (e.g. Baudrillard 2006/1981; 
Cubitt 2001). As we have seen, the camera-eye always assumes expressive 
perspectives and every unfolding event in its relentless gaze is of perpetual 
performance, the authenticity of which can not be evaluated in any stable and 
foundational manner (e.g. Deleuze 1994a; Thrift 2008). Apart from its truth-
mimicry, nothing of objective nature can be conceived about this human-
machine gaze, and thus videographies become rhetorical devices in no less 
equal way than other means of academic storytelling (e.g. Belk and Kozinets 
2005a; see also Thompson 1990; Holt 1991; Shankar and Pattreson 2001). As 
we have seen, this is not unlike text or photography, yet the ontological 
differences between these expressive media can be constructed 
simultaneously as more subtle and more profound. 
Previous research has also considered the ‘richness’ of the video medium 
(Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006; Smith, Fisher and Cole 
2007; De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009). This richness seems to be 
constitutive of the potential in the medium’s agentic qualities that bring 
about a gripping sense of embodiment in the viewer (see 2.8). Initially, we 
noted the peculiar personal, even uncomftrable nature of experiencing the 
moving image (see 2.2.1). From there, if my position as set out in this study is 
accepted, these experiences (precognitive and cognitive alike) of embodiment 
surface in emergent relations that the agency of moving image imposes upon 
the viewer in a reciprocal becoming. Thus, as we have seen, through a 
Deleuzean reading of the moving image, the ontology of the moving image is 
of movement itself, its very instancy (e.g. Bolter and Grusin 2000), a moving 
flux of ‘any-space-whatevers’ (Deleuze 1986). In considering the moving 
image, we can therefore no longer speak primarily about any ‘decisive 
instants’ (cf. Barthes 1981; see also Sutton 2010), but rather a succession of 
emerging relations in which the viewer occupies a liminal space – between 
their own bodies and the ‘body’ of the moving image (Marks 2000; Barker 
2009; Grodal 2009; see also Deleuze 1989). 
But these potentially powerful experiences of embodiment require a moving 
image that is convincing from the perspective of the audience(s). The 
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emergence of these intensities, affects, mimesis and embodiment require a 
great deal of consideration into the aesthetic qualities of the moving image, a 
question not thoroughly addressed in CCT discourse to date. Here Deleuze 
(1986, 1989) provides many conceptual categories for producing aesthetics 
that could empathically move both the body and thought of the viewer. This, 
as we have seen, becomes constructed in the ‘powers of the false’ (see 2.7), 
where symbolic expressions of the past fluidly coalesce with possible presents 
and futures. Thus, the ontology of videographic expression is movement, but 
what might be called its epistemology is of destabilized time. This flux of 
nonlinear spatiotemporal orientations in the montage of the moving image, in 
turn, forces us (the audience[s]) through its agency to go beyond 
‘representation’ (the recognition of an expression) to creatively think of the 
impossible – to go beyond our possible thoughts (see 2.7.3). But let us not 
neglect the epistemic possibilities of spatiotemporal ‘data’ from the 
perspective of the CCT discourse. 
In recent years, we have witnessed a proliferation of practice theoretical 
thought in CCT (e.g. Reckwitz 2002a; Shove and Pantzar 2005; Warde 2005; 
Halkier and Jensen 2011; Halkier, Katz-Gerro, and Martens 2011), in which 
the radical idea is to go beyond the ontology of constructivism by breaking 
down the Cartesian dualism of mind/body and fusing being into an emergent 
flux of meaning-makings, routines and material arrangements. But how to 
produce a report of such emergence? I have argued that language (and thus 
any purely textual account) offers us limited tools for this, as the structure 
(and thus thought) of Western language gives us an objectified and 
anthropomorphically overpowered world. The very linguistic logic of the 
subject-predicate-object makes the world a passive external entity in which 
we are in totalizing control (see also 2.7.4 and 3.2). But as we have seen in 
Deleuze and in non-representational theory (e.g. Thrift 2008), materials and 
spaces have equal (if not more) agency in and of themselves. Perhaps this is 
suggestive of why we have relatively few empirical publications on practice 
theory – for as we saw in Deleuze (see 2.4), language has no concepts in its 
toolkit to express these emergent mental and material relations where the 
subject is decisively decentered. Following this perspective, we have 
considered how video as an expressive medium is more of the semiological, 
than of linguistic expression, for it “has constantly achieved a language of 
objects” (Deleuze 1989: 28). When sufficient consideration (and technical 
expertise) is put into aesthetics (e.g. Deleuzian), accompanied with relational 
expression, we may become able to produce convincing illusions (if only 
glimpses) of the kind of emergence we are considering here. If such academic 
stories, mediated in the form of digital simulations of the audiovisual moving 
image, are to become seen as reflexive and empathic (e.g. see also Ellingson 
1998; Peñaloza and Cayla 2006; see also Richardson 2000; Brownlie 2006), 
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relationally convincing (e.g. Holt 1991), surprising (e.g. Thompson 1990), 
evocative (e.g. Goodall 2000; Sherry and Schouten 2002), and efficacious 
(e.g. Thrift 2008; see also Murray and Ozanne 1991; Denzin 2001a), we may 
begin to have some purchase to relatively novel forms of expression in CCT 
videographic research. 
While the postmodern frameworks in CCT research have enabled scholars 
to utilize more abstract and artistic approaches in their work (e.g. Belk 1986, 
1998; Schouten 1998; Sherry and Schouten 2002; see also Bochner and Ellis 
2003), it would seem that videographic work is most readily “bound to the 
realm of ‘art’” (Kozinets and Belk 2006: 343). While some may perceive this 
to deprivilege and delegitimize its scientific credentials (back to ‘physics envy’ 
all over again [Tapp 2007]), this consciousness can also be very liberating 
(Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006). In fact, if the ontological 
and epistemological position advocated in this study is convincing in CCT 
research, we emerge into something related to what has been labeled 
‘performative social science’, which foregrounds the relational by making 
“way for a more enlightened conception of science as opportunities for 
invention, discovery and creative endeavour, using methods which are 
counterintuitive, unexpected and polyvocal” (Jones 2006: 68; see also Denzin 
2001b; Bochner and Ellis 2003; Berbary 2011; Guttenplan 2011). If 
polyvocality and creativity have been seen as the drivers of CCT research, it 
would be a misfortune to see CCT turn back on itself to advocate less open-
minded and evocative research in exchange for more rigor (that we cannot 
philosophically defend) via some “cults of criteriology” (Sherry and Schouten 
2002: 220), or as Law and Urry (2004) note, “to the extent that social science 
conceals its performativity from itself it is pretending an innocence it cannot 
have” (p. 404). 
Yet in some sense, the videographies one sees at ACR, seem to still 
commonly occupy the realm of description – a kind of lingering idea of 
intertwining settings and events ‘captured’ and ‘reproduced’. What I argue is 
that there may be expressive reasons for us as video producers to move 
beyond what the moving image describes to how it comes together to describe 
us. Indeed, to go for a “revolutionary consciousness” (Bogue 2003: 169), or at 
the very least for some convincing ‘efficacy’ (Thrift 2008; see also Thompson 
1990; Holt 1991; Denzin 2001a). 
 
3.3.1  Adding to Existing ‘Criteria’ 
 
As we have already seen, Kozinets and Belk (2006) have devised an accessible 
‘4T’ criteria for evaluating videographies in consumer research “to be the 
starting point of discussions about quality videographic work” (Kozinets and 
Belk 2006: 342). ‘4T’ consisted of the criteria of 1) topicality (is the topic 
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interesting and relevant vis-à-vis the empirical approach and the ‘field site’), 
2) theoreticality (how is theory brought to bare and is it presented in a 
convincing manner), 3) theatricality (is the ‘story’ interesting and convincing, 
does it satisfy questions posed) and the 4) technicality (is the production 
masterful in terms of picture quality, sounds and music to create a convincing 
mood) (Kozinets and Belk 2006). These criteria provide for an inspiring 
starting point and due to their unspecific nature leave much room for 
interpretation and experimentation in media res. 
In this study I wish to further these criteria by adding considerations from a 
Deleuzean ontology that focus on emergence and relations. Similarly to Belk 
and Kozinets (2005a) and Kozinets and Belk (2006) (and in line with 
poststructural ontology), these suggestions are certainly not intended to 
cause rigidities for interpretation or pathways to any ‘right’, ‘correct’ or 
‘truthful’ ‘representations', but rather to inspire and open new avenues of 
thought for different interpretations, and to thus actualize relations of new 
series and events expressed via the moving image. My suggestions are the 
following, coined flippantly as the ‘3R’. What I suggest is to consider how 
convincing, insightful, surprising and evocative are the: 
 
 
 
R1. Expression of relations between all the participants (human 
and nonhuman, people and spatiotemporal settings) of the 
research as expressed by the videography 
 
R2. Expression of relations between the aesthetics, visuals and 
sounds expressed by the montage sequence 
 
R3. Emergent relations that come about between the 
videography, its viewers, and how the viewers thus come to 
become inspired to actualize further relations 
 
 
 
The first relation has to do with my explication of a Deleuzean ontology of 
relations, practice theory and non-representational theory (see 2.9.1 and 
2.9.2), as a transcendent flux of ephemeral relations that resonate nonlinearly 
throughout infinite series (see 2.4.1). Is the internal emergence of relations by 
people-objects convincing as an expression of becoming realities that reach, 
in thought, beyond themselves? The second relation has to do with my 
explication of the philosophy of moving image and time as they are expressed 
through simulation. Is the videographic expression an aesthetically 
convincing and artistically evocative simulation of ‘reality’ that brings about 
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new creative relations within and beyond the videography? The third relation 
has to do with my explication of the precognitive and cognitive embodiment 
when experiencing a video. What is the video’s efficacy in creating events and 
new series between itself, its viewers and beyond? 
While there will surely be no ‘right’ way to construct expressions of such 
relations, videographic researchers can draw on Deleuze’s (1986, 1989) 
typologies of the movement-image and time-image. This means a further 
recognition of the fictive nature of all expression, and perhaps thus allows 
CCT video makers to become bolder in their efforts of constructing 
informative and inspiring social performances on video, as well as the wider 
acceptance of more abstract and artistic aesthetics such as metaphoric 
moving image and moving image that has been removed from its 
spatiotemporal coordinates, or as Cubitt (1993) has noted: 
 
“The material aesthetics of electronic media lead us away from the prison of 
representation – the enounced, and the subject of the enounced – and into the realm 
of relations between enounciations, and the subjects of enounciations: what cultural 
studies isolates at the moment of reception” (p. 203) 
 
As we have discussed, this could mean an increased openness to utilize 
evocative cinematographic aesthetics in the work of CCT video makers to 
finally move beyond merely displaying one ‘talking head’ after another. This 
can be done by taking the fictive potential seriously and attempting to 
construct aesthetically convincing and evocative stories while eschewing 
some lingering routines that may still draw us to produce some sort of 
‘representation’ that would ‘faithfully correspond’ to an external ‘reality’. An 
interview needs not be an ‘interrogation’, but could be a much more relational 
setting where a phenomena is constituted and produced in situ, not merely an 
‘external’ and ‘objectified’ account of it. This becomes possible especially in 
projects that have an autoethnographic member taking an active part in all 
data collection settings. S/he is not the one who ‘records’, but one who 
participates and thus constitutes (see 4.1.1 and 4.1.3). 
In addition, relational expression can be attempted by, for example, 
producing scenes of ‘purely optical and sound situations’, and ‘haptic 
visuality’ (see 2.7.3 and 2.8.2), to accompany the more commonplace action-
image (see 2.6.3) that has a sole mode of expression in more realist 
orientations of videography work. Thus, there is an eternally extending 
relation between the shots of the video through montage, and an equally 
infinite set of relations between the medium, its producers and its viewers 
(montage has occurred far before and thus beyond the video medium – it is 
not locked in ‘representation’, just as like there is no quantitative scale of 
affect and intensities of relation). Thus:  
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“We may, then, consider the story as the development of two kinds of images, 
objective and subjective, their close relation which can go as far as antagonism, but 
which ought to find resolution in an identity of the type Ego=Ego; identity if the 
character seen and who sees, but equally well identity of the camera/film-maker who 
sees the character and what the character sees.” (Deleuze 1989: 148) 
 
This relation can be extended so as to take into account the potential of novel 
relations between and beyond the audience(s) of the videography. From a 
Deleuzian ‘poststructural’ perspective, the goal becomes one of potential 
forces, new relations, new possibilities for creative thought in life. 
Such videographies can thus become constructed as ‘crystals’ rather than as 
‘mirrors’ that can be considered as a closed system of internal relations in the 
perpetual process of breaking beyond the screen (frame) to potentially bring 
about new relations through endless resonances (Deleuze 1989). This 
emergence could be crudely illustrated as follows: 
 
 
Image 2 – Emergence of relations in producing videographic research 
 
The entire research process can thus become more sensitized to take into 
account the hermeneutic spiraling between all participants without excluding 
the agency of spatiotemporal (nonhuman) arrangements, the creative work of 
expression on video media and its efficacy to produce a ‘revolutionary 
consciousness’ through embodiment and thought. 
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Videography note (17): 
 
 
In our PTS videography, while relying (perhaps too extensively) on interviews, we put 
in great efforts to express the relationality of such situations by foregrounding the 
notion of conversation with our autoethnographic team member Desto (left in both 
images). Thus we attempted to express the production of emerging relations in the 
interviews – not as accounts of the cultural phenomenon, but exactly the opposite – as 
culture ‘being produced’ and constituting the in situ spaces and times in an emergent 
flux. 
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3.4  Final (In)Complete Contemplations 
 
“Video is a medium only in the sense that it mediates between: people, 
fundamentally. But to begin with what we actually have before us: video mediates 
between senses, between media and, at even a more profound level, between 
technologies […] This is not a quest in the classical sense: there is no definite end in 
sight. It is not teleological, guided by a historical goal, but eschatological, governed by 
the principle of hope” (Sean Cubitt) 
 
Before we enter the chapter on Production, a more practically-oriented 
workbench reading of the actual practices of the work of producing 
videographies in CCT, I would like to offer some further concluding thoughts 
regarding our epistemic journey so far. In particular, some personal 
perspectives on the current state of videographic research and some 
speculations about its possible futures warrant further speculation here. As a 
new and even controversial medium in consumer research, videographic 
production and expression is certainly still in the very marginal – and thus a 
potentially very risky undertaking for an aspiring young scholar. Indeed, only 
the in recent years, the ACR ‘Film Festival’ has witnessed a considerable 
increase in submissions by Ph.D. students, perhaps still often instructed to 
play a ‘safer game’ in terms of publishing to attempt for a more obvious and 
straightforward career path towards attaining the security of tenure positions. 
And indeed, why would anyone even consider videographic expression, which 
can be seen as “such a perilous career path” (MacDougall 2001: 15) in 
academia? 
As noted by scholars in the few extant methodological CCT videography 
publications, videography is still a relatively technically demanding 
methodology (at least contra writing text), has no established, citable, 
respectable or stable academic publication outlet, and it is often seen to be 
overtly concentrated in the realm of entertainment and art only (Belk and 
Kozinets 2005a; Kozinets and Belk 2006) – even seen “as a welcome break 
from attending the ‘more serious’ paper presentations” (De Valck, Rokka and 
Hietanen 2009: 80; see also Sunderland 2006) at the ACR Conference. And, 
as we have seen, even as more unconventional (even artistic) expressions of 
research activities have become increasingly recognized in CCT (e.g. Denzin 
2001b; Sherry and Schouten 2002; Ellis and Bochner 2003; see also Belk 
1986, 1998), videography has yet to make its mark of significance in 
becoming properly recognized outside the relatively small group of academic 
video enthusiasts. What I wish to briefly consider here is the potential for 
videographic research to overcome these challenges by turning them into 
their opposites by bravely using its internal (and inherent) potential to novel 
types of research practices and expressive strategies. If creative work and 
artistic expression continue to gain further clout in academic auspices, it can 
become an advantage of the video medium to have several of such 
considerations inbuilt in its practices in CCT research. 
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Video is still, especially in academic contexts, an up-and-coming alternative 
for conducting and expressing research. Due to this novelty, the champions of 
videographic research are in an interesting position, which makes the 
potential methodological rigidity of video expression rise, not from path-
dependencies of the current practice, but, rather from a common tendency to 
mimic the formats and expressive styles of textual publications. If the open 
potential for experimentation is not curtailed into such tempting rigidities, 
we can construct an opposite stance for the creative outlooks in video 
research. Indeed, as long as theoretical and practical relevance of the 
productions brings about efficacious relations (all accolades and criticism 
included) in our sociohistorically contingent academic discourses, the 
possibility for this creativity may exactly amount to the tours de force that 
could further the epistemic debate about the dichotomy between ‘science’ and 
‘art’. The ‘present company’ of some headstrong acolytes of orthodox 
expression notwithstanding, video work as a novel medium seems to invoke 
much contemporary interest. Even when conversing with many 
conventionally inclined scholars, the reaction is often one of curiosity, and 
thus brings about new relations through debate. In addition, the proliferation 
of video for expressing research findings does seem to resonate with many as 
an unavoidable (if not anticipated) future direction of consumer research. 
Finally, in line with Kozinets and Belk (2006), videographic research, with its 
inherent openness to artistic aesthetics comes with a promise of being 
extremely liberating, and this type of challenge was exactly what I, as a 
nascent ethnographer, was waiting for (see also Belk 1998). 
From a more pessimistic perspective, Bell (2009) provided some novel 
considerations for creative research activities. She argued that while 
academic work has often been considered as a bastion for creativity, 
innovativeness and criticality, many such efforts become actually a: 
 
“derivative due to their preoccupation with competitive [academic] practice; 
compromised due to unbounded demands of teaching and conventional research 
(now add community engagements and consultancy); technically underdeveloped 
due to the lack of time and space to refine the realization of creative concepts; highly 
theorized and therefore less accessible to an audience; and conservative due to high 
levels of accountability and uniformity demanded by the contemporary university” 
(p. 252-253) 
 
Recalling personal conversations with Robert Kozinets and Marylouise 
Caldwell in the context of my position as an assistant at Aalto University, 
which is at present undergoing an all-encompassing transformation into a 
primarily Anglo-Saxon type ‘tenure track’ system, I can but agree with Bell’s 
position. Yet, perhaps this pessimism can have a flipside as well, one that can 
be seen illustrated in my completed videographic projects, for even with all 
the substantial changes in the logic of academic work and career options 
ongoing around me in Aalto University, I have mostly received only 
encouragement for my pursuits. This together with generous resources to 
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travel extensively for both conferences and in order to conduct empirical 
work, as well as to purchase video production and editing equipment which, 
to my knowledge, constitute one of the technically most advanced ‘laboratory 
facilities’ in interpretive consumer research. Why has this been the case for 
my work? 
Videographic research at the Department of Marketing at Aalto University, 
even as it started as somewhat of a whim, seems to have become increasingly 
seen as a fruitful approach on three accounts. First, with the rise of 
spatiotemporal considerations in CCT (e.g. practice theory; see also Joy and 
Sherry 2003), it has come to be seen as a novel medium that can be 
potentially very useful with its largely nonlinguistic mode of expression. As I 
have discussed, video can elicit spatiotemporal relations differently from text, 
which due to its very structure objectifies contexts and foregrounds the 
cognitive ‘I’. Second, it seems to have become widely accepted that video and 
other novel visual research methods (as I have already argued) are ‘not going 
away’, but are rather seen as media of the future, the potential of which we 
are only beginning to envisage. To have videography in one’s methodological 
toolkit now, when it is in its academic infancy in CCT, gives one something of 
a head start in terms of the potential oncoming pluralization of our 
methodological approaches towards including the visual and the auditory. 
Third, there seems to be something very compelling about the possibilities 
the medium holds in popularizing academic research and the way it can 
potentially challenge the rigid and incumbent journal structures that are 
increasingly seen not as providers but the gatekeepers of information (see 
also Guttenplan 2011). Video as a fluid and perennially changing medium can 
resist these tendencies for its: 
 
“strength is its ability to cut across the interstices, to play upon the contradictions, of 
the regimes of looking and hearing that structure the dominant audio-visual world. 
Its very weakness, its indefiniteness, becomes its field of possibility: the necessity of 
pluriform tactics, since no structure of power presents it with a strategy. Video is 
strong because it evades, is larger than, exceeds, avoids, slips by and away from, 
cannot be accounted for in the discourses (including this one) about it” (Cubitt 1991: 
185) 
 
And to ‘cut across’ some conventional interstices, our resolute position has 
been to put, without restriction, all our work online via video service 
providers. While this has been something of work of tempered anarchy, we 
immediately discovered that the videographic medium seems particularly 
potent in popularizing academic research. As stated earlier, our statistics bear 
witness to this: a total of almost 2,000 views for our first BIP project and a 
whopping 4,000+ views for our PTS project in only three months. These 
statistics have been complemented by lively discussions on various online 
forums (see Appendix 1) – and these views have amassed for quite theoretical 
(even tedious or outright ‘boring’) videographies, and certainly not from an 
academic audience alone – seemingly the opposite. Indeed: “How perfect 
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would it be if research reports made it to the top of the viral list? Wouldn’t it 
be perfect if they were sent around” (Sunderland 2006: 378). 
It seems that videography, in its illusions of spatiotemporal proximity and 
its potential to fracture the palisade of technical academic textual expression, 
seems particularly suited for this work of popularization (see also Belk 1998). 
However, as I have attempted to cover in this study, it surely must be done in 
a fashion that can raise the interest of both academicians and the general 
public alike. We need to continue to evaluate our craft, and to never be 
content in just ‘pointing and shooting’. 
Apart from extra-academia potential, equal, if not elevated, possibilities to 
publish research in more conventional textually-based A-tier journals by 
utilizing the videographic ‘data’ as the primary empirical material 
underpinning the research might exist. Indeed, why should this in situ data 
not be considered even more ‘reliable’ (contra fieldnotes) and accessible (if a 
need arises to require parts of the empirical material for the review process) 
for a more conventionally oriented editor or reviewer? While not more 
‘realistic’ in any philosophical sense, videographic illusions of presence hold 
the possibility for better after-the-fact assessment of how convincing the 
methodological work has been. For example: was the researcher present? 
How closely was s/he in proximity to the practices of consumption? Was the 
researcher’s access considerable? Could empathic understanding and in-
depth knowledge of the cultural context be assessed from the interview 
settings and interactions? Such accounts seem very difficult to assess from 
fieldnotes scribbled in situ or even from copious amounts of photographs 
accompanying them. Similarly, the need for a heterogeneous research team 
(see 4.1.1 and 4.1.3) to enable access to consumption phenomena facilitates 
multiple points of view and contributes to amounts of discussion regarding 
what occurred during the course of fieldwork. Thus, for us, video has 
potentially a greater empirical and epistemic range as compared to a more 
conventional scientific article. It helps to intensify academic debates and 
attain broader audiences. It thus becomes a means of entering academic 
debates – not only a means to ‘represent’ them. 
In addition, I have been granted the liberty to extend the ethos and practice 
of videography beyond researchers already pursuing academic careers: at 
Aalto University’s Department of Marketing we now boast a Master’s Thesis 
group for students to conduct CCT research on video, and then to produce a 
textual companion to their audiovisual production. The first graduates of this 
pioneering Master’s Thesis group have received considerable attention from 
both within the academia and the broader media alike. Here the potential 
entertainment and artistic factors can work for us in the most direct sense. 
Compared to academic textual articles that are often conceptually 
inaccessible to broader audiences, video seems to be more readily accepted. 
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What is quite probable, however, is that traditional journal channels will not 
actualize this potential due to their path-dependency in text publication 
formats, and a contemporary over-emphasis in controlling information. 
Video, by its very nature, will wholeheartedly resist this (e.g. Cubitt 1991, 
1993). The whole nature of academia-publics relationship may need to be 
reconsidered, if videographic work is to make good of its potential to reach 
and create new efficacious relations with broader audiences. 
In addition, people in managerial roles are opening their eyes to 
nontraditional ways of expressing consumer experience and consumer 
culture (Catterall, Maclaran and Stevens 2002; Arnould and Thompson 
2005). Video can be, and seems to have increasingly become, utilized for 
managerial purposes (Belk and Kozinets 2005a; Martin, Schouten and 
McAlexander 2006; Sunderland 2006; see also Santiago-Irizarry and Gleach 
2007a; Borghini, Carú and Cova 2010), and the same applies regarding my 
own experiences of conducting a number of corporate videography projects 
and videographic Master’s Thesis seminars at which three videographic 
research projects following CCT frameworks were conducted in a close 
relationship with company managers. In fact, a relatively large dairy 
company, Valio (www.valio.com) hired one of my Master’s Thesis group 
students as the company’s official videographer. His work on consumer 
research and interorganizational communications has since been used for 
both to spark and to disseminate new ideas on many managerial levels. 
Another potential problematic regarding the video medium becoming a 
more established mode of expression in respectable academic auspices 
remains, and has to do with the very nature (ontology) of the medium 
explored in this study. What I mean by this is that the conventional academic 
game seems rigged against video medium if one is to take its creative 
potential seriously. This is the grounding of a methodological form in its 
conventional sense. Indeed, what could potentially skewer this creative 
potential is the threat emanating from attempts to establish new criteria for 
‘rigor’ of evaluation – often the very bedrock, the stone of ages, of academic 
respectability itself. Thus, how can videographic expression gain 
respectability without falling into another vicious centripetal vortex where 
“cults of criteriology” (Sherry and Schouten 2002: 220) emerge to call the 
shots?  
But while we now have some preliminary ideas regarding videographic 
research that support evocative, empathic and potentially artistic approaches, 
many political hegemonies that distribute video seem not similarly inclined. 
What we seem to see is in fact the opposite, endless sameness. As Cubitt 
(1991), in considering televised media, puts it, “Broadcasting homogenizes, 
and through its imaginary community proposes an absolution by producing a 
series of perpetual Others in order to produce a register of the Same […] The 
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refusal to be the Same, and the insistence on (decentred) individuality from 
the second necessary condition of democratic media” (p. 171). As I have 
argued, the medium’s potential can be seen as exactly the opposite, the 
freedom of creativity, artistic and aesthetic potential, the expression of new 
relations, expression of emergence, and the expression of culture in its 
evolving production. It is not about form, but about evocative, empathic and 
thus efficacious and surprising substance that could make us think previously 
unthinkable relations. Videographies thus emerge as: 
 
“A selective, interpretative gaze back at historical texts, reviewing them on video, is 
not only a process of revision but also a dialectical method of montage. I want to 
place different films and videos against one another, not as instances of historical 
teleology, but as historical interruptions” (Russell 1999: xii) 
 
Thus, an overt focus on criteria for ‘good’ videographies can 
counterproductively tame, sanitize and thrust toward a banal average. Similar 
worries could be argued for if future CCT videographies do not acquire the 
ability to break through their too often merely descriptive attempts at 
expression. Here I see parallels with how many authors, pointing out, via 
unconcealed rhetoric, how the forces of commoditization go for “the 
standardization of diversity” (Cubitt 2001: 130), “in the service of corporate 
capital: to remodel the future as the clone of the present” (ibid.: 135). In my 
darkest hours, I see academia as a potentially similar homogenizing and 
institutionalizing force. This can surely be seen as something of the opposite 
position, as compared to the playful creativity advocated by Deleuze (1989). 
In his view, cinema that does not force the viewer to think the unthinkable, 
“limits itself to a dream state induced in the viewer […] to an imaginary 
participation” (p. 168), where the dream is of static passivity not extending to 
taking full advantage of its potential. This goes “from the image to thought 
there is shock or vibration, which must give rise to thought in thought; from 
thought to the image, there is a figure which must be realized in a kind of 
inner monologue (rather than in a dream), capable of giving us the shock 
again” (p. 166). While comprehensively metaphysical, it may be this very 
magical spark of artistic creativity that may allow academic videography its 
evocative and efficacious potential – the potential to bring about new 
thinking and relations, or: 
 
“Their most powerful agent is the film. Its social significance, particularly in its most 
positive form, is inconceivable without its destructive, cathartic aspect, that is, the 
liquidation of the traditional value of the cultural heritage” (Benjamin 2007/1968: 
221) 
 
As for the future of video in CCT, I seem to have implicitly positioned my 
doctoral work between the 6th and 7th movements of CCT research (e.g. 
Denzin 2001a). The movements that came before these questioned the 
‘positivist’ logic of consumer research and emphasized a pluralistic 
philosophical underpinning for research. The 6th movement was about 
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representational pluralism (e.g. Sherry and Schouten 2002), and the 7th was 
about critical theory that emphasizes consumer emancipation (e.g. Denzin 
2001a; Murray and Ozanne 1991; see also Denzin and Lincoln 2005). In line 
with postmodern underpinnings (no logos), the critical theory approaches are 
gradually becoming incorporated in CCT (and have come more developed in 
organization theory [e.g. Gherardi 2000; Fenwick 2004]). The realization 
that there can never be objectivity or neutrality of research activities has 
made it clear that all research is an exercise in the interest of (some) political 
power. While the days of naïve realism in CCT may be slowly drawing to a 
close (proposed by Denzin already in 2001a), we must also consider the 
possibilities and potential pitfalls of critical theory. In contrast to orthodox 
research approaches, critical theory highlights conflict rather than establishes 
order, and asks not whether one is apolitical (for this cannot be), but what is 
the political stance one assumes, as ‘facts’ cannot be separated from values 
(Murray and Ozanne 1991, Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Denzin 
2001a). 
Critical theory, the descendant of the Frankfurt School, is axiologically 
emancipatory at its core (Murray and Ozanne 1991; Denzin 2001a; see also 
Hammond 2001; Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987). Thus, critical 
researchers focus on reconsidering and changing the structures in which 
human activity occurs, from the perspective of liberating the oppressed 
(Murray and Ozanne 1991; Murray, Ozanne and Shapiro 1994; Brownlie 
2006). While critical theory will surely have much to contribute to 
videographic research in CCT (see our PMW videography for evaluative 
purposes) – and I am, in fact, involved in three such nascent videographic 
projects – its broad explication here is beyond the scope of this study, as 
critical theory can be seen to partially resist a Deleuzean ontology. The 
axiological focus on emancipation of critical theory can run the risk of 
building something like a new logos, which a Deleuzean ontology resists. In 
my reading of Deleuze, emancipation has less to do with a political 
perspective, and Deleuze seems often content simply exploring the liberation 
of the creative potential of the human mind. However, Thrift’s (2008) non-
representational theory brings in more of the political, in terms of how 
human action is subjugated/liberated via technologies and spaces. The 
question, for now, must thus remain open. What kind of emancipation can 
offer novel ‘truths’, ‘righteousness’ or ‘justice’, as we know that truth is 
equally contextual, paradigmatic and politically usable to whichever ends 
deemed necessary? Thus, no radical thinking is pure, as it, in a very 
Deleuzean vein, operates as emerging relations towards the poles of both 
conservativism and revolution (Williams 2008: 61). When a radical 
movement draws away from its opposite conservativism, it simultaneously 
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draws closer to the establishment of its own set of structured and stabilized 
thinking, or: 
 
“Deleuze’s moral philosophy is therefore not of resistance, of mediation or 
conservation – however pragmatically we allow these to bend and vary. It is a moral 
philosophy of creativity in relation to events” (Williams 2008: 136) 
 
For the purposes of this study, my Deleuzean interpretation leaves the 
question of political orientation for the future, as it cannot rest on the 
destabilization of being and language to merely initiate another center – 
however diachronic and emergent it may be. Thus, while videographic 
projects in CCT can certainly adopt perspectives from critical theory, this 
study opens doors for reflexive research from any political position. The point 
to be emphasized, is simply that one should not do research naively, but with 
an acute awareness of the underpinnings of the political system it touches 
base with, and with a reflexive orientation and transparency in reporting that 
enables the creative mind to run free as it encounters impossible worlds in 
the moving image (whether the approach is critical[emancipatory], 
managerial[capitalist] or something that wishes to break down this dualism). 
Such work of criticality, which is keenly aware of its own act of constituting 
the system it is part of, is an ongoing project of non-representational theorists 
(e.g. Thrift 2008; see also Pels, Hetherington and Vandenberghe 2002; 
Kirsch and Mitchell 2004). For our present purposes, let me conclude by 
raising the following question: While we can make managerially oriented 
consumer research, should we not also ask what its purpose is, and especially, 
why such orientation is often assumed to be our given axiological position as 
consumer researchers? Indeed: 
 
“In fact a range of ‘ethnographic’ approaches, linked by little more than labels, has 
prompted me to think in terms of the good, the bad, and the ugly in qualitative 
research. We have traditional ethnography, the long term labor intensive field 
immersion favored by academic researchers. We have ‘adnography’ a kind of rip-and-
run hot-button solution to the need of managers for intimate yet efficient contact 
with contextually embedded consumers. Finally, we have ‘blitzkrieg ethnography,’ 
which combines some of the best and worst features of the other variants. Blitzkrieg 
ethnography provides just enough field exposure to tantalize and to aid 
hypothesizing, but not enough for comprehensive understanding” (Sherry 1987: 371) 
 
In order to make videographic expression more recognized we must be wary 
of the institutions and organizations that act both as (both academic and 
private) gatekeepers and funders of these expressive efforts. But, as we have 
seen in this study, the promise of academic work on video may occupy a 
greatly broader sphere of evocative and efficacious potential for philosophical 
and aesthetic expression. This expression may firmly need to resist the 
seirenic calls for quick-and-dirty approaches, going after the ‘fast buck’, and 
to resolutely continue the historical legacy of in-depth ethnography (e.g. 
Sunderland 2006), in order to become evermore convincing as both an 
academic and a managerial medium alike. Yet, it must be noticed that: 
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“Capitalism homogenizes”, and “while we run the [capitalist] machine, it also 
runs us […] we simulate choice, while the system simulates its absence” 
(Cubitt 2001: 140-141). Could we come up with something that is beyond 
such pessimistic perspectives? 
Thus, here is where we come to refer to a somewhat of a pragmatist 
approach regarding our position as ethnographic videographers in the 
academic world – do as you will, but do reflexively appreciate the political 
nature of every video expression. The true success to be potentially found in 
our ability, in line with Denzin (2001a; see also Richardson 2000), is to 
invoke what Bogue (2003) referred to as the “revolutionary consciousness” 
(p. 169), or what Deleuze termed “action-thought” (Deleuze 1989: 163). These 
new relations that Deleuze discussed call for action, for “This is no longer 
organic and pathetic but dramatic, pragmatic, praxis, or action-thought. This 
action-thought indicates the relation between man and the world” (ibid.: 161). 
Video offers a readily hermeneutic technological relation between people and 
the world, but as a digital medium, also offers a relationship between 
technologies – a relationship between relationships (Cubitt 1993). 
As we have seen, we are no longer purely constructivist or poststructuralist, 
but rather have become a bricolage of these philosophical resources, set in 
emergent videographic motion by a Deleuzian ‘superior empiricism’ and the 
‘radical humanism’ of non-representational theory. In our research activities, 
we construct academic stories, but via the largely nonlinguistic and embodied 
experience encountered in videographic form, we can express relational 
becoming in cultural contexts where the 'richness' of expression is the 
constitutive and intertwined emergence of the meaning-makings and 
ritualistic performances of the cultural agents (human), the agency of 
material surroundings, the researchers, and the relations the machinic 
videography brings about from in situ contexts via the editing table, and its 
subsequent encounter with audience(s) in profuse and simultaneously 
ephemeral digital universality. Regarding this work, the ontology of the 
moving image in CCT has become a movement itself, its epistemology has 
become its false time, perpetual difference. But, importantly, its additional 
epistemic purpose in CCT research can now be seen to consist of relation and 
reflexive efficacy. We have entered a new tentative space; one of open 
possibility. Let us thus further explore these relations, while damning the 
deadening tentacles of cynicism beneath an emerging island, where one 
further relation becomes firmly erected – a nascent relation to hope. May 
your videos be resonant, evocative and glorious! 
 
“What remains? There remain bodies, which are forces, nothing but forces. But force 
no longer refers to a centre, any more than it confronts a setting or obstacles. It only 
confronts other forces, it refers to other forces, that it affects or that affect it. Power 
(what Nietzsche calls ‘will to power’ and Welles, ‘character’) is this power to affect 
and be affected, this relation between one force and others” (Deleuze 1989: 139) 
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IV  An Account of Production 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1  Linkages to Essence(s) 
 
“If one had to define the whole, it would be defined by Relation. Relation is not a 
property of objects, it is always external to its terms […] Relations do not belong to 
objects, but to the whole, on condition that this is not confused with a closed set of 
objects” (Gilles Deleuze) 
 
In the preceding chapter, I have attempted to construct a tentative Deleuzian 
ontology and epistemology for videographic research in CCT. I would like to 
offer a warm welcome to alternative takes on these matters. Let us now move 
to a more practical account of our experiences in the praxis of doing 
videographic research. Here, drawing on our activities in the field and by the 
editing table, I will provide a list of observations and notes that briefly 
describe how we approached the production of our published videographic 
expressions. It has certainly been an exercise in ‘learning-by-doing’ an in no 
means in any way ‘complete’, indeed quite the opposite. 
Thus, after exploring the possibilities for a more philosophically detailed 
underpinning for videographic research, I will offer some ruminations on the 
actual practice of conducting and expressing videographic research in the 
CCT tradition. To do so, we can revisit the relational framework of the various 
levels of videographic production presented in 3.3.1. These levels are the 
relations between the social phenomena under inquiry (social practices and 
spatiotemporal settings), the research group and the technologies that 
mediate it and the audience(s) that thus come to encounter it. 
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Image 3 – Emergence of relations in producing videographic research 
 
4.1.1  Focusing on the Relational Contexts (in situ) 
 
“We challenge the claim that the author(s) should/could only have minimal impact 
during the filming. And we wish to extend this view beyond filming, so as to take into 
account the editing process. Throughout the editing process, we refused to give the 
impression that we stood above the debates, as omniscient narrators.” (Jean-
Sébastien Marcoux and Renaud Legoux) 
 
When shooting footage, we produce frames. In many discourses on the visual, 
frames have been construed as closed systems of analysis (in cinema theory, 
photography or visual anthropology). Yet, following a Deleuzian view, the 
frame always relationally extends to the indefinite via its encounter with a 
mind – the potential for creative thought. In the first place, the frame extends 
into the out-of-field, which “refers to what is neither seen nor understood, but 
is nevertheless perfectly present” (Deleuze 1986: 16). These can include 
sounds or external activity that, while beyond the immediate visual, have an 
affect to the frame. Cultural phenomena emerge in spatiotemporal contexts 
that constitute the emergence – the out-of-field is constitutive space (see 
2.5.1). Thus, to the best of our ability, and while it has sometimes been 
demanding, we have come to conduct all our videographic data production in 
situ, as, for us, it is not the false closed system of the frame that depicts a 
social event of consumption, but the infinitely extending spatiotemporal 
relations between the agents of consumption, the presence of our 
videographic team and the temporal (hermeneutic) relations that thus 
emerge.  
Furthermore, following Deleuze, it is through the conceptualization of 
relation that the moving image extends to and beyond the audiences 
experiencing it – all relational events extend to all future events through 
indefinite series (see 2.4.1). Thus, the relation is an open system of cultural 
change at a comprehensive scale, not a mere closed system of images to be 
explained and interpreted (e.g. as texts). Indeed, there are larger questions to 
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address. “The whole is therefore like thread which traverses sets and gives 
each one the possibility, which is necessarily realized, of communication with 
another, to infinity” (Deleuze 1986: 17). This we can exemplify through our 
PTS project, in which we make attempts to express the translocal emergence 
of social practices through which authenticity is perennially negotiated. Thus 
any frame we construct in situ presupposes an out-of-field, with its multiple 
‘threads’ each in the process of constituting qualitative change in the open 
system of the particular cultural phenomena in question. The translocality of 
parallel social practices is necessarily open, and the (quasi-spurious choices 
of) frames are intended to thus reveal the impossibility of realist accounts 
(which would need to entail a system). We can only produce short snippet-
like illusory expressions of the whole that we are always a constitutive force of 
(see also Denzin 1995). There are no external vantage points to any system, 
only the whole system’s becoming.  
We wished to highlight this illusion by additionally utilizing a multitude of 
shots that explicitly show the presence of the camera in all its obtrusiveness – 
in all its performance-inducing capacity (see 2.4.4 and 2.9.2). What we shoot 
is not the Real, but a spatiotemporal event in becoming, another performance 
in the making. 
Thus, for us, the spatiotemporal contexts become the sites of relation. These 
relations are those that we wish to construct ethnographic stories about. 
These become the very acts of production of cultural phenomena, rather than 
its abstraction, externalization and objectification (which happens 
expressively when participants are interviewed in non-relevant locales, thus 
producing only postrationalized perspectives of action, not relationally 
constituting the very cultural phenomenon itself). Therefore, in PTS, we 
produced in situ scenes, where our research team’s autoethnographic 
member took an active part to turn the interviews more like conversations, 
for “conversation is undoubtedly inseparable from structures, places and 
functions, from interests and motives, from actions and reactions which are 
external to it” (Deleuze 1989: 230). Such active partaking mediated the 
emergent negotiation of cultural phenomena, rather than constructing them 
into mere extractions produced by ‘interrogations’ with ‘talking heads’ 
reduced to ‘subjects’. The scenes thus become illusions of emerging relations 
in (at least tentatively) a practice theoretical (see 2.9.1) and non-
representational (see 2.9.2) sense. The contexts are the sites of material 
arrangements and fetishes (see 2.6.1 and 2.8.2) – of unfolding performative 
events of thought and creative negotiation. 
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4.1.2  What about the Camera’s Presence and ‘Truth-
manipulation’ 
 
“We need an ethic or a faith, which makes fools laugh; it is not a need to believe in 
something else, but a need to believe in this world, of which fools are part” (Gilles 
Deleuze) 
 
It is important to note that doing videographic research is, in its 
obtrusiveness, very different than traditional field note writing (e.g. when 
shoving a camera into someone’s face it would be advisable that s/he thinks it 
is a ‘good idea’). Thus, many scholars have commented on these inherent 
problematics of camera presence in naturalistic settings, with the early visual 
anthropologists even attempting more systematic and representative “non-
interventionalist approach, leaving the camera to film continuously to 
produce ‘objective materials’” (De Valck, Rokka and Hietanen 2009: 91; Belk 
and Kozinets 2005a). This invokes a positivist notion of an untarnished and 
‘purely’ objective possibility of capturing reality. 
Yet, as we have seen, the threat of the camera significantly changing the 
setting is not a key concern from a contemporary poststructural and radical 
humanist viewpoint. As we have already seen via Deleuze (1989/1985) and 
Thrift (2008), there can be no ‘accurate’ way for anyone to act in a 
philosophical sense, as everything that we do is ‘performative’. All relations, 
including the research participants and the equipment alike, are in any event 
constitutive forces of its emergence, and thus we can do no work of 
externalization (which would indeed move us toward a more ‘positivist’ 
underpinning), or making the recorded event ‘more natural’. It is our role, as 
videographic storytellers, to edit the videography in a manner that ethically 
corresponds to our best idea of an interpretation – as there can be no 
‘truthful’ one. Marcoux and Legoux (2005) further emphasized the 
importance of the in situ recording, as they found it constructs a ‘context 
effect’ that invokes a sense of vox populi communication. From the 
perspective of a Deleuzean ontology, this ‘context effect’ could be interpreted 
as the spatiotemporally unfolding relations between people-objects – an 
intertwined emergence of thought and material arrangements. Indeed, for 
Deleuze, the ‘camera eye’ should be, though the perspectives it ‘chooses’, seen 
as an active participant, the machinic and agentic “third eye, replacing the eye 
of nature” (Deleuze 1989: 265), as through the work of close-ups and the 
nonlinearity of time produced by the montage-cut, it can potentially produce 
impossible thought (see 2.7.3), affect (see 2.6.2) and embodiment (see 2.8.2). 
The perspective is never neutral, never a “non-intrusive fly on the wall” (Belk 
and Kozinets 2005a: 134), and thus, we as videographers, need to use it to our 
advantage – to fill it with expressions. 
For Deleuze (1986), even the early visual anthropologists were, at least 
implicitly, aware of the impossibility to ‘capture reality’. Yet, this inherent 
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fictitiousness became undermined by the illusion of the ‘camera eye’ as an 
objective observer; overthrown with the false conception of the real as the 
polar opposite of fiction (Deleuze 1986). Likewise, “everybody has always 
known that the camera has an active effect on situations, and that characters 
react to the presence of the camera, and it hardly troubled Flaherty or 
Leacock, who already saw only false problems in it” (Deleuze 1989: 151). This, 
especially in our most recent PTS videography, is why we attempted to 
produce illusions of how cultural phenomena become constituted in a flux of 
emergent performances, so as to create honest accounts of hermeneutical 
becoming in togetherness, not “illusions of absence” (Marcoux and Legoux 
2005: 254). Thus, we made an effort to express the emergent artificiality of 
every camera perspective and the performative nature of every cultural 
context, by making the presence of the ‘camera eye’ explicit (see also 
Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). As an ethnographic participant, the camera is 
not an externality to be hidden, as it is necessarily a part of, or participant in, 
the videographic research team. Indeed, “Not only do bodies bang into each 
other, but the camera bangs against the bodies” (Deleuze 1989: 193-194) (see 
Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). Additionally, in line with Marcoux and Legoux 
(2005), all these elements are composites of an ethnographic togetherness: 
the research team, the ‘camera-eye’, the in situ material contexts and the 
conversational interviews. These become active and constituent participants 
in the cultural phenomenon we are researching – no less than how the 
participants embedded in the cultural phenomenon become to constitute us. 
From a more practical perspective, Belk and Kozinets (2005a) and Kozinets 
and Belk (2006), note that the presence of the camera in the research setting 
can become daunting, as it “can definitely interfere with the conduct of 
interviews” (2006: 342). Certainly, the problem of participants ‘freezing’ in 
front of the camera can be a problem. As stated above, we have attempted to 
remedy this issue by carefully planning the composition of our research 
teams. All our projects have included an autoethnographic member, who has 
been very influential in the particular cultural context, and thus able to set up 
interviews, and provide access to contexts that would have forever remained 
beyond the reach of ‘outsiders’. Importantly, they were not included to the 
team as a ‘key informants’, but as active authors, who just happened to be 
mostly involved in the production of background understandings for the 
other members of the research team and in securing field access. 
The possibility of spurious manipulation of the videographic data, at the 
outset, seems like a very serious problem (also seen in the ‘critical comments’ 
described in the introductory chapter, see 1.1). However, this concern 
becomes less threatening from a poststructuralist and radical humanist 
perspective, and even from a more practical viewpoint, when one recognizes 
the nature of video media contra textual expression. When taking a 
  181 
poststructuralist position, the veracity of the material does not assume 
paramount importance – convincing and evocative storytelling does (see e.g. 
2.3.3, 2.5.1, 2.6.5 and 2.7.2). Thus the possibility of intentional manipulation, 
or of the “sweetening, titling, scoring, and other enhancing that goes on in the 
editing process is capable of telling many ‘truths’. Even the cuts, dissolves, 
and bits of music that are usually added to a video can do much to determine 
its emotional impact on the viewer” (Belk and Kozinets 2005: 133), is no 
longer an alarming concern, for every camera angle and cut necessarily tells 
its own story – as does the use of every metaphor and metonymy in textual 
expression. Further, to ‘completely fake it’, so as to produce videographic data 
from nothing is surely a very difficult (if not impossible with contemporary 
technology) undertaking. However, when crafting academic reports utilizing 
textual expression, could one not write whatever one chooses? Even if 
audiotapes of the interviews can be requested by journal reviewers, what 
makes, for example, fieldnote scribblings convincing when written during 
situational participant observation? Certainly, it is possible to reconstruct 
video data to emphasize a particular perspective (and necessarily so), but why 
is this a concern for video in particular? At least, regarding the video data, a 
reviewer can request the original footage files. From such ‘raw’ recordings any 
work of deliberate mischief in terms of ‘cutting and combining’ should be 
fairly easy to detect. 
Finally, a brief word on ethics and the intrusiveness of the ‘camera eye’. Due 
to its inherent audiovisual nature, it is not so straightforward to conceal the 
identity of a participant in the video media (although this can certainly be 
done as well – in PTS, the last participatory conversation with ‘Seckle’ does 
not reveal his appearance in accordance with his request). In our projects, we 
have incorporated the use of Internet-based video services when conducting 
videographic research in international settings. Before the interviews, we 
have told all key participants that before any finalized version will be made 
available to public, they will be able to view and comment it online – where it 
would be set up behind a password on the Vimeo service. To date, apart from 
the aforementioned ‘Seckle’, no comments requesting changes or the 
exclusion of any material have been received. 
 
4.1.3  On Autoethnography and Research Team Interaction 
 
“[Rouch] took cameras into Paris streets for impromptu encounters in which the 
filmmaking process was often a part of the film, with filmmakers and equipment in 
the frame. Those filmed became collaborators, even to the extent of participating in 
discussions of the footage, which were, in turn, incorporated in the final version of 
the film” (Jay Ruby) 
 
Video is a high-risk ethnographic medium. When constructing a textual 
expression of research findings, the author can rely on the abstractions in 
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his/her fieldnotes and memories of the relevant events. Video footage needs 
to be shot at the right moment, the focus must be right, the zoom must be 
right, the batteries must be charged, the memory cards need to have storage 
space, and the lens and the microphone must be at least adequate with 
respect to the particular context, if one is to produce a potentially affective 
(see 2.6.3) or embodying experience (see 2.8) on video. Even from a purely 
technical perspective, it is truly a methodological quagmire in and of its own 
– you either have it [the footage] or you don’t (Artis 2008). And as we have 
seen, we have come to insist on producing videographic data only in situ to 
express the relational becoming of the spatiotemporal context and the 
hermeneutical spiraling between the research team and the cultural 
phenomena. But how to go about this? In our experience, the best way to 
mediate these concerns is to have a high degree of access.  
To do so, we have always included an autoethnographic member in our 
every videographic research project to negotiate access to interesting contexts 
and participants, and to be able to become more holistically immersed in any 
particular consumption phenomenon we are attempting to become an 
empathically relational part of. To work in such teams, as opposed to the 
conventional ‘mentor-graduate student relationship’, seemed to be 
particularly suited for facilitating “the rhizomatic, synergistic impulse of truly 
collaborative research” (Sherry 2006: 275). We can thus bring about diverse 
interpretations of the research phenomena, and also show some glimpses of 
the emergence of qualitative relational changes between the authors and the 
autoethnographic member – something that video has a capacity to express 
as an emerging story, but which is typically only highlighted in methodology 
sections of textual accounts. It must be pointed out that this form of 
autoethnography (perhaps another concept would work better) is not 
similarly emphatically personal, as the fully-fledged introspectively-
orientated autoethnography written from an ‘I’ perspective (cf. Ellis and 
Bochner 2000; see also Van Maanen 1995). Yet, at the same time, it does 
require a willingness on the part of the autoethnographic member to distance 
him/herself from the very context s/he feels very passionately about – in 
effect to “be willing to be vulnerable” (Ellis and Bochner 2000: 752). In 
addition, as we follow a Deleuzian relational ontology, it is only natural that 
the autoethnographic ‘I’ in a research team will rhizomatically blend to 
become a performative part of the entire videographic collaboration, which 
will carry its offspring into the emergence of hermeneutic relations in the 
production of the videography, and in thought, beyond to future projects and 
lives. 
Yet, this ‘willing vulnerability’, in our experience, is no light matter, as it 
invokes completely novel and personal thoughts about the social phenomena 
one was a passionately engaged part of. To do active autoethnography means 
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the reflexive questioning of these, once taken-for-granted relations. Thus, as 
the autoethnographic member takes part in his/her particular social 
phenomenon, there is an opportunity for a constant interplay of meanings 
among the research team (what could be also referred to as member checking 
from a more conventional perspective), as s/he enters into an emerging 
interplay of distanciation (e.g. Berry 2011; see also Videography Note 13 in 
2.8.2). This requires an active contemplation on the developing hermeneutic 
by the autoethnographer, as the autoethnographic researcher is estranging 
himself from the immanent and emerging practices of the social phenomenon 
– hovering to become an ‘outsider’, while, in terms of academic research, s/he 
is entering into more intimate, more analytically profound and theoretically 
abstract understandings of the social phenomena under inquiry. Here the 
vulnerability gains prominence, as this interplay of distance/closeness is 
certainly not void of emotional anxiety – a potential outcome about which the 
autoethnographic member should be consulted before the start of the project. 
In any case, the essence of the autoethnographic member, one not only a ‘key 
informant’, but a fully-fledged participant, is one of greatly improved access 
to the social phenomenon, and the sharing of voluminous personal insights 
that emerge to form novel relations among and beyond the research team in 
the course of the research activities. 
Let us also briefly consider how some of the conventional, now somewhat 
discredited (see 2.3.3), criteria for qualitative fieldwork can still inform us 
during our contemporary experiences in the field. Even though we have come 
to epistemologically eschew any stable criteria for ‘good’ or ‘more accurate’ 
fieldwork predispositions, we can yet find considerable merit in pragmatically 
utilizing some of the tenets of the more ‘positivistically’ underpinned notions 
that dominated the CCT field some two decades ago. But to be sure, for us, 
these guidelines do not produce ‘accuracy’ (in any sense), but rather a 
reflexive orientation for producing more relations among the immediate 
research team members and beyond – perhaps then allowing for more 
convincing ethnographic tales as a bonus. Indeed, using these notions as 
helpful guidelines for more relational and pluralistic fieldwork interactions, 
not as principles of validation and veracity production, can further facilitate 
reflexivity. We can build on them, not become subjugated by them! The aim is 
not to construct ‘truer’ accounts as ‘objective’ researchers – rather to foster 
techniques that can enable honest, holistic, evocative, and empathic 
storytelling (e.g. Marcus and Fischer 1986; Goodall 2000, Richardson 2000; 
Ellis and Bochner 2000; Denzin 2001a). 
For example, Wallendorf and Belk (1989) advocate for the importance of 
regular on-site (research) team interaction, to facilitate a collective and 
constant construction of the emergent design. Our research team 
compositions have made these interactions emergent, as there have always 
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been two to three team members present during all phases of fieldwork. 
Additionally, due to our focus on multi-sited or translocal ethnographic 
research, we got to travel together and share hotel rooms and other 
accommodations in various contextual settings. Also, in our case, the risk of 
groupthink becomes beneficially diminished, due to the highly different levels 
of initial researcher involvement with the social phenomenon under 
investigation. Also, as Wallendorf and Belk (1989) state, negative case 
analysis (trying to uncover evidence that does not confirm the emerging 
interpretations) became an important technique, serving to keep the natural 
enthusiasm of the researchers in check. Here we find the interplay of 
emerging interpretations between the autoethnographic and the not-initially-
immersed participant ethnographers in our research teams invaluable. As the 
autoethnographers emergently become to view what is often their passion 
from more analytic perspectives, they seem to be more than ready to criticize 
the (to them often seemingly naive) enthusiasms of the other ethnographers. 
While the ‘sufficient’ amount of diversity remains equally ambiguous as the 
question of ‘sufficient’ time spent doing fieldwork, it is our experience that 
the varying backgrounds, and especially the differing amounts of contextual 
experience among the researchers, has spurred amounts of lively discussion 
and critique of our varying interpretative reasonings – making the work, in 
and of itself, a delightful yet sometimes taxing activity of “ethnography […] 
conducted as an extreme team sport” (Sherry 2006: 268). 
In addition, coming up with diverse videographic teams can be seen as an 
inversely-oriented ‘triangulation’ across researchers, where multiple 
interpretive perspectives can arise due to the differences in researcher 
backgrounds. As an example, in conducting the BIP videographic inquiry, our 
team consisted of myself, a Finnish autoethnographic member (with 15 years 
of experience in international tournament paintball) in his early thirties, a 
Finnish member, who tried paintball for the first time during the study, also 
in his early thirties, and a French Assistant Professor in her late thirties who 
was initially relatively uninformed about the research topic. In PTS, our team 
consisted of three Finnish members in their early thirties, out of which two 
were trained ethnographers, with varying expertise in electronic music, and 
an autoethnographic member who was a prominent international notoriety in 
the cultural phenomenon, and hailed from a different university than the first 
two. Thus, we all came to learn together, or to produce something of “a 
synthesis, perhaps the dialectical product, of […] personal views and 
backgrounds” (Marcoux and Legoux 2005: 255). 
While Wallendorf and Belk (1989), at the time of their criteria-building, 
found debriefings by peers (circulating emergent research constructions with 
researchers not directly involved in the research) only marginally useful, they 
place great emphasis on the importance of member checks (auditing the 
  185 
interpretations with the informants). For them, somewhat unlike Hirschman 
(1986), informant comments can be thus used for revision, if the descriptive 
emic voice of the informants has become misinterpreted. In line with more 
contemporary thinking in CCT, Holt (1991) does mischief for this perspective 
by pointing out that the researchers’ rapport of an emic account is just 
another etic interpretation, and is thus no more credible or even sacred – 
everything becomes, in a sense, etic interpretation, and thus we cannot get 
any closer to anything more ‘real’ on the logocentric pole of a ‘positivist’ 
undertone. Yet, while always etic, by utilizing the ease of access to many 
influential participants via the autoethnographic members, we were able to 
encounter and consider a variety of viewpoints. Indeed, in PTS and PMW, we 
collected a vivid array of viewpoints from our participants by uploading a 
version of the videography to a password-protected account on the Vimeo 
online video service. This constituted another relational possibility, not to 
ensure the veracity of our interpretations, but rather to maintain an active 
global interaction between all participants. 
As we have seen in the Essence(s) chapter and also here, my epistemic 
position in terms of videographic research in CCT has moved beyond 
questions of ‘representation’ to, rather, a focus on the problematics of relation 
(see 3.3). This can be seen to be in line with the ‘7th movement’ in consumer 
research (e.g. Denzin 2001a), but also can make some early attempts to go 
beyond social constructivism, as it incorporates elements from the practice 
theoretical and radical humanist toolkit (see 2.9.1 and 2.9.2, respectively). 
Following Deleuzian (e.g. 1994a/1968) thinking, an account of a ‘system’ 
becomes impossible, for all accounts are also constituents of the emerging 
system itself. Thus, specific methodological techniques cannot act as any type 
of guarantors of privileged status of academic research. Technical expertise 
(both in terms of equipment and ethnographic method) in the field is surely 
of considerable pragmatic importance, but the ethnographic value resides in 
the diversities of interpretation and the efficacy of novel relations. Any notion 
of a stable trustworthiness, dependability, transferability, integrity and 
dependability, and the like, regarding the data or the interpretation(s) can 
probably be put to rest – the poststructural position remains in line with what 
Thompson (1990) and Holt (1991) posited already two decades ago – the 
criteria for ‘good’ research can only come in destabilized form – does it 
evocatively surprise and convince the reader (see also e.g. Goodall 2000; 
Richardson 2000; Denzin 2001a). While evocativeness and the surprise seem 
to be firmly rooted in the metaphysics of good dialectical storytelling, 
convincingness seems to constitute of making a holistic, comprehensive and 
theoretically relevant ethnographic expression – partly is can be the 
‘convincingness of sweat’. 
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Let us now briefly visit the three videographic projects that accompany this 
study. I will attempt to provide something of a workbench account how these 
projects came about, and how we emergently negotiated the most pressing 
problematics. A brief account of the theoretical outcomes is also provided, 
regarding how video, as an expressive medium, was utilized to found the 
theoretical approaches. 
 
 
4.2  Notes on ‘Brothers in Paint’: A Practice Theoretical Inquiry 
into a Tribal Marketplace Culture (BIP) 
 
• See the videography at: ‘http://vimeo.com/36543163’ (Rokka, 
Hietanen and De Valck 2010) 
 
4.2.1  Foreword 
 
What became BIP was truly a coincidental, yet a fortuitous project in 
retrospect. It was early 2008, and, at the time, I was still focused on B2B 
project marketing literature, when a fellow doctoral student Joonas Rokka 
stormed into my office, and spectacularly disclosed his newlyfound aspiration 
to conduct a videography. It was only recently that he had heard of the 
method’s existence, having been introduced to it in a CCT workshop 
conducted by Robert Kozinets. At the time (and considerably after, I must 
confess) I remained very suspicious. Rokka’s epiphany had been coming up 
with the idea to make me an autoethnographic research team member, in 
order to conduct research on the extreme team sport of paintball – a practice 
I had been closely involved with on an international level for circa ten years at 
the time. The European Championships (www.millennium-series.com) 
season was to begin in some months, and with my team Helsinki Cyclone 
(www.cyclone.fi) participating on a divisional level, it seemed like only a 
matter of purchasing a cheap video camera, and we would be all set. I was to 
assist in providing extensive access to our teams social activities, and between 
the games we were to prowl around the staging areas at the tournaments, 
(research was actively conducted in six international tournaments in all) 
looking for interesting characters to interview. What could have been more 
simple? 
 
4.2.2  Notes on Some Notable Problematics 
 
When this project got underway, we were certainly ‘born yesterday’. Neither 
of the active fieldwork participants (Hietanen and Rokka) had any substantial 
experience in video work, or for that matter, even photography. Thus, we 
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knew virtually nothing about shooting video or aesthetic composition (do we 
know today?), operated with a single cheap video camera, and had no 
previous experience on any video editing software. While the quality of the 
finished work was certainly mediocre at best, I feel surprised it turned out as 
anything at all, or even became finished in the first place. 
In addition, our idea of ethnographic fieldwork was idealistic, or naïve when 
put in more frank terms. Certainly, one of the hallmarks of videographic 
research calls for an in-depth understanding of the cultural phenomena 
under inquiry (long in situ presence), which could bring about an empathic 
relation between the researchers and other research participants. However, 
when shooting videographic footage, there are some pressing questions of 
research economics that also come into question. The pragmatics of video 
footage production in ethnographic research operates between two poles, it is 
a 1) high risk medium and 2) it is a laborious process, to analyze and to 
construct into a finalized product. Let us elaborate. 
Unlike manual fieldnote recording (and taking photographs [only] to 
elaborate findings, not to constitute them), video footage that can compiled 
into a finished work of videography comes in the form of ‘you either have it or 
you don’t’. While a textual account can be constructed by relying on 
memories of events, the construction of a convincing videography relies on 
recorded footage that, to be useful, needs to be sufficient in terms of quality, 
and audiovisually excellent to be potentially evocative. The recognition of this 
becomes largely a question of technicality, aesthetics and field site access. In 
retrospect, we can only note our considerable lack of a clear understanding of 
the role of technical (cheap amateurish equipment) and aesthetic (no 
theoretical training) considerations. What we had through myself, the 
autoethnographic participant, was access alone. And thus, while the quality 
can be now deemed as substandard when compared to any contemporary 
efforts, the relational quality allowed by great opportunities for close access to 
the consumption phenomenon, may still have some merit to it. This idea 
became carried with us to our following projects, as we came to include an 
autoethnographic participant in all our subsequent work. Additionally, we 
noticed, how our cheap equipment recorded sound in mediocre quality at 
best, but the soundtrack could be resurrected post facto by hiring the services 
of a professional sound engineer. In terms of ‘getting it or not’, this practice 
allowed for fieldwork flexibility, as we were not forced into planting lavalier 
microphones on the shirts of the participants’ we had the opportunity to 
interact with. In our experience, an ad hoc orientation of this kind seems to 
come with plentiful contextual advantages. 
In terms of the laborious nature of analyzing extensive amounts of raw 
footage, there are definite research economics questions we had to also 
negotiate. During the BIP fieldwork, we were quite uninformed about how to 
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shoot and, indeed, what to shoot. The unfortunate outcome of this ‘wetness 
behind our ears’, was that we had voluminous amounts of raw footage – over 
40 hours – yet of poor quality, and which mostly consisted of ‘overall’ 
distance shots that did not concentrate on any particular (or interesting) 
viewpoint into the consumption phenomena. Thus, while it may contradict 
some holistic notions of ethnographic field presence, we would now 
recommend that an aspiring CCT videographer will probably do well to have 
some initial ideas about what particular contextual events to shoot. Naturally, 
these ideas can, and will, change during the course of the fieldwork. 
Do to our nonspecific and uncoordinated approach to shooting footage, we 
were initially at a loss, when the time came to begin our work at the editing 
table (not to mention that we had no experience on the software beforehand). 
Yet, through what seemed like endless hours of going through the raw 
material, themes began to gradually emerge, and the very visuality of the 
medium began to direct us to practice theoretical considerations. It was, at 
the time, a year into our project, and we began to fetishize about producing a 
videographic submission for the up-and-coming ACR2009 ‘Film Festival’. 
Yet, our editing inexperience was considerable, manifesting into, at best, 
mediocre montage, going completely beyond the original schedule, and a 
deeply felt reluctance to discard any (unnecessary) shots. This amounted into 
submitting an incomplete production into ACR2009, almost missing the 
conference deadline entirely, and shipping a videography that was almost an 
hour in length (the final edition that accompanies this study is now less than 
40 minutes – adequate, but still certainly still on the lengthy side). 
Thus, our acceptance into the conference (albeit with considerable review) 
came in as a pleasant surprise, and through great pains we completely 
overhauled the entire production. While one cannot conjure up excellent 
aesthetics from poor quality footage, we felt the review round did much to 
improve the video in terms of the criteria set up by Belk and Kozinets (2006). 
Gradually, we seemed to improve our skills in critically evaluating the 
material (and thus became more readily inclined to drop unnecessary 
footage). In addition, albeit to a humble extent, we were able to improve our 
theoretization, so as to bring about some theoretical closure in the conclusion 
of the videography. 
The outcome, even if acceptable in its time (fortuitously winning the 
‘Juror’s Award’ in the ACR 2009 Film Festival), certainly looks amateurish, at 
best, in contemporary light. And while some of the aesthetic limitations can 
be attributed to our shoddy equipment, the lack of theatrical evocativeness in 
the montage cannot. The limitations in our vision, are best exemplified by our 
incapability to go beyond the traditional journal format of academic 
expression, even as we were working with an unconventional medium. Partly, 
this may have come about due to the mediocre aesthetics of the raw footage – 
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it did not invite an aesthetic consideration! Yet, mostly, it was due to our own 
incapability to challenge convention. Thus, the outcome seems like a journal 
article in an audiovisual format, focuses largely on ‘talking head’ interviews 
and is filled with ‘voice-of-god’ narration, which consists of an excessive 
mumbling that closely follows a journal publication structure. While having 
its moments (especially the more autoethnographically oriented sections 
where emotion becomes more evocatively expressed), as an account of 
practice theoretical emergence, it now seems an odd naively realist attempt 
for some implicit objectivity. At the time, however, it was the limit of our 
nascent ability, and as such expresses an interesting initial endeavor to the 
methodology. 
While they seem excessively commonsensical from a contemporary 
perspective, the following points summarize the most important lessons we 
learned in the course of producing BIP: 
 
What to take into consideration in advance: 
• Acquire adequate video recording equipment and practice extensively 
with them beforehand – no, I mean, really do experiment with them 
 
• Plan ahead for some immediate theoretical and aesthetic guidelines, 
then let these initial ideas evolve reflexively during fieldwork 
 
• Even when utilizing an autoethnographic research team member, set 
up contacts in advance – do not only rely in fortuitous contacts in the 
field 
 
What to take into consideration in the editing phase: 
• Always ask yourself: Why video? Is any particular use of the medium 
in the montage interesting and evocative as an aesthetic expression? 
Consider letting go of the conventional journal format and assuming a 
brazenly explorative stance 
 
• Be ruthless with your raw footage: Do we really need this particular 
shot? Establish an illusion of presence and communion, but be wary of 
any overt repetition of any particular perspective 
 
• Foreground visual storytelling, as it is the video footage of emergent 
social settings that does the work of convincing (perspectives in 
action), not externalized accounts of the social phenomena 
(‘interrogated’ talking heads) or overt ‘voice-of-god’ justifications 
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4.2.3  A Note on Theoretical Implications 
 
The BIP project constituted of our initial foray into the videographic 
methodology. Due to our inexperience, both in aesthetics and in constructing 
an initial theoretical orientation, the outcome can be seen to be humble at 
best. As practice theoretical thought was gaining some initial recognition at 
the time (see 2.9.1), our outcome became descriptive – how to operationalize 
a practice theoretical framework in videographic expression. We thus 
conceptualized the social practice of paintball as a multi-site activity 
(incorporating into consideration virtual online interactions as well) of a 
‘tribal’ marketplace culture (e.g. Cova and Cova 2001, 2002), where resource 
constellations and relevant socially understood meaning-makings come 
together in a ‘nexus of practice elements’. Through this conceptualization, we 
attempted to shift the notion of the ‘social as the site’ to a more translocal 
perspective, in which the nexus itself can be understood as the site, no matter 
where this ‘site’ emergently manifests in interrelated meaning-makings, 
routines and material surroundings. By further highlighting the performative 
nature of social practices – how practices become continuously renegotiated 
in dispersed translocal contexts – we were also tentatively able to investigate 
their evolutionary trajectories empirically. Thus, the nexus became a flux of 
emergent meaning-makings of practitioners, technologies, and commercial 
aspirations of marketers, all of which collectively constituted the emergent 
tribal practice. 
Although implicitly, the videographic method exemplified the emergence of 
relations of collective meaning-makings in social settings – and emergence 
difficult to describe due to the limitations of textual expression (see 3.2). This 
relation between videographic expression and the non-Cartesian ontology 
and epistemology of practice theory and non-representational theory (see 
2.9.1 and 2.9.2, respectively), will be more thoroughly foregrounded and 
explored in a future project (to be submitted to ACR 2012). 
 
  
4.3  Notes on ‘Pushing the Scene’: Tensions and Emergence in 
an Accelerated Marketplace Culture (PTS) 
 
• See the videography online: ‘http://vimeo.com/32192229’ (Hietanen, 
Rokka and Roman 2012) 
 
4.3.1  Foreword 
 
PTS was to become our second large-scale videographic project. Now, armed 
with a new confidence bolstered by our accumulated experiences and many 
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studied and recited volumes on cinematography (e.g. Deleuze 1986, 1989; 
Marks 2000; Barker 2009) and video theory (e.g. Cubitt 1991, 1993), we set 
out to conduct our first ‘real’ production. Therefore, again, little did we 
anticipate that our novel brazen hubris would bring along with it a new 
spectrum of challenges as well. 
PTS started out with substantially more forethought than the more 
haphazard BIP affair. Keeping up with the spirit of incorporating an 
autoethnographic member into our research team, we contacted my old 
friend and former university flat mate Risto Roman to discuss the conducting 
of a large-scale videographic inquiry into the social phenomena of the 
‘dubstep’ genre electronic music subculture. Refining our theoretical 
approach from the BIP videography, now primarily following Giesler’s (2008) 
notions, we had agreed to initially focus on how the ‘dubstep’ practitioners 
negotiated ‘authenticity’ in their cultural practices, thus potentially 
expressing their social relations through colliding and evolutionary ‘drama-
filled’ practices. Roman was very interested in taking part in the project as an 
autoethnographic member, and, as he (under the pseudonym ‘Desto’) had 
achieved notable international fame, he was in a prime position to set up 
contacts to allow for an unprecedented access to DJ’s, producers and other 
important agents in this marketplace of marginal ‘underground’ music 
production and consumption. A further initial focus was to highlight the non-
Cartesian underpinnings of the practice theoretical approach by empirically 
constructing a criticism of the producer/consumer dichotomy prevalent in 
consumer research. Through Desto’s extensive ability to set up contacts, we 
decided to primarily focus on what we conceptualized to be ‘powerful cultural 
agents’; famed DJ’s, producers and other cultural aficionados such as 
bloggers, record label owners and online forum administrators. 
 
4.3.2  Notes on Some Notable Problematics 
 
We acquired a whole new repertoire of video equipment for the PTS project. 
We purchased a semi-professional video camera, but on top of that, we, after 
some consultation, switched most of our video equipment into DSLR’s; digital 
photography cameras with video recording capability. While this allowed to 
record footage of considerably higher quality (by enabling exchangeable 
lenses and much more light sensitivity), it brought about a novel quagmire of 
the need to learn the pitfalls of these somewhat experimental set-ups not 
exclusively designed for video recording. This study does not boast a technical 
orientation (as one would date quickly), so it may suffice to say we 
encountered, usually in the midst of fieldwork, how to manage novel memory 
card issues (HD video needs the fastest cards [preferably ‘Level 10’]), the 
batteries swiftly draining (have spares), the cameras overheating, the 
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handling of excessively large files, the fitting and monitoring of external 
aftermarket microphones to the camera systems, and the installing and 
operating open source software hacks in our cameras to alter their 
functionality, so as to make them more video enabled (e.g. 
http://magiclantern.wikia.com). In hindsight, we would have perhaps been 
better off by investing more resources in order to purchase conventional 
dedicated video cameras. Alas, the context of filming in nightclubs and other 
low-light events required the light sensitivity only a DSLR system could 
provide with anything that resembled a reasonable price. In addition, these 
contexts were considerably loud, an obstacle we mediated by careful 
monitoring of the microphones (after some initial calamities) and 
incorporating the professional sound engineering capabilities of Desto during 
the editing phase.  
As this project moved to the editing table, sound nevertheless emerged as a 
considerable problem. And as we have seen (see 2.7.4), sound seems to 
become often overlooked in academic discourses on the moving image. For 
example, from firsthand experience, there seems to be considerable talk in 
the ACR corridors about video cameras, but far less seems to come said about 
adequate microphones and other sound recording devices. We discovered this 
in truly destructive fashion in the early stages of the PTS project, as we first 
introduced our recording equipment to very challenging settings – the 
darkness of music clubs and the associated booming noise levels. In a 
personal conversation, Robert Kozinets advised us to use ‘lavalier 
microphones’ (the small microphones attached to the participants’ shirts), 
but we decided against this practice, as we wanted to be able to freely move in 
crowded in situ contexts, without the obstructing effect of a wad of cables, 
and the potentially decontextualizing effect of attaching devices to 
participants as they were partaking in emergent and unplanned social 
practices. Thus it soon became apparent that the sound quality was 
substandard in many shots. As stated above, our rescue came in the form of 
our third author, who is a professional sound engineer, and was thus able to 
‘rescue’ many parts of the audio track. 
 
The following illustrates some of the contents of our gear bag at the time of 
the writing of this study: 
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Videography note (18): 
 
 
(From left to right, somewhat) Handytools Base-X, Rode SM3, Audio-Technica 
AT875R, Canon 60D, Sigma 18-50mm F2.8 EX DC Macro, Rode Stereo Mic, Sigma 
15mm F2.8 EX DG Diagonal Fisheye, Canon 550D/T2i, Zoom H4, Redrock/Ops 
Running Man. 
 
 
(From left to right, somewhat) Sigma 70-200mm F2.8 EX DG APO Macro HSM II, 
Canon 60D, Joby Gorillapod SLR, Silk Monopod 350, JVC GY-HM100U, Glidecam 
2000. 
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Our Canon 550D running the experimental Magic Lantern third party open source 
software (with automatic gain control [AGC] disabled, audio meters, focus peak and 
zebras), which modifies the camera into a more video enabled device. 
 
 
 
All the novel problems notwithstanding, this was our first videographic 
production where we had the privilege to utilize technical equipment, which 
boasted a degree of sophistication to allow the recording of many Deleuzian 
aesthetic notions. In terms of these aesthetics, by far the most difficult one 
seems to be the affection-image; the extreme close-up that deterritorializes 
the spatiotemporal coordinates of the moving image. The difficulty in 
producing such aesthetics has naturally much to do with the in situ settings of 
shooting ethnographic video, as it is certainly not a simple task to be able to 
record extreme close-ups of facial expressions in the emergent and unscripted 
flux of performative events. We went about this by considerably preplanning 
the camera angles, as well as utilizing advanced telescopic zoom lenses to 
record emotive images (see 2.6.2). 
As stated, we also acquired a decent video camera (JVC GY-HM100U), but 
quickly noticed its inadequacy in low light conditions (amounting into very 
granular footage). But even such shots, when used in moderation, could 
become aesthetic tools following Marks (2000; see 2.8.2) aesthetics of haptic 
visuality. As the ‘dubstep’ scene stems from an ‘underground’ and 
uncommodified ethos, a ‘rough’ visuality was also usable, in order to express 
haptic qualities. In addition, we were now able to record footage with moving 
focuses, that brought about a territorialization of the image from a texture 
blur – an expressive attempt to ‘blend’ the viewer haptically into a relational 
embodiment with the moving image. Both of these aesthetic shifts expressed 
humble attempts to bring about viewer embodiment in the agentic quality of 
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the moving image, as it races between different spatiotemporal orientations 
(see 2.8.7) 
Another important consideration was our goal to bring about some notion 
of Deleuzian relationality to the emergent events expressed in the montage. 
This called for videographic aesthetics firmly embedded in situ, in events of 
cultural production, but with a relational twist. We wished to make interview 
settings not into the aforementioned ‘interrogations’ that externalize the 
cultural phenomena, but rather into conversations where Desto took an active 
role. This made them into loci where the cultural marketplace of ‘dubstep’ 
itself is emergently and relationally negotiated and expressed – not mere 
objectified accounts of them. 
Our aspirations for relational expression also amounted to another critique 
of a realist conception of moving image data. As stated earlier (see 2.6.1), here 
we made an effort to express the emergent artificiality of every ‘camera eye’s’ 
perspective and, thus, to emphasize the performative nature of every cultural 
context by making the presence of the ‘camera eye’ explicit (see also 
Videography Note 5 in 2.6.1). Following Marks (2000), it was our intention 
to, as ethnographers, not to only fetishize the cultural context, but to also 
reveal the fetishistic relation of the camera (see also Žižek 2006) and the 
research team, within the hermeneutic spiraling of our ongoing 
interpretations. We hoped to potentially bring about an expression of the 
emergent relationality of every cultural performance – with us as researchers, 
and the culturally embedded participants in emergent interaction with the 
spatiotemporal settings and meaning-makings. 
Another focus we wished to improve upon from BIP, consisted of our take 
on the narrative storyline we were expressing. We wished to make some 
breaks from the ‘journalesque’ structure, which we generally followed in BIP, 
so as to incorporate elements of potentially evocative storytelling to the 
montage. As we have seen from a Deleuzian perspective, the power of the 
moving image consists of making us ‘think the unthinkable’ by presenting us 
with convincing worlds of false temporal connections (see 2.5.1). In a humble 
way, this notion gave us permission to rearrange our ethnographic narrative, 
to not follow a temporal scheme, but rather, a scheme of our ethnographic 
understandings. To exemplify this, the PTS videography follows a fictive 
‘ethnographic road-trip’ form, even as the events did not follow such 
temporal sequences (e.g. we visited the New York scene before London, and 
the events recorded in Helsinki took place throughout the research, not 
before as the videography expresses). We, albeit in a humble way, liberated 
time to strengthen our ‘truth effects’ (Shankar and Patterson 2001) and the 
arc-of-drama. Likewise, the interview-events recorded in New York express 
an ongoing conversation with the DJ/producers in the ‘Dub War’ 5th 
anniversary party, even though some of the interview events occurred after 
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the party had already seceded. We thus attempted, with these aesthetic 
considerations, to expressively increase the relationality and the immanence 
of cultural phenomena underlying our theoretical argument of ‘cultural 
acceleration’. In addition, we hoped to further express the relational break-
down of a linear temporal scheme, by blending the transitions in the latter 
part of the montage, so as to highlight how the different locales of the 
accelerated marketplace all blend together in a flux of events, affects and 
performative emergence. 
 
Thus, in comparison to BIP the lessons to be learned from PTS had now 
become considerably refined: 
 
What to take into consideration in advance: 
• With more sophisticated equipment, the technological expertise 
required to maintain and run them increases considerably: practice 
(this time I really mean it) with your new equipment in advance 
 
• Scene management – when operating in difficult shooting conditions, 
both the use of specialized equipment, and some work of preplanning 
camera angles, can enable the recording of evocative aesthetics (so as 
to produce some forms of Deleuzian cinema aesthetics) 
 
• Think ahead of different types of aesthetics that you need to record to 
come up with footage that can be utilized in a Deleuzian schemata 
 
 
What to take into consideration in the editing phase: 
• Constructing a montage from unconventional interview settings and 
focusing on their aesthetic expression to bring out the most relational 
use of the medium 
 
• Constructing creative and nonlinear time to bring about a potentially 
evocative narrative – Thus going beyond the medium and reflexively 
considering the efficacy the videography could have in terms of its 
relation with the audience(s) 
 
4.3.3  A Note on Theoretical Implications 
 
In PTS, we construct a notion of an ‘accelerated marketplace’ to define the 
rapid flux of events negotiated in the practices of the ‘dubstep’ electronic 
music culture, which is mediated by the instancy of the global reach of the 
Internet. Musical scenes had been commonly researched by exploring their 
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marketplace structures, for example, the relations between producers, 
intermediaries and consumers. In our emergent, fast-paced and translocal 
context such boundaries had become ambiguous. 
We thus interpret cultural practices that ‘powerful cultural agents’ employ, 
in order to negotiate and maintain their cultural positions, in the flux of 
events they no longer seem to be able to control – while at the same time 
expressing an infatuation for the liberating potential of the global reach of 
Internet-mediated technologies. Thus, we construct categories of social 
practices, such as 1) practices of maintaining a connection with audiences in 
an accelerated marketplace, 2) practices of controlling accelerated cultural 
knowledge and 3) practices of balancing off the profit motive and 
foundational nomadism.  
These tensions become emergently negotiated, but seem to entail a 
disenchanment in the emergent breakdown of stable cultural scripts. Could 
this be the flipside of the liberating promise of postmodernism (e.g. Firat and 
Venkatesh 1995)? As the powerful cultural agents had lost much of their 
cultural authority in the accelerated flux of globally dispersed cultural 
emergence, they seemed to have lost much of their passion regarding the 
cultural practice itself. They seemed to have become ‘cultural nomads’, now 
only temporarily attached to its social practices. The lack of control in the 
‘accelerated marketplace’ now had become to allow them only to desperately 
cling onto cultural resources and scripts – a seemingly disenchanted 
maintaining of the prevailing order, thus the reconstructing and allowing the 
cycle of acceleration to remain intact. 
 
 
4.4.  Notes on ‘Post-Materialist Work’: Dreams as Fetishes 
(PMW) 
 
• See the videography at: ‘http://vimeo.com/30893212’ (Hietanen and 
Uotila 2012) 
 
4.4.1  Foreword 
 
PMW consisted of a project that was quite dissimilar to both BIP and PTS. It 
was the first outcome of a Master’s Thesis seminar I had been assigned to 
conduct – the first of its kind, where the students produced their Master’s 
Thesis work as videographies. PMW was not originally produced as CCT 
research; not in the least. It was the pioneering handiwork of Hannu Uotila, a 
master’s student from the Aalto University Department of Entrepreneurship, 
who took up the video challenge due to his expertise with the video medium, 
 198 
as he was the CEO of a music video production company that he had 
personally founded. 
Thus, while Uotila had shot the footage and constructed a videography for 
the Department of Entrepreneurship, we decided to use the same material 
and bring it into the CCT discourse. After much deliberation, we moved on to 
reconstruct the material with a focus on the consumption of one’s vocation, 
and after the first review round in ACR 2011, we moved further to bring about 
views from critical theory and a dialectical interpretation of the tensions our 
participants had to negotiate in their professional life. 
The interesting challenge in this project thus had, for my part, very little to 
do with shooting footage (even though I did participate in the settings of 
music video productions to shoot some background footage). Indeed, this was 
primarily Uotila’s project, but it was up to me to reconstruct it theoretically 
into a CCT videography. This work brought about novel interesting 
perspectives to storytelling, as the same footage thus emerged to tell an 
academic story through both entrepreneurship as well as a CCT framework. 
 
4.4.2  Notes on Some Notable Problematics 
 
Changing the story of this video footage, originally shot to be utilized in the 
field of entrepreneurship, entailed the usual work of thoroughly going over 
the material and in-depth discussions with Uotila, the autoethnographic 
research team member. I had recently become interested in critical theory 
and what had become conceptualized as the ‘7th movement’ in consumer 
research (e.g. Denzin 2001a), and thus we decided to foreground the dialectic 
of one’s vocation, from the perspective of aspiration that is negotiated 
between a longing for a creative freedom, but simultaneously subjugated by 
the need to scuffle in ‘mainstream’ projects, so as to maintain one’s business 
and monetary pursuits in the capitalist marketplace. 
Administering a Master’s Thesis seminar, where the students conducted 
their research as videographies, was not without its administrative problems. 
Indeed, the fact that the project got underway at all in the first place is a 
testimony to the forward thinking of our department head Henrikki 
Tikkanen. Similarly to the Consumption, Markets and Culture special DVD 
issues (see Appendix 2), it was agreed that a written piece was required to 
serve as a theoretical companion to the videography. Thus, in effect, the brave 
souls doing their pioneering Master’s Thesis research in video medium came 
to effectively do twice (if not exceedingly more) the work, when compared to a 
traditional thesis report. The students’ persistent aspiration to submit all the 
finalized videographies to ACR also reveals their unfaltering dedication. 
There were some preconditions, however. All the students in the group had 
extensive experience in video work, and thus they were all relatively 
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comfortable with the medium. My position thus became one of a provider of 
theoretical orientations for their work. There were no stringent rules, so we 
had to negotiate problems on-the-go. 
Following the orientation of all our videographic projects, I directed the 
students to work on something autoethnographic with a keen reflexive eye. In 
terms of Uotila’s work, this seemingly worked especially well, as he 
wholeheartedly agreed with the dialectical outcome of the study, as it became 
converted into a CCT framework. As an instructor, this brought about its own 
problematics – I had to become empathically invested in the students’ work, 
in effect, to become a participant in their research myself. This entailed 
considerably more than the lending of some video equipment, but taking part 
in their research contexts and even spending time in their homes to 
participate in the evaluation and editing of their video footage. I must add 
that this participation was by no means unidirectional, as I was lucky to learn 
voluminous amounts about video production by observing their professional 
expertise with the video media. 
 
In comparison to BIP and PTS the lessons to be learned from PMW have 
more to do with the admitration of the novel Master’s Thesis seminar itself: 
 
• Administering a group of video professionals conducting videography 
research is not the running a Master’s Thesis seminar in any 
traditional sense, its about participating as an empathic and invested 
member in each project to the best of one’s ability. 
 
• Always tell the (autoethnographic) students to be reflexive and 
introspective about their context, but also about the use of video 
medium itself. Indeed, why video? What would be the most relational 
use of the medium? 
 
4.4.3  A Note on Theoretical Implications 
 
Reworking the story, so as to follow our emerging interest in critical theory in 
CCT (e.g.; Murray and Ozanne 1991, 1993; see also Denzin 1995, 2001a; 
Horkheimer and Adorno 2002/1987), made us focus exclusively on a 
dialectical interpretation. Thus, we produced one the first (to our knowledge) 
videography in CCT that specifically followed the ‘7th movement’ espoused by 
Denzin (2001a; see also Clifford and Marcus 1986). Our footage seemed to 
continuously tell us a story of video professionals with creative aspirations for 
expressive freedom, only to be subjugated by the necessities of the capitalist 
marketplace, which encouraged practices of ‘selling out’, and producing video 
work that would appeal to the commoditized mainstream tastes. 
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While these creative aspirations can be conceptually constructed as ‘post-
materialist’ (e.g. McLarney and Chung 1999), it seemed that the capitalist 
marketplace hindered such aspirations by monetarily rewarding 
commoditized and non-artistic ‘mainstream’ video productions, which our 
participants were forced to produce to eke out a living. When speaking about 
this tension, our participants often reverted into what we conceptualized as a 
‘heroic narrative of one’s striving’, which maintained a fetishistic narrative of 
a future, in which they would eventually get the chance to fulfill their creative 
and artistic (and often not commercially-oriented) aspirations. 
Thus, it seemed that these creative and artistic aspirations functioned as an 
impossible fetishistic pursuit, one that maintains one’s striving, but can never 
be achieved (see also Žižek 1999). While one can exercise creativity in one’s 
work, in the video industry it seems to assume a sanitized nature, which one 
must bear and maintain by negotiating the fetish of a future where one could 
be emancipated from this burden. The videography ends in an attempt for a 
relational message, as we ask the viewer to ponder: ‘in the contemporary 
capitalist society, what keeps you aspiring – what is the fetish you make do 
with?’ 
 
 
“Our projects must show how human beings endure and prevail in the face of those 
technological structures which threaten to erase forever the fragile, sacred self and 
the few remaining spaces it occupies in this horrible and terrifying world we call the 
postmodern. And it is with downcast eyes we must now look” (Denzin 1995: 218) 
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Appendix 1 
 
Examples of discussion threads on Internet discussion forums about our 
videographic projects: 
 
 
Pushing the Scene (PTS) 
 
Step Ahead forum (http://stepahead.fi/) 
http://www.stepahead.fi/YaBB.pl?num=1321437057 
 
Dubstep forum (http://dubstepforum.com/) 
http://www.dubstepforum.com/viewtopic.php?f=1&t=224888&hilit=pushing 
 
 
Brothers in Paint (BIP)  
 
Paintball Nation forum (http://pbnation.com/) 
http://www.pbnation.com/showthread.php?t=3332994 
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Appendix 2  To  gain  a more established  footing on extant  videographic work  in CCT,  I  examined  the videographic publications of the two Consumption, Markets and Culture Special DVD issues (Vol.  8,  2005;  Vol.  10,  2007).  Thus,  I  can  provide  a  table  summarizing  the  research  as follows:  
Context  Author(s) 
Points of 
theoretical 
contribution  Use of video  CCT Domain 
Marketing 
domain Macintosh as a quasi‐religious brand cult among avid users 
Belk and Tumbat (2005)  Brand cults with an all‐encompassing role in life ‐ Consumerism in the form of sacred devotion with a secular focus 
Video used exclusively for collecting interview data which was then transcribed  
Marketplace Cultures + Mass‐Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers’ Interpretive Strategies 
Brand communities 
Background music as a bohemian romantic experience negotiated by musicians 
Bradshaw, McDonaugh, Marshall and Bradshaw (2005) 
Contemporary muzak as performance versus composition ‐ Marginal‐mainstream tension negotiated by artists who perform music for non‐romantic commercial ends 
No video, textual account accompanied by an audiotape to "enrich the listener’s perception" 
Consumer Identity Projects  Identity and consumption 
Subcultural market resistance in tattooing practices from the perspective of tattoo artists 
Bengtsson, Ostberg and Kjeldgaard (2005) 
Marginal‐mainstream tension between perceptions of sacred and profane ‐ commercialization as the Other through which the marginal defines itself 
Textual account as supplementary to the videography, video utilized in participant observation and the visualization of cultural symbols 
Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects 
Consumption cultures, Identity and consumption 
Cross‐cultural analysis of consumers' perceptions of ethical consumption and its influence on purchasing behavior 
Belk, Devinney and Eckhardt (2005)  Disconnect of consumer rationale and behavior ‐ Consumer perceptions of ethical importance influenced purchasing behavior to a limited extent 
Video utilized to record in‐depth interviews, video used to illustrate the results, text to provide a conceptual foundation 
Marketplace Cultures + Mass‐Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers’ Interpretive Strategies 
Consumption cultures, Consumer ethics, Business ethics 
Tension in the changing socioeconomic status of women in a traditional Greek context through globalizing forces of tourism 
Costa (2005)  The dynamic effect of tourism and the subsequent global materialist culture on traditional values and gender relations in a traditional culture ‐ women assuming novel cultural roles 
The nature of the video not explicitly addressed  Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects 
Tourism, Identity and consumption, Gender studies 
World holidays as global versus local culture 
Kimura and Belk (2005)  Local adaptation and hybridization of global holiday discourses 
Video utilized for contextual participant observation, videography contains extensive narration 
Marketplace Cultures + Mass‐Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers’ Interpretive Strategies 
Globalization of consumption 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Context  Author(s) 
Points of 
theoretical 
contribution  Use of video  CCT Domain 
Marketing 
domain Commercialization of perceived sacredness in the context of the 9/11 ground zero through selling of merchandize 
Marcoux and Legoux (2005)  Commoditization of a place, social phenomenon transformed and reduced into commercial artifact 
Videography as stand‐alone academic publication, textual account problemitizes videography in academia ‐ video used for interviews and participant observation, camera as "part of the action" 
Marketplace cultures  Consumption cultures, Identity and consumption 
Freedom and unfreedom of consumption in subaltern consumers 
Vikas and Varman (2007)  Critique of capitalism regarding the mirage of freedom in consumption ‐ requirement of resources in order to achieve freedom in global markets 
Videography conducted to aid understanding by adding richness and depth. Video footage from interviews and participant observation in situ 
The Sociohistoric Patterning of Consumption + Mass‐Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers’ Interpretive Strategies 
Critical marketing 
Global brands in local contexts, influence of global coffee culture in the Scandinavian marketplace 
Kjeldgaard and Ostberg (2007)  Furthering the discourse of the glocalizing nature of MNC brands, local and global brands found co‐existing without considerable tension. 
Video as a supplement to other forms of ethnographic data gathering, used to record spatial settings only 
Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects 
Consumption cultures 
Ritualistic consumption practices in the context of heavy metal music 
Henry and Caldwell (2007)  Catharsis through collective rituals ‐ facilitating emancipation from the mundane and moral justification through positive reevaluation of self 
Video used occasionally in interviews and also for participant observation in situ 
Marketplace Cultures + Consumer Identity Projects 
Consumption cultures 
Practices of deviant consumer behavior in the context of homeless children 
Varman and Vikas (2007)  A humanistic Kantian criticism of the utilitarian ethics of neoliberal markets 
Video used exclusively for collecting interview data, thus capturing "rich temporal and non‐verbal details"  
The Sociohistoric Patterning of Consumption + Mass‐Mediated Marketplace Ideologies and Consumers’ Interpretive Strategies 
Critical marketing 
Life stories of informants related to domestic disorganization and clutter in a materialistic culture 
Belk, Seo, Li (2007)  The deep symbolic meanings of attachment to possessions, the relationship with clutter and the notion of dirty are explored 
The role of videography is not explicated  Consumer Identity Projects  Identity and consumption 
Cross‐cultural consumption related identity projects of 'contemporary young mainstream female achievers' (CYMFA) 
Caldwell, Kleppe and Henry (2007)  Culture spanning inclination of CYMFAs incorporating multiple gender role identities in order to operate in various gender role domains 
Vidography as a 'supplement' to text, yet providing broad accounts including interviews and participant observation in situ over several days. 
Consumer Identity Projects  Identity and consumption, Gender studies 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Context  Author(s) 
Points of 
theoretical 
contribution  Use of video  CCT Domain 
Marketing 
domain Meaning‐makings and individual justifications of fandom and fan culture in consumption 
Smith, Fisher and Cole (2007)  The consumers' usage, acceptance and refusal of stigmatization in practices of fanatic consumption (fandom) 
Video seen as a way of producing thicker first‐person emic accounts in situ, making video superior in subsequent interpretative analysis. 
Consumer Identity Projects  Identity and consumption 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 “He was too tough to experience disappointments and resentment – negative affections. In this nihilist fin‐de‐siècle, he was affirmation. Right through to illness and death. Why did I speak of him in the past? He laughed. He is laughing. He is here. It’s your sadness, idiot, he’d say”  Jean‐François Lyotard on Deleuze’s suicide in Le Monde 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